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The aim of this study was to investigate the relevance of African Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (AIKS) in contemporary conflict transformation with 
specific reference to the chieftaincy of the Bakweri people of the South West 
Region of Cameroon. The study population comprised of Bakweri indigenes as 
well as settlers and other short-term residents in the district of Buea such as 
students, business people and government employees. Taking into 
consideration the holistic and community-based nature of indigenous 
knowledge systems, interactive research methods such as in-depth interviews, 
participant observation, and focus group discussions were used data collection. 
The qualitative data from both the primary and secondary sources were 
analysed through content analysis. A combination  of theoretical  frameworks  
were used  to analyse  the  challenges and prospects of  using  Indigenous  
Knowledge  Systems  (IKS) in  contemporary  conflict transformation among 
the  Bakweri  people in  Buea.  These included endogenous development, the 
postcolonial theory, the modernisation theory and the concept of integralism. 
 
The  study  revealed  that  due to the political, social, economic  and cultural  
significance  of  the  Buea, the  contemporary  conflict issues among the  
Bakweri  people  arose  from  land,  marriage, crime, corruption and those 
associated with the proliferation of Pentecostal churches. It was also found that 
although the Bakweri people have a rich history of indigenous institutions, the 
most resilient of these, even in contemporary times, is the chieftaincy. The 
institution is very central to the cultural, economic and political ethos of local 
communities. In spite of this, the Bakweri chieftaincy and associated 
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indigenous institutions tended to be marginalised by the state in the search for 
sustainable solutions to contemporary conflicts. The policy makers did not take 
the chieftaincy seriously in policy implementation.  
 
The Bakweri chieftaincy and associated indigenous institutions had certain 
limitations which undermined their relevance in mitigating contemporary 
conflicts. These included the appointment of chiefs by the state, the system 
being dominated by the French bureaucratic system which marginalized African 
traditional leadership systems, rent-seeking, the patriarchal nature of the 
Bakweri customary law and the impact of heterogeneity on Bakweri culture. 
This is compounded by the fact that state-based structures are laden with 
excessive bureaucratic red tapes, corruption, low morale and a culture of 
impunity in the civil service.  
 
The study recommended the need for conflict resolution mechanisms to adopt 
a bottom-up approach and for governments to empower indigenous structures 
to resolve their own conflicts. There is also need for further research using 
different cases, on the relevance of indigenous approaches to conflict 
transformation in the era of globalisation in order to build on or challenge 
existing theories.  Furthermore, traditional institutions have to be interfaced with 
modern institutions to meet the contemporary challenges arising from 
globalization.     






1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
There has been a persistence and apparent increase both in frequency and in 
scope, in the number of intra-state conflicts over the past two decades on the 
African continent (Miguel, 2004:727). Contemporary conflict hotspots on the 
continent include religious extremism in Nigeria, terrorism in Kenya and 
Somalia, political turmoil in Libya and Egypt and sectarian violence in the 
Central African Republic (Ferim, 2014). These indicate a gradual shift from 
traditional conflicts in Africa which were predominantly characterised by among 
others, inter-tribal wars, conflicts over grazing land, marital disputes, 
superstition and witchcraft (Kohnert, 2003; Peters, 2004). The upsurge of new 
forms and sources of conflict such as terrorism, inter-religious violence, 
resource wars, migration and refugees in Africa is a litmus test to the 
continent‘s capacity to transform them. This has necessitated the post-colonial 
state in Africa to continuously embark on the search for effective and 
sustainable mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolve its numerous 
conflicts. 
 
Conflict transformation is considered ―as a process by which conflicts are 
transformed into peaceful outcomes. It differs from conflict resolution and 
conflict management approaches in that it recognises that contemporary 
conflicts cannot be resolved simply through the reframing of positions and the 
identification of win-win outcomes‖ (Miall, 2004:3). The author further maintains 
that once relationships have been strained, tensions between parties remain 
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protracted and usually serve as the bedrock for future violent conflicts. It is 
against this backdrop that conflict transformation entails ―the process of 
engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and if 
necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of 
violent conflict‖ (Miall, 2004:4). It thus encompasses conflict prevention, conflict 
management and conflict resolution mechanisms. Attempts at achieving 
effective conflict transformation in Africa have at times been sought in the 
continent‘s indigenous knowledge systems.  
 
Indigenous knowledge systems refer to the holistic practices of indigenous 
peoples which are handed down usually orally from one generation to another 
(Ajibade, 2003). It is the outcome of a combination of generations of 
observations, experiments and experiences that enhanced the survival of 
peoples (Grenier, 1998:1-5). As Hammersmith (2007:34) states, ―IK is stored in 
peoples‘ memories and activities, expressed in stories, songs, folklore, 
proverbs, dances, myths, cultural values, beliefs, rituals, local language and 
taxonomy, agricultural practices, equipment, materials, plant species and 
animal breeds‖. However, indigenous knowledge is not static but adapts and 
readapts to changing times and circumstances, making it ideal for the 
transformation of even complex conflicts. It is the fluidity and ethnographic 
nature of AIKS that makes it difficult for it to be codified and hence generalised. 
Studies in AIKS are thus largely relevant to a particular case at a particular 
point in time. As Brettle (2012) posits, ―by attempting to codify it, ethnographers 
run the risk of framing it within their own individualised world-view, confining it 
in ways and words that perhaps run counter to, and distort its very essence‖. 
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There is an abundance of literature on the use of IKS in preventing, managing 
and resolving conflicts across the world. In Canada for instance, the Aborigines 
have ―developed a unique cultural and spiritual connection with the land and an 
intimate knowledge of the forest and other ecosystems and their traditional way 
of life is based on the idea of using and managing the resource so that it will 
last in perpetuity. It stands to reason that their ecological knowledge can 
contribute to sustainable forest management practices‖ (Natural Resources 
Canada, 1997). Additionally, Kiene (2006:1) argues that ―for centuries, 
European traditional rural societies have been preserving their own systems of 
knowledge, especially about natural resource management and agriculture‖. 
The author documents how local farming communities in France and Germany 
maintain complex ecosystems and diversify plant and animal breeds to 
generate local agricultural foodstuffs.  
 
Tadese (2010) on the other hand, documents how unmarried Somali women 
for instance, practise the Heerin tradition, which involves visiting the village of 
an enemy clan and contracting marriages with suitable males, thereby uniting 
and bringing peace between both warring villages. Documenting the role of 
indigenous courts in transitional justice, Zeleke (2010) explores the role of the 
shrine of Tiru Sina and the court of the Sheiks at the shrine known as the 
Shakoch Chilot. This is a traditional institution of conflict resolution in the 
Oromiya Zone in Ethiopia which has legal recognition from both the local and 
central government. As per the author‘s narrative, cases tried by the Court of 
the Sheiks are held under a big Podocarpus tree and can number up to 50 per 
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month, a figure that is by far greater than that those handled by the local state 
court. Even though the Ethiopian Constitution limits the powers of customary 
law courts to family and private matters following the consent of the parties to a 
dispute, the Court of the Sheiks handles a much wider range of conflicts, 
including theft, homicide and inter-ethnic conflicts. The three main spiritual 
elements used in trying cases are blessing, cursing and oath-taking.  
 
AIKS also continue to play an important role within local communities in 
addressing challenges of food security, especially in contemporary times. 
Authors such as Eifediyi et al. (2008) and Olatokun and Ayanbode (2008) have 
documented the role of rural women in the cultivation of indigenous vegetables 
both for nutritional as well as medicinal uses in Nigeria. The authors document 
a wide cultivation of indigenous plants such as Bitter leaf (Vernonia Amydalina), 
Moringa Olefera, Water leaf (Talinium Triangulare) and Green (Amaranthus 
Hybridus) in South West Nigeria. These plants are used by local communities 
to among others, cure illnesses in children, treat malaria, high blood pressure, 
dysentery and also act as a rich source of vitamins to community members.  
 
Noting the contribution of IKS to sustainable community livelihoods, the 
declaration by the World Conference on Science held in Hungary in 1999 
states that: 
―Traditional societies, many of them with strong cultural roots, have 
nurtured and refined systems of knowledge of their own, relating to 
such diverse domains as astronomy, meteorology, geology, ecology, 
botany, agriculture, physiology, psychology and health. Such 
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knowledge systems represent an enormous wealth. Not only do they 
harbour information as yet unknown to modem science, but they are 
also expressions of other ways of living in the world, other relationships 
between society and nature, and other approaches to the acquisition 
and construction of knowledge. Special action must be taken to 
conserve and cultivate this h-agile and diverse world heritage, in the 
face of globalisation and the growing dominance of a single view of the 
natural world as espoused by science. A closer linkage between 
science and other knowledge systems is expected to bring important 
advantages to both sides.‖ 
 
There has been, however, much contestation regarding the efficacy of African 
indigenous approaches to contemporary conflicts. This is due to various 
factors, including the heterogeneity of African societies and the sources of 
conflicts emanating from global challenges beyond the capabilities of local 
community ways of knowing and value systems. One of the major challenges to 
Africa‘s IKS has thus been the encroachment of globalisation. This has 
undermined and in some instances, replaced the continent‘s knowledge 
systems with Western ones, creating what Ntuli (2002:53) refers to as the 
Balkanisation of Africa. Successive generations of Africans have for the most 
part, been assimilated into the age of quantum physics, laser technology and 
consumerism which is characteristic of Western societies. Western values of 
individual rights, freedom of speech, gender equality, monogamy and even 
communication technologies such as Facebook and WhatsApp, have 
undermined the collective and communal mode of production that was 
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characteristic of African traditional societies. This trend seems to be irresistible 
as it is argued in Modernisation theory that modernisation is irreversible 
(Chazan et al., 1999). This has put a big question mark on the relevance of 
Africa‘s IKS in contemporary times.  
 
Some researchers such as Briggs (2005) have even questioned indigenous 
knowledge as a knowledge system. That notwithstanding, Elechi et al. 
(2010:73-74) maintain that ―although African cultures are diverse and, 
moreover, have been tempered by external cultural influences and colonialism, 
there remain certain tenets of African culture that have survived, to which we 
can refer as African culture. Again, no culture is static, and African societies 
have had to borrow from others to enhance their viability and adaptability to 
technological and economic changes‖. It is on the basis of this consideration 
that the following section grapples with the concept of indigenous knowledge 
within the context of knowledge systems. 
 
1.1.1 Indigenous Knowledge within the Context of Knowledge Systems 
Green (2008) reveals the tension which exists in western scholars‘ 
acknowledgment of indigenous knowledge as knowledge in its own right. This 
has created a challenge in the effort to interface the two divergent systems of 
knowing in  Africa  for sustainable  livelihood and development,  including  
transformation  of  contemporary  conflict  in  Africa. Therefore, any effort to 
integrate the two systems should begin with an examination of what knowledge 
is all about in order to facilitate a process of generating a knowledge system 
which will encompass both systems (Akpan, 2011). 
 7 
 
The concept of knowledge has various faces, some of which are religious as 
they tend to embrace spirituality. This has been separated from western 
knowledge systems in mainstream debates. This is elaborated by Gyekye 
(1997) who maintains that while millions of human beings regard knowledge of 
the spirit world as the lynchpin of their whole orientation in this world, spirituality 
is increasingly being neglected in the education and lives of younger 
generations. It has been argued that the marginalisation of spirituality as part of 
knowledge is a major factor in the moral degeneration that has engulfed the 
modern world (Ellis, 2012). For some western scholars, knowledge is 
attributable essentially to the individual. Davenport and Prusak (1998) consider 
knowledge as a fluid mix of framed experiences, contextual information, value 
and expert insight that provide a framework for assessing and integrating new 
skills and information. This framework considers knowledge constructed by any 
individual as valid knowledge. This view implies that everyone is essentially a 
knowledge producer without looking at its social and cultural context.  
 
Dewey (2008), however, emphasises the changing character of knowledge. 
Knowledge continues to change as new relationships are created with every 
new situation that presents itself. Dewey (2008) further elaborates on the power 
and the interconnected character of knowledge. According to him, knowledge 
as power has allowed those with the knowledge, or with the power, to decide 
what knowledge should be in the public domain and how it can be utilised to 
dominate others. Van Dijk (2003) states that knowledge is institutionalised 
when directed and controlled by the dominant group(s) in society. This gives 
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the dominant group/s the power to decide what knowledge should be in the 
public space and what knowledge should not be in the public space. This 
implies that the majority of people who are not part of the dominant group are 
simply controlled through the knowledge they are allowed to access. For 
instance, under colonialism and the apartheid system in South Africa, the 
different racial groups remained separate and had different levels of access to 
knowledge depending on their racial categorisation in the apartheid social 
engineering. In spite  of their  numerical minority, whites  as the  dominant  race  
in apartheid  South Africa,  had more  access to knowledge, especially modern 
scientific and technological knowledge than blacks. Since the white minority 
controlled the state and all other institutions of society, including education, the 
judiciary and the media, the laws promulgated under this perspective made 
South Africa thrive as an apartheid state owing to the ignorance allowed by the 
state. State intervention in allocating people of different social groupings 
different resources and opportunities cemented the belief in the superiority of 
white people in the country (MacDonald, 2006).  
 
Jessop (2007) illustrates the way knowledge has been used as a commodity 
under capitalist relations. The author argues that the innovations and 
technologies protected under intellectual property rights have afforded those 
who own and control the major means of production with particular knowledge 
of a monopoly on inventions and business. This contention is elaborated by 
Lankshear et al. (2000) who question that if knowledge is tied to intellectual 
property rights, one has to interrogate the value of the knowledge transmitted in 
curricula in educational systems. The acquisition of this knowledge at various 
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formal educational levels, including higher education, has become a 
commercial undertaking as formal education is becoming unaffordable to many 
people. Choo (2002) states that what was traditionally a conversation between 
people exchanging information in formal settings, has become commercialised 
to the point where those who do not have the means to acquire information, are 
likely to remain outside the knowledge system. Marginson (2004) adds that 
institutions of higher learning are becoming more and more expensive, hence 
running the risk of reproducing social hierarchies, because only those with 
money will be capable of affording formal education, especially higher 
education. 
 
The domination of individuals, social groups and nations over others has not 
always been based on brute force but rather on the knowledge at their disposal 
and on the innovation and creativity they bring to bear in using their knowledge. 
―Ideally, perfect knowledge is one that presents a network of interconnections 
where all experiences are valued and seen as contributing to knowledge 
already accumulated in order to solve problems in new contexts. This 
knowledge is acquired through experience and by studying what others have 
ascertained and recorded‖ (Dewey, 2008). However, in spite of the earlier 
argument that knowledge is a by-product of power relations, Allen (2014) 
argues that knowledge does not in itself have power. Rather, power is 
generated as a consequence of knowledge. For instance, western scientific 
knowledge, as knowledge that is currently dominant, has power. The relevance 
and importance of knowledge to any society, therefore, breeds authority and 
begets power.  
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1.1.2 Knowledge within the Context of Indigenous Knowledge Systems 
Odora Hoppers and Makhale-Mahlangu (1998) consider knowledge within the 
context of indigenous knowledge systems as being a combination of 
technology, social, economic and philosophical learning, and systems of 
education, law and governance. It is knowledge relating to technological, social, 
institutional, scientific and developmental experiences, together with 
experiences deriving from liberation struggles. Serote (1998) adds that 
indigenous knowledge systems involve human experiences that are organised, 
ordered and accumulated as knowledge that can be used to achieve quality of 
life and to create a liveable environment for both human and other forms of life. 
This conceptualisation of IKS includes all forms of knowledge technologies, 
know-how, skills, practices and beliefs that allow the community to attain 
steady livelihoods in their setting. Nakashima et al. (2000) posit that IKS, 
sometimes known as indigenous sciences, present themselves holistically as 
knowledge deeply tied to the earth and everything in it. They are forms of 
knowledge systems that value all human experiences. This knowledge is 
generally held by indigenous people and transmitted mainly orally. 
 
Cajete (2000:79) defines native science as ―a celebration of renewal, where the 
ultimate aim of the knowledge is not to explain and objectify the universe, but it 
is rather learning about and understanding responsibilities and relationships 
and celebrating those that humans establish with the world‖. According to Doe 
(2009:8), ―indigenisation is the process of enabling people to reflect upon their 
own practices, identify their own resources, and cultivate their own sources of 
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power to heal themselves, reconcile their society, and build new institutions or 
transform old ones so that they respond to their new challenges and needs‖. 
Such practices, resources, structures and processes are inherent in all 
societies, with African local communities being no exception. Indigenous 
mechanisms are ―unique, informal, communal, restorative, context-specific and 
diverse‖ (Mutisi, 2009:18). In Africa, communities have utilised indigenous 
mechanisms to transform all forms of conflict long before the advent of the 
modern state. Such knowledge systems ―have been practised for an extended 
period and have evolved within African societies rather than being the product 
of external importation‖ (Zartman, 2000).  
 
It is the view in this study that due to Africa‘s integration in the global political 
economy, the continent has emerged as one of the most contested spaces in 
international politics. In addition to its traditional significance as the hub of raw 
materials, the continent is playing an increasing role as a market for finished 
products from the industrialised world and also serves as a strategic base in 
global geo-politics. Moreover, the emergence and persistence of different forms 
of conflicts such as religious fundamentalism and sectarianism has also made 
Africa the focus of international discourses. With the prevalence of poverty, 
underdevelopment and lack of capacity to address its conflicts, the continent 
thus plays host to the largest number of multilateral peacekeeping and state 
reconstruction agencies in the world (Doe, 2009). This internationalisation of 
Africa‘s conflict transformation architecture places Africa‘s indigenous 
knowledge systems at risk of being overshadowed by exogenous approaches. 
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There is thus a risk for the implementation of approaches that are not culturally 
relevant and thus not acceptable by the majority of people concerned.  
 
1.1.3 The Case for a More Culturally Relevant Approach to Conflicts 
A case is made in this study for Afrocentrism as a more culturally relevant 
approach and a more sustainable path to conflict transformation in Africa. 
Afrocentrism advocates the promotion of a more Africa-centred paradigm which 
is reflective of the customs and traditions of African local communities. It seeks 
to dispel Eurocentric negativity, especially by Western media which depicts 
Africa as poverty-stricken, conflict-ridden and choking with infectious diseases 
and bad governance. The overall objective of Afrocentrism is the creation of an 
inclusive and balanced society based on fairness and coexistence. It is against 
this backdrop that African mechanisms of conflict transformation ―include 
settlement of disputes using peaceful deliberation and not force, correction of 
wrong-doing through compensation and restitution not retribution, adjudication 
and assessment by a body of impartial elders that is fair‖ (Makwerere and 
Mandonga, 2012:2). Even though Africa is heterogeneous, and the West is by 
no means homogenous, there are common values and characteristics shared 
by African societies. Eurocentric mechanisms generally depend on legal state-
based institutions and focus on the rights of individuals. On the other hand, 
Afrocentrism involves structures and processes which ―are community-initiated 




As Obarrio (2011:23) observes, ―huge swathes of African populations, rural-
dwellers in particular, seek the resolution of conflicts in informal, ‗traditional, or 
‗customary‘ mechanisms of justice‖. There is an abundance of literature which 
documents the role of indigenous knowledge systems in conflict transformation 
throughout Cameroon even in contemporary times. Hansen (2003) for instance, 
documents the role played by the Lamido, a Muslim traditional chief in Northern 
Cameroon in the politics and religious education in his kingdom. In the North 
West Region of the country, the people of Bafut have retained a powerful 
chiefdom also known as Fondom, headed by the Fon and his council of elders 
known as the Kwifor. Still in the same region, there is an indigenous secret 
society known as the Takumbeng, made up exclusively of post-menopausal 
women from about 16 different Fondoms. Through nocturnal naked marches of 
protest, this group draws government‘s attention to critical issues facing local 
communities. It ―is noted for its function of social peace and the settlement of 
disputes among women involving quarrels, gossips, theft, land disputes, 
married partners and even between men and women‖ (Tanga, 2006:6).  
 
Also, the Ngondo traditional festival which unites the ethnic Sawa coastal 
peoples of Cameroon is held annually at the banks of the river Wouri whose 
waters play an important role in shaping the cosmology of the Duala people. As 
Mokake (2012:95) notes, ―it is on this occasion that the coastal people 
commune with the water gods or spirits through their intermediaries (traditional 
rulers). For their part, traditional leaders renew their oath with the deities of 
water in the founding spirit underlying the Ngondo‖.   
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The Bakweri people are an ethnic group located predominantly in Buea, at the 
foot of Mount Fako in the South West region of Cameroon. They also have an 
abundance of indigenous structures which they utilise to transform conflicts and 
enhance social peace. Scattered across about one hundred small villages in 
the region, with each headed by a chief, the people are united by their totem, 
the elephant. Due to its volcanic fertile soil, the region has since colonial times, 
witnessed an influx of migrants to work either in its banana and tea plantations, 
or as ordinary small-scale farmers. As a result of this immigration, the region 
today can thus be classified into rural and urban. However, the Bakweri people 
remain relatively small compared to other ethnic groups in Cameroon and have 
an estimated population of over 50 000 people (Ngoh, 1996). No recent statistic 
is available on the population of the Bakweri people.    
 
Empirical studies gathered from participant observation indicate that most 
Bakweri people still retain traditional societies and observe customs such as 
chieftaincy, councils of elders, language and secret societies. However, parts of 
the population that reside in more cosmopolitan areas appear to have been 
integrated into the structures and mechanisms of the ‗modern‘ state. It is thus 
necessary to document the knowledge systems of transforming conflicts in 
Bakweri communities so as to advance a more sustainable mechanism to 
conflict transformation.       
 
1.2 RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
The study is based on the personal experiences of the researcher as a member 
of the study area and the fact that there is abundance of indigenous knowledge 
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systems that have been used in local communities in Cameroon for conflict 
transformation. These include rituals, song, dance and traditional institutions 
such as councils of elders, sacred societies and vigilante groups. As a 
researcher who originates from Cameroon, I closely observed how the Bakweri 
people of the South West Region of the country use community-based 
structures to address conflicts related to land and domestic disputes for 
sustainable community livelihood. Some of such indigenous mechanisms 
include traditional leaders, spiritual healers and secret societies such as the 
Obasinjong and Malay dance groups. These indigenous systems of conflict 
transformation have not been thoroughly investigated to inform policy, further 
research and education for younger generations.  
 
Furthermore, the few studies which exist have tended to examine community-
based approaches and structures from a western perspective rather than 
focusing on community members themselves. The postcolonial state in Africa 
(Cameroon being no exception), is notorious for bad governance, dysfunctional 
institutions and corruption. Nevertheless, most local communities across the 
continent are characterised by relative peace and have the capacity to restore 
social equilibrium following any conflict (Elechi, 2010:74). There is thus a need 
to properly document, preserve and utilise the indigenous mechanisms of the 
Bakweri people as they offer prospects for sustainable transformation of 
conflicts. As Ineba (2000) argues, ―if Africa has to put the ‗falling apart 
together‘, her original values must be revisited‖.    
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The western positivistic view of value-free science which propagates that when 
a researcher originates from a study community, the findings might be biased, 
is rejected in the study. The study ascribes to the  indigenous ways of  knowing  
and knowledge production  that  the  researcher, as  a member of the local  
community, cannot detach him/herself  from the  challenges of the  society. 
He/she has the responsibility to ensure that the experiences and views of the 
people studied are not distorted due to cultural and language differences. They 
are conducted and presented from the cultural perspectives of community 
members themselves. This cannot be done adequately by an outsider but by a 
person who originates from the community itself. As Butera (2012:XX) argues, 
―if you do not tell your story, someone else will tell it, and most times, the 
contextual flavour will be wanting‖. In addition, an Igbo proverb supports this 
claim that ―Until lions have their own historians, tales of the hunt will always 
glorify the hunter‖. The researcher happens to originate from the study 
community, understands the culture and local language and is able to interact 
easily and meaningfully with community members. Moreover, conflict is a 
universal phenomenon, inherent in most, if not, all institutions and societies 
alike. It has the potential to render catastrophic consequences on any nation 
state. A research project like this that sets out to scrutinise in any form the 
different types of conflicts and recommend measures of transforming them, is 
of utmost importance.  
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Chieftaincy has emerged as one of the most resilient indigenous institutions of 
the Bakweri people in the South West Region of Cameroon. It plays a very 
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important role in unifying the people and has a great potential to resolve land 
disputes, which is certainly the most protrusive form of contemporary conflict 
within Bakweri communities. As Olonisakin (2000) argues, indigenous 
structures are more culturally relevant and thus, are a more viable option for 
the sustainable resolution of conflicts than non-indigenous ones. In spite of its 
great potential, the role of the Bakweri chieftaincy appears to be overshadowed 
by the encroachment of globalisation and the heterogeneity of Buea in 
particular and the South West region of Cameroon as a whole. This 
heterogeneity appears to dilute the role of the chieftaincy in the resolution of 
conflicts. To further exacerbate the problem, the reluctance of Cameroon‘s 
―central government to relinquish its traditional grip of power at all levels of 
society‖ (Mbuagbo, 2012), seems to undermine the capacity of indigenous 
structures to transform contemporary conflicts.    
     
The  study  is  based on the broad premise that although  there  is sufficient 
literature on the widespread usage of African indigenous knowledge systems in 
transforming conflicts such as  the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda (Corey and 
Joireman, 2004), the Mato Oput in Northern Uganda (Baines, 2007) and the 
Guurti System in Somaliland (Renders and Terlinden, 2010), these 
mechanisms, which are rooted in traditions and cultural practices, need to be 
relevant to contemporary Africa as an integral part of the  global village. A 
global village dominated by western ways of knowing and value systems 
propagated by western mass media and other sophisticated communication 
technologies. It is within this context that western approaches to contemporary 
conflicts maintain that African indigenous knowledge systems are out-dated in 
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meeting the global challenges of contemporary conflicts in heterogeneous 
societies (Sillitoe, 1998).  Sigsworth (2009:12-13) emphasises the patriarchal 
nature of African societies characterised by the  supreme role played by the 
father as head of the clan or family as  another limitation of indigenous 
approaches in a world propagating human rights and equality among  gender  
sections of  society, including the rights  of children. 
 
In spite of these western criticisms of the efficacy of African indigenous 
approaches and methods to contemporary conflicts, various African indigenous 
communities such as the Bakweri people of the South West region of 
Cameroon, are still utilising their indigenous structures and values in 
transforming conflicts. This is partly because of the absence, lack of access to 
and / or understanding of modern mechanisms of conflict transformation. These 
structures which include secret societies, traditional leadership and spiritual 
healers, are cheaper, easily accessible and culturally relevant to the people as 
opposed to western formal state-centred institutions. However, it is 
acknowledged in the  study  that due to the  challenges of  globalisation such  
as immigration  of  people from outside local communities with  different cultural 
values, the indigenous  structures on their own cannot effectively address 
contemporary conflicts. They need to work together with formal state 
structures. This experience was observed in the District of Buea which is the 
hub of the Bakweri people and the seat of the paramount chief. This 
emphasises the dynamism and adaptability of African indigenous ways of 
knowing and value systems to contemporary challenges. Besides traditional 
conflicts such as land and family disputes, as well as witchcraft, the Bakweri 
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are now faced by contemporary conflicts, including corruption, cyber fraud and 
armed robbery. However, the sustainability of modern approaches to conflict 
transformation in the community should be built on the local ways of knowing 
and value systems. This is important if they are to be locally accepted and 
supported. 
 
The following research questions are asked in the study with regard to the 
Bakweri people of the South West region of Cameroon: 
 What types of conflicts exist in Bakweri communities?  
 What is the role of the Bakweri chieftaincy and associated indigenous 
institutions in the transformation of these conflicts? 
 What state-based structures are involved in the transformation of 
conflicts in Bakweri communities? and 
 What are the limitations of both Bakweri indigenous as well as state-
based structures in transforming these conflicts in the study area?  
         
1.4 AIM OF THE STUDY 
The aim of the study was to investigate the relevance of African Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (AIKS) in contemporary conflict transformation with 
special reference to the chieftaincy of the Bakweri people of the South West 







1.5 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of the study were to:  
 Investigate the types of contemporary conflicts that exist among Bakweri 
communities of the South West region of Cameroon;   
 Examine the role of the Bakweri chieftaincy and associated indigenous 
institutions in the transformation of these contemporary conflicts;  
 Analyse the role of the various state-based structures involved in the 
transformation of contemporary conflicts in Bakweri communities; and 
 Identify the limitations of both Bakweri indigenous as well as state-based 
structures in transforming contemporary conflicts in the study area.  
 
1.6. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Though this study sheds light on some of the indigenous knowledge systems of 
conflict transformation of the Bakweri people of Cameroon, it focuses 
predominantly on the role of the Bakweri chieftaincy as well as state-based 
mechanisms and their roles in transforming contemporary community conflicts. 
This is primarily because even though the Bakweri people have a rich culture 
and an abundance of indigenous structures used to mitigate conflicts, the 
majority of these have been overshadowed by modern state structures in the 
contemporary era of globalisation. That notwithstanding, the chieftaincy among 
the Bakweri people in particular, and Cameroon in general, has thrived as the 
most resilient indigenous institution even within the context of globalisation and 
Westernisation.    
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1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The major limitation of this study was the limited access to secondary data 
such as official government reports and decrees such as the laws governing 
traditional authorities in Cameroon. The researcher also encountered 
challenges regarding the availability of some of these documents in English. 
Most of them were in the French language. Moreover, there was a dearth of 
data regarding the current population of the Bakweri people. The problem of 
access to official documents is not peculiar to Cameroon alone as many other 
developing countries do not have accurate and complete data banks on social, 
economic and political indicators since governments in these countries lack the 
financial resources and logistical means to gather and collate accurate figures. 
Dawson et al. (2001) maintain that ―the quality of data varies directly with the 
wealth of a country and unsurprisingly, poor countries have poor quality data‖.  
 
Lemke (2003:120-4) argues that ―Africa is systematically underrepresented in 
statistical international relations analysis because of missing information on 
regime-type and power‖. In this study, accessibility to data such as relevant 
policies and decrees was thus hampered by poor documentation and 
inaccessible government websites. To address this problem, the researcher 
relied heavily on primary data obtained from interviews with key informants and 
other resource persons within the study area. The researcher also had to 
obtain hard copies of these documents from the relevant offices, and employ 
professional translation services into English language before analysis.   
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1.8 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
Chapter One is the introduction. It provides the background, rationale, 
objectives and research questions as well as the significance of the study. 
Chapter Two is a review of related literature. Relevant theories are also 
critically discussed in the Chapter in order to develop a conceptual framework 
to theoretically and methodologically guide the study.   
Chapter Three presents the research methodology used in conducting the 
study. The methodology is informed by the conceptual framework of the study 
within the context of the indigenous knowledge system paradigm.  
Chapters Four to Six present and discuss the findings of the study: Chapter 
Four presents the different types of contemporary conflicts in the study area; 
Chapter Five examines state-based as well as African indigenous mechanisms 
of contemporary conflict transformation within Bakweri communities with 
specific reference to the Chieftaincy; Chapter Six is a discussion of the 
limitations of both indigenous and modern state-centred mechanisms in 
transforming conflicts in the study area.   
Chapter Seven provides the conclusion and recommendations of the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
According to Hart and Bond (1998:13), ―a literature review is a selection of 
available documents (both published and unpublished) on a topic, which 
contain information, ideas, data and evidence written from a particular 
standpoint to fulfill certain aims or express certain views on the nature of the 
topic and how it is to be investigated, and the effective evaluation of these 
documents in relation to the research being proposed‖. Far from merely 
reinventing the wheel or out of sheer pleasure derived from learning something 
new, the essence of this section is to dig into and analyse available 
documented data relevant to this study. This is not just for purposes of 
identifying gaps or building on previous studies, but also to have a broad 
perspective on African indigenous knowledge mechanisms of conflict 
transformation. Secondary sources of information such as textbooks, journal 
articles, websites and other published materials are used extensively in order to 
achieve this objective.  
 
Existing literature related to this study demonstrates the contestations which 
exist with regard to the relevance of African indigenous knowledge systems 
(AIKS) in contemporary conflict transformation. The literature can be classified 
into two categories as follows: The first category, which could be classified as 
Eurocentric, considers state-based institutions (as the modern state itself is a 
Eurocentric creation) as having the sole authority in the transformation of all 
forms of conflicts within the society. It also criticises African Indigenous 
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Knowledge Systems as being too local and incapable of addressing 
contemporary global challenges and conflicts in the era of globalisation. Its 
procedures are, therefore, formal, rational and scientific. The second category 
is Afrocentric and emphasises the relevance of African indigenous knowledge 
in contemporary conflicts. Initiated at the grassroots, it relies predominantly on 
structures within local communities and its procedures are informal and usually 
rooted in rituals, song and dance (Huyse, 2008:5). As a more sustainable 
mechanism for conflict transformation, Afrocentric approaches should not deny 
the importance of interfacing African indigenous knowledge systems with other 
systems to meet contemporary challenges. However, relevant knowledge 
systems should build on what African people in their respective communities 
already know. This is meant to create sustainability and ensure that those 
knowledge systems from outside are relevant and appropriate to local 
conditions and challenges. This study ascribes to this conceptual framework in 
its investigation of the relevance of AIKS in contemporary conflict 
transformation with special reference to the Bakweri people of the South West 
Region of Cameroon. The review is organized as follows: 
 
The Chapter begins with an outline of the evolution and entrenchment of 
Eurocentrism. This includes an overview of Eurocentric mechanisms of conflict 
transformation and their limitations in transforming African conflicts. This is 
followed by a discussion of the evolution of Afrocentrism including its 
conceptualisation of Africa‘s contemporary conflicts and the need for 
Afrocentric mechanisms of transforming African conflicts. The salient features 
of African Indigenous Knowledge Systems in conflict transformation are 
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presented including their challenges in contemporary conflict transformation. 
Finally, the Chapter outlines the conceptual/theoretical framework of the study. 
  
2.2 THE EVOLUTION AND ENTRENCHMENT OF EUROCENTRISM  
Eurocentrism refers to beliefs and practices that claim and emphasise the 
superiority of European culture in particular, and Western civilisation as a 
whole, implying that all which is good, innovative and progressive, starts in 
Europe. As Marks (2007:8) argues, ―Eurocentric views of the world see Europe 
as being the only active shaper of world history, its ‗fountainhead‘ if you will. 
Europe acts; the rest of the world responds. Europe has ‗agency‘; the rest of 
the world is passive. Europe makes history; the rest of the world has none until 
it is brought into contact with Europe. Europe is the centre; the rest of the world 
is its periphery. Europeans alone are capable of initiating change or 
modernisation; the rest of the world is not‖.  
 
For centuries now, Eurocentric models have maintained hegemony in 
explaining human behaviour and advancing solutions to societal problems 
including contemporary conflicts. This is due to the political and economic 
dominance of the West in the global knowledge economy. This dominance has 
led to a control of knowledge production and knowledge validation that omits or 
marginalises the indigenous knowledge systems of non-Western societies. This 
Western hegemony and arrogance was echoed in the writings of Western 
scholars such as Trevor-Roper (1967:9) who argued that,  
―It is fashionable to speak today as if European History were devalued: 
as if historians in the past, have paid too much attention to it, and as if 
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nowadays; we should pay less. Undergraduates seduced as always by 
the changing breath of journalistic fashion, demand that they should be 
taught the history of black Africa. Perhaps, in the future, there will be 
some African history to teach. But at present, there is none or very 
little: there is only the history of the Europeans in Africa. The rest is 
largely darkness, like the history of pre-European pre-Columbian 
America. And darkness is not a subject for history.   
 
This arrogance has not only been evident in the academia, but even more so in 
economic and cultural milieus. Africa‘s consumption behaviour has been 
overshadowed by European goods and services from food chains such as 
McDonald‘s and Kentucky Fried Chicken, to financial institutions such as the 
Bretton Woods institutions as its associated development advisors. It is against 
this backdrop that Eurocentric approaches denigrated African knowledge 
systems in particular, arguing that African customs were uncivilised, inferior 
and even barbaric. Such ethnocentric thinking has justified centuries of slave 
trade and European imperialism in Africa (Schiele, 1996). In support of this 
view, Chukwuokolo (2009) argues that European imperialism ―saw Africa under 
colonial bondage, involving socio- political domination, slavery and economic 
exploitation, racial and cultural devastation. In fact, the colonisers destroyed the 
philosophical and religious base of Africa and foisted European system as an 
alternative. Colonial experience left two broad ―legacies‖ on Africa: denial of 
African identity and the foisting of western thought and cultural realities and 
perspectives on Africans. Even in contemporary times, ideas and methods are 
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frowned upon if they are not benchmarked to Western standards and purported 
by Western scholars‖.  
 
Since the advent of the modern state, Eurocentrism has thus entrenched itself 
as having control on explaining phenomena and advancing solutions to the 
problems plaguing most societies. This hegemony has become increasingly 
obvious in the 21st Century wherein principles of liberal democracy such as the 
promotion of human rights and rule of law have become universalised. It is 
within this context that globalisation is increasingly becoming synonymous to 
westernisation, with the latter looking down with contempt, on other knowledge 
systems. The schism between Eurocentric approaches and other indigenous 
knowledge systems are brought out by Briggs (2005:102) who argues that 
―Western science is seen to be open, systematic and objective, dependent very 
much on being a detached centre of rationality and intelligence, whereas 
indigenous knowledge is seen to be closed, parochial, unintellectual, primitive 
and emotional‖. Both AIKS and Eurocentric approaches have thus been 
categorised as being diametrically opposed to each other, a bifurcation which 
has been perpetuated by an interplay of power politics.           
 
2.3 AN OVERVIEW OF EUROCENTRIC MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION 
Eurocentric mechanisms are founded on positivist methodologies which purport 
to employ objectivity, rationality, quantitative and mathematical models in 
conflict transformation. According to positivism, knowledge ―should consist of 
empirical propositions that are logically related and can be tested against 
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evidence so that theory as a whole is confirmed or refuted by observations of 
data‖ (Nicholson, 1996:132). Positivism, therefore, rejects intuition, 
introspection and spiritualism and maintains that just like the physical world 
operates on laws such as gravity, society also operates according to general 
laws. As an individual rights-based society, its approaches to conflict 
transformation are rational and scientific. Such positivistic approaches hold that 
the only sources of true authority are science and logic. It dispels all forms of 
‗non-scientific‘ approaches as bias and inadmissible and hence, there is an 
overwhelming focus by Western approaches on forensic science. It is this 
Eurocentric contempt for ‗non-scientific‘ approaches that prompts Western 
scholars to attribute the origins of thought, reason and civilisation to the 
Greeks. Condemning this view as chauvinistic rationalism, Asante (2008:157) 
argues that ―the West cannot impose Greece as some universal culture that 
developed full-blown out of nothing without the foundations it received from 
Africa‖. 
 
One of the foundations of Eurocentric approaches to conflict transformation is 
the liberal peace approach. ―Liberal peace theories prescribe electoral 
democracy and the free market as panaceas for all post conflict states, 
irrespective of the institutional and cultural ripeness of the societies to cope 
with the inherent competitiveness of ‗democracy‘ and the markets‖ (Doe, 
2009:1). Such a universalised one-size-fits-all model is merely an extension of 
neo-colonialism wherein the colony is perceived as tutelage of the empire. It 
falls within the ambits of the modernisation theory which perceives African 
knowledge systems as primitive and incapable of coping with modern 
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challenges. Prescriptions by the liberal peace approaches thus undermine 
indigenous and organic structures and processes of conflict transformation 
within African societies. As such, an approach that undermines African cultures 
and values that have been practised for generations is not a sustainable path to 
conflict transformation in Africa.        
 
There is overwhelming literature which maintains that a core aspect of 
Eurocentric approaches is its focus on the individual as opposed to the 
community. Such individualism is evident in the writings of French philosopher, 
Decartes (1637) who maintains that ―I think, therefore I am‖, rendering the 
individual to constitute the core of Western societies. Asante (2006:156) aptly 
captures the nature of Western societies, by arguing that ―the political and 
social ideology of aggressive individualism celebrates self-reliance, autonomy, 
personal independence, individual liberty and triumphalism over others‖. The 
author argues further that when individualism and self-interest become the 
norm in society, they pose a danger to the preferred principle of human 
cooperation.  
 
To further exacerbate the problem, the individual, according to the Western 
conceptualisation, is selfish and inherently bad, leading to potentially solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish and short lives (Hobbes, 1651). The author thus 
recommends that a strong and authoritative government be put in place to 
protect citizens from a potential war of all against all. It is for this reason that 
the focuses of Eurocentric approaches are on the law and retribution. The law, 
according to Eurocentric conceptualisation, constitutes a supreme set of rules 
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and regulations that are binding on all individuals within a given territory. A 
court of law is a state-based Eurocentric mechanism of resolving conflicts and 
utilises logic, precedence and the rule of law in the administration of justice. 
―Prosecutions are slow, partial and preoccupied with either/or simplifications of 
the adversarial process‖ (Minow, 1998:87), rendering the outcomes of trials as 
either guilty or not guilty.  
 
The dominance of Eurocentrism in conflict transformation has taken root in 
Africa as there is a continuous reliance on foreign aid and western interventions 
in resolving the various problems plaguing the continent. This reliance has 
perpetuated western values in the conflict transformation architecture of Africa. 
Hoffman (2009) maintains that  such  western values are dominated by liberal 
peace whose core focus is on ―democratisation and good governance, respect 
for the rule of law, the promotion and protection of human rights, the growth of 
civil society and the development of open market economies‖ (Hoffman, 
2009:10).  
 
2.4 LIMITATIONS OF EUROCENTRIC MECHANISMS IN TRANSFORMING 
AFRICAN CONFLICTS 
In spite of the rapid encroachment of globalisation on Africa‘s political 
economy, there is still a persistence and in some cases, a further escalation of 
conflicts. This is an indication that Eurocentric paradigms on their own are not 
sufficient in transforming African conflicts. Perceptions and attitudes towards 
globalisation have thus been changing on the continent. In support of this view, 
Kloh (2001: i) argues that ―among the important factors are the lack of tangible 
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benefits to developing countries from opening their economies, despite the 
well-publicised claims of export and income gains; the economic losses and 
social dislocation that are being caused to many developing countries by rapid 
financial and trade liberalisation; the growing inequalities of wealth and 
opportunities arising from globalisation; and the perception that environmental, 
social and cultural problems have been made worse by the working of the 
global free market economy‖. This is further exacerbated by the fact that 
globalisation, is in actual fact, Westernisation in disguise as it undermines non-
Western knowledge systems. This has prompted some scholars to refer to 
globalisation as the latest stage of imperialism (Chukwuokolo, 2009). 
 
Against this backdrop, one of the main challenges of Eurocentric mechanisms 
and their efficacy in resolving African conflicts is their applicability to the African 
context. Onwuzuruigbo (2011:306) argues that ―nothing is wrong with western 
dogmas and instruments of conflict resolution in themselves. But certainly, 
something is awry with the assumptions and contexts under which they are 
employed to resolve African conflicts.‖ This view expresses concerns that 
solutions which have worked elsewhere are hardly a panacea for the resolution 
of African conflicts. The continent has its own dynamics, including practices 
such as polygamy, chieftaincy, long-serving rulers and communal networks 
which put Africa apart from Western societies. As Museveni (2014) aptly coins 
it, a ―valued relationship cannot be sustainably maintained by one society being 
subservient to another society‖. It is thus imperative for IKS of African societies 




A key feature of Eurocentrism is individualism as opposed to communal-based 
systems that are characteristic of most African local communities. The 
individual rights-based Eurocentric model also does not fit well within the 
context of the communal and organic nature of African societies. Zeleke 
(2010:63) for instance, argues that ―the ideology of the state legal system is 
drawn mainly from the western legal philosophy which is highly influenced by 
an individualistic orientation and does not fit the strong social orientation on the 
ground where it is being implemented‖. This Eurocentric flaw of individualism 
has long been echoed by some scholars who argue that:  
―Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels 
him to increase his herd without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own interest in a 
society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all‖ (Hardin, 1968:1244). 
 
Besides, among the Western solutions to Africa‘s developmental challenges, 
are the promotion of democracy and regime change. The problem can partly be 
attributed to fact that regime change is a very delicate and complex operation 
across the African continent. As Engelbert and Tull (2008) argue, there exists 
numerous, informal, yet legitimate decision-making structures, rooted in patron-
client relationships across the continent. By using the phrase ―Institutional 
Transfer Fallacy‖, they argue further that it is erroneous to attempt to transfer 
Western institutions to Africa as the two contexts are completely different. They 
also lambast terms such as ―rebuilding‖ and ―re-establishing‖ with regard to the 
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state and its institutions in Africa, arguing that these institutions never existed 
on the continent. What has been in existence ―is more the vision (or dream) of 
the progressive, developmental state that sustained generations of academics, 
activists and policy-makers, than any real existing state‖ (Milliken and Krause, 
2002:762). Citing some of the challenges to the liberal peace approaches, the 
study supports Hoffman‘s (2009:10) argument that Eurocentrism is ―an elite-
driven, top-down, outside-in, technocratic and overly formulaic experiment in 
social engineering that lacked local legitimacy‖. Based on this premise, the 
major challenge with Eurocentric approaches in transforming contemporary 
African conflicts has been its lack of knowledge of and relevance to the African 
context. 
 
Against this backdrop, Western institutions and values cannot be transplanted 
to Africa largely because the modern state, which is sine qua non in the 
entrenchment of Eurocentrism, does not exist on the continent. Eurocentric 
approaches have failed to transform African conflicts largely because they 
undermine the realities and verities of African polities which include issues of 
neo-patrimonialism, nepotism and tribalism. ―Local political and civil society 
leaders pointed to the many political, social, economic and cultural 
contingencies that make it impossible for their societies to fulfill the duty to 
prosecute‖ (Huyse, 2008:2).  
 
2.5 THE EVOLUTION OF AFROCENTRISM 
In his writings on Afrocentrism, Chukwuokolo (2009:32) opines that the concept 
―was created by Afro-American intellectuals in asserting that Africans should be 
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given their intellectual pride of place as the originators of civilisation‖. It is 
relevant in a context where globalisation is synonymous to westernisation and 
has overshadowed almost all forms of African knowledge systems, including 
music, philosophy, folklore and even consumption. The Western perception of 
Africa as underdeveloped, barbaric, inferior and irrational still prevails even in 
contemporary times. This perception is being increasingly challenged by 
scholars, with Thompson (2004:2) arguing that ―Africans are innately no more 
violent, no more corrupt, no more greedy, and no more stupid than any other 
human beings that populate the planet. Not to believe this is to revive the 
racism that underpinned the ethos of slavery and colonialism‖. Afrocentrism is 
thus a movement against the socio-economic and cultural domination of Africa 
by predominantly Western norms. It is a philosophy and moral justification for 
action against the denial of the ‗Africanness‘ of Africa. As Onyewuenyi 
(1993:39-40) maintains, 
―The Afrocentric movement is a series of activities by concerned 
African and African-American scholars and educators and directed 
towards achieving the particular end of ensuring that the African 
heritage and culture, its history and contribution to world civilisation and 
scholarship are reflected in the curricula on every level of academic 
instruction…..Advocates of Afrocentrism demand a reconstruction and 
rewriting of the whole panorama of human history in its account of the 
origin of mankind, the origin of philosophy, science, medicine, 
agriculture and architecture, etc‖. 
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That notwithstanding, global institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund have been and are still involved in the redesign of 
Africa‘s political economy from a Eurocentric perspective. Even African 
literature has been devalued in favour of writings by Western scholars. As 
Mazrui (2001:97) points out, ―there has been excessive effort to make Africa‘s 
ideological experience conform to the European ideological categories of 
liberalism, conservatism, capitalism, socialism, Marxism, fascism, and the rest.‖ 
Arguing that globalisation is a Western construct designed to perpetuate white 
supremacy, Asante (2006:153) maintains that ―there can be no trans-historical 
religion of Westernism that suits the entire world. There will only be the death of 
culture, the destruction of ways of life, the assault on information about 
societies, and the attempt to equate modernisation, urbanisation, art, education 
or architecture with Westernisation‖. It is in view of this that Mazrui (2001) 
argues further that although African structures were undermined and destroyed 
by colonialism, African attitudes and values persisted. Africa‘s traditional 
political values and ideas, therefore, endured the encroachment of European 
civilisation albeit the annihilation of some of its traditional institutions. However, 
Afrocentrism should not be translated as a drive to promote blackness for its 
own sake. It should take cognisance of the fact that African communities are 
becoming increasingly heterogeneous and are thus part of a global community.   
 
2.6. CONCEPTUALISING AFRICA’S CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS  
Ahuja (2006) posits that conflict is part and parcel of all communities, whether 
homogenous or heterogeneous. All social groups (family units, clans, ethnic 
communities or religious gatherings) are every now and then, entangled in 
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complex disputes. Conflict is thus an essential creative element in human 
relationships. It is the means to change, the means by which our social values 
of welfare, security, justice and opportunities for personal development can be 
achieved. This is elaborated by Burton (1972:137-138) who maintains that if 
suppressed, as is often the case in traditional societies where conflict is settled 
according to traditionally accepted norms, society becomes static. There is thus 
conflict between the individual and society, between the privileged and 
underprivileged, between managers and the managed, and between those 
possessing different ideological values. These conflicts challenge authorities 
and traditionally held values. But they are neither to be deprecated nor feared. 
The existence of a flow of conflict is the only guarantee that the aspiration of 
society will be attained. However, due to underlying socio-cultural, political and 
economic factors, a presumably negligible disagreement may escalate into a 
major violent conflict with disastrous consequences on nation-states. Moreover, 
―a seemingly resolved dispute may resurface long afterwards because the 
underlying conflict remains‖ (Castro et al., 2000).  
 
Several authors such as Grewal (2003), Brahm (2003) and King et al. (2006) 
have advanced definitions to concepts of peace and conflict. However, John 
Galtung, one of the foremost scholars in peace research, expanded the 
concepts of peace and violence to include indirect or structural violence. This 
ushered in a direct challenge to the established notions about the nature of 
peace which had for long been considered to be the absence of war. Peace, in 
contemporary times, considers not only the absence of manifest violence 
(negative peace) but also the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1996). 
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This expanded definition of peace is particularly important as conflicts generally 
begin at a community level and remain dormant for several years as they do 
not make good stories for international media. Such conflicts are implanted in 
socio-economic and political superstructures, making them opaque in the eyes 
of an outsider. Yet, they linger on as a slow torture for concerned community 
members. However, as Smith (2004:5) cautions, ―this should not create the 
illusion of their capacity to escalate suddenly and viciously. When that 
escalation occurs, it often seems to international observers to have come out of 
a clear blue sky‖.  
 
It is argued in this study that the escalation of conflicts also occurs due to the 
malleability of individuals. This is supported by Mill (1989:60) who argues that 
―human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly 
the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires growing and developing 
itself on all sides, according to the tendency of inward forces which make it a 
living thing‖. The escalation of violent conflicts could be a result of the absence 
or denial of ontological needs such as recognition, participation, security and 
dignity. It stems from the demands by individuals and groups to make certain 
adjustments in behaviour that are unacceptable and probably beyond human 
tolerance and capabilities (Burton, 1990). It is on the basis of this consideration 
that Amoo (1997) argues that any political system that denies or suppresses 
these human needs must eventually generate protest and conflict. It could be 
likened to beating a dog to a wall, leaving it with no option but to retaliate.  
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It is thus imperative to address the root causes of conflict and even more 
importantly, put in place early warning mechanisms to identify and tackle 
conflict in its latent stages. According to Adedeji (1999:7), most contemporary 
conflicts are generally caused by ―violent reactions to the pervasive lack of 
democracy, the denial of human rights, the complete disregard of the 
sovereignty of the people, the lack of empowerment and accountability and 
generally bad governance‖. These are aspects of what is generally referred to 
in Peace Studies as structural violence. It is a silent and usually preventable 
form of oppression that often manifests itself in inequality, starvation, diseases, 
lack of jobs and freedoms of expression (King et al., 2006:45). Nathan (2000:6) 
advances the view that with regard to contemporary conflicts, ―critical structural 
conditions in Africa are authoritarian rule, the marginalisation of ethnic or 
religious minorities, socio-economic deprivation and inequality, and weak states 
that lack the institutional capacity to manage political and social conflicts 
effectively‖. In addition, there is a need to analyse the role of foreign 
governments in the politics of African nation-states. Research needs to be done 
on the role played by these institutions in perpetuating conflicts in Africa as they 
strive to pursue their personal interests. 
 
Gurr (1993) on the other hand, exposes how and why national peoples, 
regional autonomies, indigenous peoples and minorities tend to migrate from 
non-violent protests, through violent protests, to outright rebellion in an uneven 
escalation that takes many years in most cases. According to the author, this is 
the time lag that gives major incentives for the proactive prevention of violent 
conflicts. Goals generally include demands for political access, autonomy, 
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secession or control, triggered by historical grievances, and contemporary 
resentments against the socio-cultural, economic and political conditions within 
the polity. Groups, therefore, fight for power as it is important in securing 
access to a better quality of life. Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1998) believes 
―the surest recipe for unrest and turmoil is if the vast majority have no proper 
homes, clean water, electricity, good education and adequate health care … If 
the disadvantaged, the poor, the homeless and unemployed become 
desperate, they may use desperate means to redress the imbalance‖. 
  
Klare (2001:190-212) also identifies diverse causes of internal wars as 
triggered by grievances over the exploration and exploitation of natural 
resources. Conflict, according to the author, is ―motivated by a desire to reap 
the financial benefits of resource exploitation. This is usually coupled with long-
standing ethnic, political and regional antagonisms, often provoked when 
governments exploit resources in areas occupied by indigenous people or 
ethnic minorities‖. This is most likely to occur in developing countries where 
there are few sources of wealth and governments are weak and divided, widely 
seen as corrupt and unable to mediate competition for valuable resources by 
legal and regulatory means. In line with this view, Ross (2004:343) produces 
evidence linking oil and other mineral wealth to (separatist) conflict. The author 
exhibits ground-level research carried out on the links between mineral wealth 
and secessionist movements in areas such as the Western Sahara in Morocco 
(1975-1978), the struggle over Cabinda in Angola (1975), the Katanga rebellion 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1960-1975), the Biafran secession in 
Nigeria (1967-1970) and Liberia (1990s), among others. According to the 
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author, the rents available from oil (and sometimes, other minerals) give actors 
a financial incentive to initiate conflict.  
 
Another key source of conflict in most African states is abuse of power which 
results in the proliferation of governments for life. Vakunta (2006:33) asserts 
that ‖more often than not, abuse of power in Africa goes unpunished largely 
because Africans have the tendency to revere political leaders. In many parts 
of Africa, the sacred role as assigned to traditional leaders has been 
transformed to political leaders‖. This has resulted in the proliferation of 
‘governments for life‘. Examples include the regimes of leaders such as Paul 
Biya of Cameroon, Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea and Robert Mugabe 
of Zimbabwe. Against this backdrop, multiparty politcs will remain a window-
dressing if Africans continue to turn a blind eye to wanton abuse of office and 
corrupt practices that plague the continent. 
 
Kadende et al. (2005) on the other hand, are of the opinion that the refugee 
problem is another crucial factor linked to African conflicts. They argue that 
conflicts do not simply spill across boundaries because of movement of 
refugees. Instead, conflicts arise when refugees enter a polarised situation or 
one that already contains the seeds of discord. In such cases, refugees create 
tensions by entering into new alignments or changing old ones. South Africa for 
instance, has witnessed sporadic attacks on foreigners, motivated by 
xenophobia and criminality with the 2015 attacks on foreigners being 
condemned worldwide (Crush et al., 2015).    
 
 41 
At the micro level, marital disputes resulting to separation and divorce are 
increasingly becoming a key feature, especially in more urbanised areas of the 
continent. For instance, divorce statistics provided by Statistics South Africa 
(2016) reports that the incidence of divorce in the country has gone up, with 
over 50 per cent of divorce requests being made by women. Numerous authors 
have also documented some of the causes of marital disputes across the 
African continent. Coining the phrase ―no romance without finance‖, Mills and 
Ssewakiryanga (2005) highlight the role of materialism as a catalyst to marital 
disputes. Finance is particularly important in an increasingly monetised and 
Westernised economy characterised by consumerism. ‗Sugar daddies‘, ‗sugar 
mummies‘ and sexual relationships based almost exclusively on pecuniary 
interests are increasingly becoming the norm in most African communities.  
 
Moreover, the bastardization of the culture of bride price (referred to as lobola 
in South Africa) has reduced the practice to a money-making scheme, making 
many families to retain receipts as proof of payment in case of divorce. Lawoko 
et al. (2007) on their part, document how the age difference between couples 
and literacy rates influence intimate partner violence in Kenya. Marital problems 
are thus increasingly coming under the spot light in African local communities. 
This is coupled with the fact that polygamy is a customary practice inherent in 
almost all African traditions. Within the African context, polygyny is the norm 
and refers to a situation where one man is married to more than one wife. This 
practice is very common in the Sahel states with Fenske (2015:58) referring to 
the region from Senegal to Tanzania as the ―polygamy belt‖. This practice also 
sets the pace for numerous marital disputes.  
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Another contemporary source of conflict, especially in sub-Saharan Africa is the 
proliferation of Pentecostal churches. The upsurge of these ‗new‘ churches has 
seen a knock-down effect on the membership of traditional Anglican, Baptist 
and Catholic mission churches established by European colonisers over a 
century ago. The precursor to Pentecostalism in Africa ―were indigenous 
prophet figures, many who of whom were persecuted out of historic mission 
denominations for pursuing spiritualties, sometimes scandalously perceived by 
church authority as belonging to the occult‖ (Asamoah-Gyadu, 2013). Some of 
these Pentecostal churches, such as the renowned Synagogue Church of All 
Nations in Nigeria, airs miracles and prophesies by its leader, Prophet T.B. 
Joshua, on its equally famous Emmanuel TV channel. These miracles convert 
hundreds of thousands into believers as they generally testify about 
supernatural healings that defy mainstream scientific medicine and preach a 
gospel of abundance. Prophet T.B. Joshua is so popular across the continent 
that his church has been graced by the visit of renowned African politicians 
such as Winnie Mandela, the ex-wife of late South African president Nelson 
Mandela, Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the opposition in Zimbabwe and John 
Atta Mills, former president of Ghana. In 2003, a Pentecostal evangelist was 
invited by Ghana Airways, the country‘s national airline, to pray for and deliver 
the airline from periodic financial woes (Asamoah-Gyadu, 2005).     
 
However, Pentecostal churches are increasingly becoming controversial in 
Africa. This is as their doctrines for the most part, call on Africans to discard 
their customary practices such as ancestral worship, and serve the ‗living God‘. 
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Besides, some of their own practices are also increasingly being considered 
unethical and exploitative in contemporary Africa. There are also numerous 
reported incidences of unconventional acts such as pastors in South Africa 
ordering their followers to eat grass, snakes and drink petrol. These have at 
times created tensions between church leaders and the local communities, 
resulting in the destruction of the church buildings in some areas of the country. 
In Nigeria, for instance, over 100 people died when a building belonging to the 
Synagogue Church of All Nations collapsed. Though Nigerian engineers 
alleged later that the building was poorly constructed, Prophet T.B. Joshua and 
the church‘s authorities maintain that the building was bombed by a mysterious 
aircraft (The Economist, 2014). The controversy of churches is further 
exacerbated by the fact that they are tax-free entities even though they rake in 
millions of dollars of tithes and offerings from followers desperate for miracles 
such as financial breakthroughs and healing from above. Forbes Magazine 
(2011) for instance, ranked Bishop David Oyedepo of the Living Faith Church 
World Wide also known as Winners‘ Chapel which is headquartered in Nigeria, 
as the richest pastor in Nigeria with a net worth of about 150 million dollars. 
Authors such as Adedun and Mekiliuwa (2010) and Adeboye (2015) note that 
the church‘s Faith Tabernacle, a 50 000 seat auditorium in Nigeria is the largest 
church auditorium in the world.  
 
It is this unregulated framework under which churches operate that prompted 
the South African Commission for Promotion and Protection of the Rights of 
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities to conduct an investigative 
study on the commercialisation of religion and human rights violations in the 
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country. According to Mkhwanazi-Xalavu (2015) (chairperson of the 
Commission), the purpose of the study is to investigate ―the commercialisation 
of religion and the abuse of people‘s belief systems in terms of when these 
institutions are run, how are they being run, where is their funding going into, 
who collects how much and what do they do with the money, where does the 
money eventually go to, and what are the governing principles that are there?‖ 
The Commission subsequently issued subpoenas to several pastors and 
church leaders to appear before it to give an account of their religious 
practices. In spite of this, most Pentecostal churches across the continent 
operate in highly unregulated and unchecked environments probably because 
no administrator wants to intervene with the ‗Word of God‘.  
 
Land has also been a key source of conflict across the African continent. Soini 
(2005) for instance, traces the evolution of land use practices in the Chagga 
farming systems on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro in Tanzania. The author 
conducted a historical analysis of land use in 1961, 1982 and 2000 and 
concluded that land use patterns in the region have evolved from agricultural 
cultivation and patches of grazing land, through home gardens to the 
expansion of human settlements. In contemporary times, the state itself has 
been a major role-player in land allocation and use, especially given the 
increasing pressure from both domestic and international communities for 
among others, land redistribution, forest conservation, the preservation of 
natural game reserves and environmental protection. It is, therefore, no 
surprise that this multiplicity in the use of land has led to numerous land 
disputes across the continent and hence, a major policy problem for most 
 45 
governments whose control of land allocation is increasingly becoming a 
constraint on the livelihoods of local peoples (Mertz et al., 2005).  
 
The government of Botswana for instance, was involved in one of the most 
lengthy court cases in the history of the country following its eviction of the San 
people from the Central Kalagadi game reserve. The eviction was partly as a 
result of attempts by the Botswana government to ‗modernise‘ the traditional 
hunting-gathering lifestyle of the San and pave the way for the Kalagadi game 
reserve (Hitchcock et al., 2011). Similarly, Sithole et al, (2003) explore the 
conflicts between the state and the peasants which arose as a result of 
dissatisfaction over the land reform program. They observed how ―unfulfilled 
promises by Zimbabwe‘s political leadership  were beginning to backfire as 
some landless peasants forcibly occupiedwhite owned commercial farms, 
threatening to plunge the long delayed resettlement programme into further 
disarray‖ (Sithole et al, 2003:83).      
 
Corruption is also a vice that is becoming increasingly Kentrenched in Africa. 
Kyambalesa (2006:108-109) attributes the causes of corruption to governance 
―not sufficiently guided by principles of accountability, transparency, rule of law 
and genuine citizen participation‖. Other causes include political instability, job 
insecurity, low pay, regular government reshuffles, weak judiciary, bureaucratic 
red tape and greed. Rasheed (1995:44) contends that ―most people in 
developing countries, especially in Africa, see corruption in more practical 
terms. They see it as theft of public resources by civil servants; illegal taxation 
of economic activity; nepotism, including favouring relatives, friends, and other 
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acquaintances in the distribution of public goods and services, employment in 
the public sector; embezzlement of public funds; the misuse of one‘s public 
office to extract extralegal income and other benefits for the office holder; 
capricious and selective enforcement of government regulations in an effort to 
benefit the regulator; and differential treatment of business owners in the 
expectation of a bribe from the entrepreneur being granted the preferential 
treatment‖. 
         
Against the backdrop of the foregoing, Grounden (2005:12) outlines conditions 
necessary for sustainable conflict transformation. The author maintains that in 
order for sustainable peace to exist in Africa, there is a need for the existence 
of three sectors – the state, the private sector and the civil sector. The state 
has to be characterised by a separation of powers. The three arms of 
government (the executive, the legislature and the judiciary) must act 
independently of each other but must stand as checks and balances to 
counterbalance the growing influence of any one arm. The rule of law and 
accountability must thrive. The legislature must make laws, the judiciary must 
interpret the laws and the executive must execute these laws. These processes 
are contrary to what generally prevails in most African countries. In Cameroon 
for instance, some authors (Akoko and Oben, 2006:25-48; Mbaku and 
Takougang, 2004) have advanced that the abuse of power by the executive, a 
plethora of profit-seeking political parties and a survival-of-the-fittest private 
sector, are common features in the society.  
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2.7 THE NEED FOR AFROCENTRIC MECHANISMS IN TRANSFORMING 
AFRICAN CONFLICTS 
As discussed above, contemporary Africa is plagued by numerous and diverse 
forms of latent and violent conflicts. These include unemployment, poverty, 
natural resource conflicts, ethnic clashes and terrorism. Even though traditional 
African societies had structures within them to address all types of conflict, the 
advent of Western imperialism and globalisation undermined and in some 
cases, eradicated these African community-based structures. The 
marginalisation of AIKS by the colonialists was meant to facilitate Western 
administration and ease exploitation (Awedoba, 2009). To further exacerbate 
the continent‘s marginalisation plight, current solutions to address 
contemporary conflicts in Africa remain predominantly Western-centred. These 
include peacekeeping operations, international criminal tribunals, the 
involvement of international statesmen as mediators and the role of human 
rights and civil society organisations. Even initiatives aimed at enhancing 
sustainable development in Africa are often forged without the consent and 
inputs of the continent‘s indigenous people (Varte, 2012). These largely 
account for the protracted nature of conflicts on the continent as these 
Eurocentric approaches undermine culturally relevant Afrocentric approaches. 
It is, therefore, imperative for the knowledge and inputs of indigenous peoples 
to be considered in all policies and projects that concern them. As Galloway 
(2010) maintains,  
―in recent years, there has been an increasing realisation that the 
observations and assessments of indigenous groups provide valuable 
local level information, offer local verification of global models, and are 
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currently providing the basis for local community-driven resource 
management and adaptation strategies to global environmental change 
that are way past the planning stage and are already being implemented 
and tested‖.  
   
There is thus a growing need to recognise, appreciate and utilise Africa‘s 
indigenous knowledge to address contemporary challenges such as disaster 
management, forest conservation, climate change, pandemics, epidemics, 
conflicts and even a basic understanding of human behaviour. African 
communities, therefore, require their own solutions to conflict transformation 
even in contemporary times. The African continent has unique socio-economic 
developmental challenges due to its diverse colonial history and heterogeneity 
of its cultures (Meredith, 2006). This contention is supported by Olonisakin 
(2000) who maintains that African cultures are different from western ones, 
including their approaches to conflict transformation. Cultural aspects such as 
traditional religion, music and institutions can play a very important role in 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. The predominant Western 
approaches to African conflicts is aimed at universal applicability whereby the 
state, and the state alone, exercises what Weber (1948:78) refers to as a 
―monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force‖.  
 
Boege (2006) asserts that the cultural diversity of Africa creates what he terms 
‗traditional segmentary societies‘. The author argues that diverse societies 
―have their own peculiar institutions of control of violence, conflict 
transformation and peace building‖. These are self-regulatory and legitimated 
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by the people‘s own interpretations of customary rights. As Ntuli (2002:53) 
succinctly argues, ―Africa is neither Europe nor America. Africa‘s problems are 
not European or American problems. Africa‘s solution to her problems cannot 
be anybody‘s but Africa‘s. If we accept these truisms, we then accept that 
Africa has to find her own indigenous ways to define, identify and address her 
challenges‖. In line with this view, Castro and Ettenger (2000) maintain that 
African indigenous knowledge systems can provide ―an alternative perspective 
and combination of local wisdom and practical experience that compete with 
(and in some cases, outperforms) or enhances the models offered by ‗western 
science‘‖. This, unfortunately, is not always the case.        
 
It is in recognition of this that Igboin (2011:101) laments that the advent of 
western imperialism and the encroachment of globalisation have seen a 
gradual erosion of the values that existed within traditional African societies and 
the replacement of these values by foreign ones. This has resulted in Western-
centric principles and mechanisms of conflict transformation on the continent, 
to the detriment of indigenous mechanisms, largely because most African 
countries are dependent on western donors for aid and grants. There is thus a 
need for endogenous African approaches to play a key role in the 
transformation of African conflicts. Afrocentric scholars are increasingly 
lambasting the claim to knowledge that has been monopolised by Eurocentric 
scholarship, even on knowledge about Africa itself. As Nyamnjoh (2003) 
argues, ―only by creating space for scholarship based on Africa as a unit of 
analysis on its own right,
 
could scholars begin to correct prevalent situations 
whereby much is known of what African states, institutions and communities 
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are not (thanks to dogmatic and normative assumptions of mainstream 
scholarship) but very little of what they actually are‖. 
 
However, such Afrocentric mechanisms must be interfaced with other 
knowledge systems in order to maintain global standards. The need for such 
interface is also due to the fact that however traditional they are, African 
indigenous mechanisms are not static. They evolve and adapt to the dynamics 
of global political discourses. As Anan (2004:12) maintains, ―due regard must 
be given to indigenous and informal traditions for administering justice or 
settling disputes, to help them continue their often vital role and to do so in 
conformity with both international standards and local tradition‖.  
 
2.8 FEATURES OF AFRICAN INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS IN 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
AIKS have certain key characteristics which distinguishes them from 
Eurocentric ones. These features are still clearly visible within most African 
local communities, especially in rural parts of Africa that still retain traditional 
structures and observe African customs. Though still considered as archaic in 
the eyes of Eurocentric values, these features account for the maintenance of 
relative peace and stability in most African local communities even in 
contemporary times. Some of them are discussed below.   
2.8.1 Rooted in Oral Tradition 
One of the key aspects of Afrocentrism as an approach to conflict 
transformation is that it is rooted in oral tradition as opposed to well-laid down 
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written rules or laws as is typical of Eurocentrism. Oral communication through 
face-to-face encounters is the bond of belonging to a nation wherein individuals 
within the group, perceive themselves as having a common past, culture, 
language, adaptation, folklore and destiny. ―Everything takes place as if, to 
remedy the transitory nature of the oral discourse, tradition came along to 
support certain words, to underline them, to give them weight, and thereby, to 
make of these landmarks in social experience‖ (Sumner, 2001:23). In support 
of this view, Zion and Yazzie (2006:152) posit that ―the major difference 
between western adjudication and indigenous dialogue is that western thought 
tends to be rational and is based on Aristotelian logic, using inductive or 
deductive reasoning. Indigenous thoughts tend to be based on affect or 
feelings, where feelings are often more important than ‗finding facts,‘ and both 
are expressed in languages that are more sophisticated than English‖. 
 
Such sophisticated discourses are sometimes expressed through proverbs, 
storey-telling and myths. Agbaje (2002:237) maintains that ―a myth is the 
storehouse of African beliefs, traditions and values‖. It is not stipulated that 
myths and proverbs, in themselves, can provide solutions to conflicts rather, 
they are viewed as important tools to curb conflicts. Onwuzuruigbo (2011:311) 
notes that ―like many Nigerian groups, the Yoruba use proverbs and myths in 
situations of conflict, but more importantly, they are used by elders to arbitrate 
and resolve conflicts in a manner that reiterates Yoruba worldview, customs 
and values‖. The utilisation of proverbs and myths in conflict resolution has 
helped the Yoruba people to live in harmony and this could be applied in Africa 
as a whole. 
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2.8.2 Absence of Professional Legal Representation  
Though well-structured, the processes of resolving conflicts in African 
traditional societies are less formal compared to state-centred mechanisms. 
Due to the communal nature of these structures, which focus on relationship-
building, Afrocentric mechanisms lack professional legal representation. This 
augurs well for restorative justice as the formal legal system is highly 
structured, formal, complex, time-consuming and retributive in nature (Obarrio, 
2011). Such Eurocentric processes have been met with a lot of frustrations and 
dismay among African traditional societies. As Dinnen (2003:30) decries, a 
modern approach to conflict transformation such as a court of law ―failed to 
appeal because it excluded ordinary people from participation. It also created 
further divisions through its adversarial character. Taking disputes to court 
became a way of making money (through compensation claims) for many 
parties and led to further disagreements and conflict‖. The absence of 
professional legal representation in Afrocentric mechanisms of conflict 
transformation thus makes the entire process less intimidating for the parties 
involved. The environment is also familiar to the parties as cases are heard by 
elders, family heads and local chiefs within the confines of the village (Osei-
Hwedie and Rankopo, 2012). 
 
As Elechi et al. (2010) note, the justice system in contemporary African local 
communities is two-tier with one being the state-administered system based on 
Western norms, and the other being localised and run by community members 
based on African traditional values. However, there is a preference for the latter 
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as it is inexpensive, accessible, understood and run by community members 
themselves. Besides, ―state court interventions in conflicts have tended to 
polarize community members further. It is also important to appreciate the fact 
that African communities are close-knit, thus conflicts not quickly resolved to 
the satisfaction of litigants, can undermine the peace and harmony of the 
community. State-based tribunal decisions often follow the ‗‗winner takes all 
approach,‘‘ which goes against the principles and values of the African justice 
system‖ (Elechi et al., 2010:78).   
   
2.8.3 Focus on the Community as a whole instead of on the Individual 
A key aspect of African mechanisms to sustainable conflict transformation is a 
focus on the entire community as opposed to on an individual. The community 
is a significant component that substantially distinguishes African traditional 
societies from Western ones. As Schiele (1996:287) maintains, ―considerable 
emphasis in the Afrocentric paradigm is placed on a collective 
conceptualisation of human beings and on collective survival; individual identity 
is conceived as a collective identity‖. The author argues further that the focus 
on the community does not reject the uniqueness of the individual. It instead 
dispels the notion that an individual can exist in isolation from his/her 
community. Such a communal focus has been echoed by advocates of African 
socialism through African philosophies such as Ubuntu.  
 
Nussbaum (2003:2) moots that Ubuntu is a philosophy which expresses ―our 
interconnectedness, our common humanity, and the responsibility to each other 
that deeply flows from our deeply felt connection‖. Ubuntu as a traditional 
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mechanism of conflict resolution, stipulates sympathy, care, reciprocity and 
shared respect for other people and that one can be a person through others. 
Throwing some light on this, Mbiti (1989:141) maintains that the principle 
literally means ―I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am‖. This 
focus on collectivism places emphasis on communal cooperation, sharing and 
social responsibility and enhances the welfare of the entire community.     
    
Collective rights and responsibilities are thus common themes rooted in African 
local communities in contrast to individual rights and responsibilities, which are 
characteristic of Western societies. This collective mode of existence explains 
why people in most African cultural societies tend to be treated as members of 
one‘s family. Community members are ―addressed as father, mother and 
brother irrespective of the generic relationship‖ (Mkhize, 2006:187). It is within 
this context that anything and anyone within the community is everybody‘s 
business. There is a keen interest in strangers and visitors to the community as 
community members are interested in knowing the purpose of their visit, their 
length of stay and even the nature of their own communities. Everyone acts in 
the spirit of ‗thy brother‘s keeper‘.  
 
This is in sharp contrast to Western societies where everyone minds their own 
business. The researcher experienced this during one of his international trips 
to the United Kingdom. As the researcher toggled between trains, sweating 
under the strain of the heavy bags he was carrying, while at the same time 
wondering if he was headed in the right direction to catch the right train, not 
even once did anyone bother to ask him where he was coming from or where 
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he was heading to. It is needless to say neither did anyone heading towards 
the researcher‘s direction bothered to assist him with some of his luggage. The 
only one who eventually took some interest in the researcher was a Heathrow 
train ticket conductor who asked the researcher where he was from and where 
his final destination was. Following the short conversation, the old man 
subsequently told the researcher that he was from Ghana!         
 
In African traditional societies, a dispute is not understood as in the West, as a 
conflict between two parties but as a problem between an offender and the 
community. This is based on the rationale that what is finally affected is not a 
person but the whole group to which that person belongs. ―Modern justice 
systems are designed to identify individual responsibility, but guilt and 
punishment, victimhood and reparation are viewed as collective in most African 
societies. Moreover, trials only recognise criminal guilt, not political or moral 
responsibility‖ (Huyse, 2008:15). 
 
2.8.4 Focus on Reconciliation and Restoration of Social Harmony 
A key feature of the traditional justice system in local communities in Africa is 
its focus on restorative justice as opposed to retributive justice. The essence is 
to promote reconciliation and healing among parties involved in a dispute and 
not merely the punishment of offenders. As Elechi et al. (2010:74) outline, 
―African social institutions provide the necessary social support that 
prevents conflict and work towards the restoration of law-and-order when 
necessary. As a victim-centred justice system, the primary goal of 
African indigenous justice system is the restoration of victims, through 
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empowering them and addressing their needs. Again, offenders are held 
accountable to the victim and the community. Efforts are also made to 
reintegrate the offender back into the community. The counselling efforts 
are geared towards the healing and transformation of the offender into a 
conforming citizen. Although this is primarily the responsibility of the 
offender‘s family and well-wishers, the tone of the tribunals do also 
encourage the healing and reintegration of the offender‖.   
 
Zartman (2000:222) posits that restorative justice in African societies has to be 
understood ―as a compensation for loss, not as a retribution for offense‖. There 
is thus a focus on values such as apology, repentance, forgiveness and 
empathy. For instance, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
established in 1995, was designed to heal a society torn apart by apartheid. It 
laid the foundation for ground-breaking restorative justice in the country. The 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 which 
established the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, states that 
the purpose of the Commission includes,  
―the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the 
relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said period; 
affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the 
taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the 
rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of victims 
of violations of human rights‖. 
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This indicates a focus on healing and relationship-building as opposed to 
revenge. Similarly, Rwanda‘s indigenous approach to addressing the 1994 
genocide was the introduction of the gacaca courts in 2001. The courts focused 
on the restoration of social harmony through communal reconciliation. Led by 
individuals of exemplary moral and ethical standards, the courts were rooted in 
Rwandan traditions and notions of indigenous communal law enforcement. 
Designed to promote healing, this method of transitional justice aimed at 
providing truth, justice and reconciliation. ―The gacaca system rests upon the 
voluntary confession, demonstration of remorse, apology and request for 
forgiveness by perpetrators‖ (Mutisi, 2009:19). The process gave community 
members the opportunity to talk about the 1994 genocide. Rwandan 
communities worked together as witnesses, tribunal personnel and jurors and 
this offered local communities an opportunity to be part of the solution to the 
country‘s problems through relationships and consensus-building.  
 
Elechi (2008) notes this desire to build communities in his observation of the 
Ibo people in Nigeria. The author argues that no offense can be so serious that 
it cannot be atoned for by a commensurate action by the offender and other 
community members. Punishments are, therefore, finite and offenders have the 
option to restore their dignity and position within the community. Since 
subsistence agriculture remains the mainstay of most African local 
communities, social harmony is imperative in maintaining the productivity of 
societies. Thus, ―reintegrating offenders into the community is important so that 
they can remain productive and contribute to the survival of the community‖ 
(Elechi et al., 2010:78). The focus on reconciliation also takes centre-stage at a 
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traditional institution for conflict resolution known as the Court of the Sheiks in 
the Oromiya zone of Ethiopia. Zeleke (2010) documents how the Court whose 
members are well conversant with the customs of the people, transform 
conflicts by oath-taking thereby, committing parties to refrain from reprisals. 
―The court of the Sheikhs is also keen to avoid the sense of grudges (tit for tat). 
In a way, the institution also serves as a damage control institution‖ Zeleke 
(2010:73).    
 
2.8.5 Use of Rituals – Metaphysics in Judgments 
Rites and rituals are key aspects of traditional justice mechanisms in Africa. 
There is a belief in close affinity and a symbolic relationship between the living 
and the ancestral realm. The rite of passage from birth, maturity and death is 
celebrated in song, dance, rituals and narratives such as story-telling and 
proverbs. These all form part of conflict transformation within most African local 
communities. There is thus a tendency for Africans to fervently hold on to and 
revere customs and traditional beliefs. Practices such as ancestral worship, 
divination, sorcery, secret societies, liturgy and the rite of passage are still 
deeply revered by traditional African societies. Mutisi (2009:19) documents that 
―in traditional Rwanda, when a dispute had been resolved, a ritual or ceremony 
would be held to reflect the symbolic and practical importance of the process‖. 
These customs are not some imaginary, archaic and uncivilised superstitions, 
but a religious dogma, the essence of being and a way of life that defines most 
African rural communities. Given this premise, opposition to such traditions, 
especially within rural areas in most of Africa, is often considered offensive and 
even blasphemous. Afrocentrism thus transcends positivist approaches which 
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seek rational explanations to phenomena and underscores spiritualism in 
healing and divination processes across Africa. This reinforces perceptions that 
the African is egregiously supernatural as expressed by Senghor (1964:24) 
when he opined that ―emotion is black . . . reason is Greek‖.   
 
The reliance on supernatural forces, traditional healers and sacrificial rituals are 
key features of African traditional societies (Obario, 2011:37). In South Africa, 
Ulwaluko is traditionally regarded as an educational institution where initiates 
are taught about courtship, negotiating marriage and social responsibilities and 
conduct (Meintjes, 1998:7). It is an important rite of passage which marks the 
transition from boyhood to manhood. The initiation rites which normally take 
place between June and July or November and December, involves a series of 
teachings in isolated tents in mountains for several weeks, marked by the 
circumcision of young males (known as abakwetha) aged typically between 18 
and 25 years. The circumcision process, which is performed without any 
anaesthetic or pain-killers and the subsequent period of seclusion from society, 
―is viewed as demonstrating bravery and instilling endurance and discipline in 
initiates‖ (Ndangam, 2009:212). 
 
2.8.6 Role of Elders and Traditional Leaders 
The role of elders in conflict transformation in African societies cannot be 
overemphasised. Their importance is rooted in the belief that they are an 
embodiment of knowledge, experience and wisdom, hence the African proverb 
that ―what an old man can see sitting down, a young man cannot see standing 
up‖. It is perhaps with this in mind that the African Union established a 
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consultative body in 2007 known as the Panel of the Wise. This body is made 
up of renowned African leaders, tasked with the duty to advise the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union on issues related to conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. As stipulated in Article 11(2) of the Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union (2002), ―the Panel of the Wise shall be composed of five highly 
respected African personalities from various segments of society who have 
made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development 
on the continent‖. It is against this backdrop that Makwerere and Mandonga 
(2012:2) maintain that ―Elders were and are still respected as trustworthy 
mediators all over Africa because of their accumulated experience and wisdom. 
The roles of these mediators depend on traditions, circumstances and 
personalities.‖ There is thus a preference for kinship solidarity as opposed to 
ideological theory (Mazrui, 2001).   
 
A key African institution which sets Afrocentric mechanisms apart from 
Eurocentric ones is the chieftaincy. The chieftaincy is perhaps the most 
dynamic and resilient of all African indigenous institutions. While colonialism 
had different influences on traditional institutions in Africa, it by no means 
succeeded in dismantling the pre-colonial power relationships (Cheka, 2008). 
This is in spite of the fact that Eurocentric paradigms such as the Modernisation 
theory have often been insensitive ―to the cultural structures of African 
societies, and to the domesticated agency of Africans‖, condemning their 
indigenous institutions such as the chieftaincy as ―primitive, repressive and 
unchanging in character‖ (Nyamnjoh, 2003). This arrogance of Western 
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rationale has often attributed the shortcomings of chiefs as individuals, to the 
failure of the chieftaincy as an institution. That notwithstanding, the institution 
has stood the test of time throughout Africa‘s history and contemporary politics. 
Even at the state level, there is still the existence of kingdoms across the 
continent in countries like Morocco and Lesotho albeit with largely ceremonial 
monarchical powers, whereas in Swaziland, the monarchy is absolute.  
 
In line with this, several nations across the continent also maintain powerful 
chiefs and chieftaincies. These include Paramount Chief Chikowi of the Yao 
people of Malawi, King Otumfuo Nana Osei Tutu II of the Ashanti in Ghana, 
Chitimukulu Ackson Mwamba of the Bemba people of Zambia and King 
Goodwill Zwelithini of the Zulu people of South Africa. In South Africa for 
instance, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003) 
empowers traditional councils to participate ―in the development of policy and 
legislation at local level‖. Article 18 of the Act states that: ―Any parliamentary 
Bill pertaining to customary law or customs of traditional communities must, 
before it is passed by the house of Parliament where it was introduced, be 
referred by the Secretary to Parliament to the National House of Traditional 
Leaders for its comments.‖ Somali communities such as the Issa and the 
Gurgura are organised in a hierarchical structure that maintains social cohesion 
and is headed by the Ugaz or the King, who is the administration head of the 
clan. ―The Ugaz has ultimate power over all aspects. He is considered as the 
peacemaker and mediator between the society and their ‗god‘. If there is a 
problem such as drought, disease or famine, he appeals to the ‗god‘ and 
comes with a solution‖ (Tadesse, 2010:98).  
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Highlighting the importance of traditional leaders in African, Keulder (1998:11) 
maintains as follows:  
―The institution of traditional leaders and its procedures of governance 
is not only a simpler form of government, but also a more accessible, 
better understood, and a more participatory one. It is more accessible 
because it is closer to the subjects than any other system of 
government; subjects have more direct access to their leaders because 
they live in the same village and because any individual can approach 
the leader and ask him or her to call a meeting . . .; decision-making is 
based on consensus, which creates greater harmony and unity; it is 
transparent and participatory because most people may attend tribal 
meetings and express their views, directly not through representatives; 
and lastly, harmony and unity prevail because the interests of the tribal 
unit, rather than an individual or group of individuals, are pursued and 
expressed.‖ 
 
Across West Africa for instance, there is a growing commitment by the new 
elites to maintain strong linkages with their home village and even adopt neo-
traditional titles. Whether out of genuine recognition or out of sheer politics, 
there is an apparent renewed commitment by state bureaucrats to tap into the 
influence of the chieftaincy in enhancing governance, especially at the 
grassroots. The institution itself is adapting to the changing dynamics of global 
politics even as Africans themselves are engaged in the process of negotiating 
their multiple identities (Nyamnjoh, 2003). 
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Indigenous mechanisms of transforming conflicts have been in existence in 
African communities long before the advent of the modern state. They are in 
most cases, not codified in a written document and the essence is to build 
sustainable relationships between community members. A contemporary 
Eurocentric repackage such as alternate dispute resolution which emphasises 
methods such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration and conciliation, was a 
response to the inadequacies and deficiencies of court proceedings. AIKS has 
never been a response or an alternative to any system as they have always 
been indigenous and unique to African communities. 
 
2.9 CHALLENGES OF AFRICAN INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS IN 
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
African indigenous approaches to conflict transformation need not be 
romanticised as they are not a panacea for the resolution of all types of 
conflicts in all contexts, especially given the heterogeneity of contemporary 
African communities. One of the major challenges to AIKS is its inferior status 
in the global political economy of knowledge. Power is central to knowledge 
production and because of the inferior status of Africa in the global political 
economy, AIKS are being marginalised. This marginalisation is further 
exacerbated by the fact that AIKS is considered as being too local to resolve 
contemporary global challenges. Referring to attempts at mainstreaming AIKS 
as ―a conspiracy of empathy‖, Akpan (2011:117) frowns on the labelling of 
indigenous knowledge as local and native. He argues that such perceptions 
merely reinforce a master-servant asymmetry wherein AIKS has become ―a 
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target of ‗caring‘ thought and a subject of quiet disdain‖. Knowledge therefore, 
should not only be premised on the physical and its contribution to the 
production of tangible goods and services within the ‗modern‘ context. 
Emphasis also needs to be placed on the spiritual significance of knowledge 
and the role it plays on the lives of communities concerned. Such spiritual 
aspects of knowledge are evident even among urban-dwellers in for instance, 
their preference for the village as the place of retirement and burial place 
(Geschiere and Gugler, 1998). This spiritual knowledge is thus a crucial asset 
that can be harnessed for sustainable community livelihood across African local 
communities.   
 
Additionally, given the heterogeneous and diverse nature of traditions and 
customs in Africa, the relevance of indigenous mechanisms to solve inter-
cultural conflicts involving non-communal actors such as multinational 
corporations and modern state institutions, has also been questioned (Boege, 
2006:10). This is largely due to the fact that Africa is by no means 
homogenous, rendering conflict transformation a context specific exercise. 
Africa‘s increasing heterogeneity is also having negative effects on the 
communal livelihood inherent in African local communities. The extension of 
this collective mode of existence pledges certain individuals with parental 
responsibilities (Mkhize, 2006), including the ability to reward as well as the 
capacity to punish. It is this assumed responsibility to lay down specific 
communal norms and prescribe modes of behaviour that has resulted in 
intolerance for the ―other‘ within some local communities. It is, therefore, no 
surprise that ―most of the so-called troublemakers in most communities are 
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often people who are socially, politically and economically marginalised‖ (Elechi 
et al., 2010: 80).  
 
In South Africa for instance, homophobic violence is rife within local 
communities. Lesbians regarded as transgressing patriarchal norms, have 
been raped and even murdered in an attempt to prescribe communally 
acceptable behaviour (Lubbe, 2007). Other forms of prescriptive behaviour to 
women across the continent include the stigma on the wearing of mini-skirts, 
female genital mutilation and virginity testing. This intolerance for difference 
within Africa‘s local communities and the relegation of women as a second 
class gender, endorsed by local communities, are clearly flaws in African 
approaches to conflict transformation.     
 
More so, the use of elders in conflict transformation in Africa is almost always 
the prerogative of males, giving such processes a sexist patriarchal dimension. 
Sigsworth (2009:12-13) emphasises the patriarchal nature of African societies 
and maintains that ―patriarchy is a form of social organisation marked by the 
supremacy of the father in the clan or family; the legal dependence of wives 
and children; and the reckoning of descent and inheritance in the male line‖. 
Women thus tend to be marginalised and excluded from decision-making 
processes and structures as traditional African societies are predominantly 
male-dominated. The respect for and use of elders as mediators in conflict 
situations has been assumed by political leaders across the continent, leading 
to a culture of gerontocracy. This is a leadership practice whereby politics and 
statecraft are governed by individuals who are significantly older than most of 
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the adult population. As Plato, cited in Bytheway (1995:45) states, ―it is for the 
elder man to rule and for the younger to submit‖. Vakunta (2006:32) maintains 
that ―the sacred role as assigned to traditional leaders has been transformed to 
political leaders‖. It has thus become common practice for African heads of 
government to persistently change constitutional provisions to enable them to 
cling on to political power, leading to a continent predominantly ruled by old 
people.  
 
Examples include Robert Mugabe (91 years) of Zimbabwe, Paul Biya (82 
years) of Cameroon, Hifikepunye Lucas Pohamba of Namibia (80 years) and 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (73 years) of Equatorial Guinea. Former 
presidents like Omar Bongo (president of Gabon for 42 years), Gnassingbé 
Eyadéma (president of Togo for 38 years), and Muammar al-Gaddafi (president 
of Libya for 42 years) were all removed from political power only through death. 
The ages of these Africans sharply contrast with leaders in developed countries 
such as Barack Obama of the United States (54 years), David Cameron of the 
United Kingdom (49 years), François Hollande of France (61 years), Angela 
Merkel of Germany (61 years), Tony Abbott of Australia (58 years) and Vladimir 
Putin of Russia (63 years) (World Presidents Database, 2016). The reluctance 
of African leaders to relinquish power probably explains the high rates of 
unemployment among the youth in most African countries. Gerontocracy in 
African leadership correlates with the significant challenges experienced in 




Additionally, given the fast encroachment of globalisation, modern societies 
have regarded indigenous people and tradition as out-dated. This view is 
supported by other scholars who maintain that:  
―Historically, modern societies have regarded indigenous people and 
tradition as less progressive, and as a result, many groups of indigenous 
peoples, especially their younger generations, are influenced to devalue 
their native cultures and to adopt new lifestyles and technologies‖ (Osai, 
2010:9).  
 
According to a report by Minority Rights Group International (2008), the 
government of Botswana considers the Basarwa as an embarrassment to the 
modern state. These indigenous people of Botswana have insisted on 
maintaining their traditional lifestyle as hunter-gatherers. The Botswana 
government has been keen on changing the ‗primitive‘ traditional lifestyles of 
the Basarwa. There have been numerous attempts by the government to 
forcefully evict the Basarwa from the Kalagadi game reserve and integrate 
them into the ‗modern‘ society. African younger generations also tend to 
undermine AIKS as they are increasingly being influenced by Western 
civilisation (Ossai, 2010:9).  
 
Also, Gordon (1996) contends that the reliance on supernatural forces as used 
by traditional healers in the delivery of judgments and sacrificial rituals to 
promote reconciliation is a key feature of traditional justice systems in Africa. 
This is not easily accommodated in modern secular societies, especially in the 
wake of universal notions of human rights, equality and other democratic 
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norms. More so, the restorative justice approach which focuses on truth and 
reconciliation is partly flawed in that truth-telling does not necessarily guarantee 
reconciliation. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa for 
instance, has been criticised as having contributed very little to nation-building 
as South Africa remains a deeply divided society (Gibson, 2002; Meintjies, 
2013). Truth might in some instances, stir memories and open up old wounds 
which might further compound the reconciliation process. Additionally, truth is 
relative, subjective, elusive, complex and even contradictory (Hayner, 2001). It 
is in view of this that the former South African Archbishop, Desmond Tutu, 
considered reconciliation to be a miracle.  
 
However, AIKS is a methodology in its own right albeit these contestations. 
Besides, the history of all knowledge systems is a history of contestations. 
Knowledge is a manifestation of power relations. He who controls the media 
and is able to exercise leverage over government policy, influences what 
knowledge systems will be given priority in any given political system. 
Unfortunately, African countries have generally been at the receiving end of 
power relations hence, the marginalisation of AIKS. It is, however, important to 
look for ways in which both Afrocentric and Eurocentric mechanisms can be 
integrated in the search for sustainable solutions to contemporary African 
conflicts. This has by and large, been undermined in the literature as scholars 
from both paradigms often tend to play the chicken or the egg approach, which 
comes first?  
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The study fills the knowledge gap by advancing the polyepistemic view. This 
advances the view that we are living in a world characterised by different and 
diverse knowledge systems which are supposed to be complementary rather 
than competitive. Colonialism and other forms of imperialism have created a 
situation such that Eurocentricism became a dominant knowledge system and 
marginalized other knowledge systems, especially Indigenous Knowledge 
Systems (IKS) as unscientific and primitive.  The study realizes that people live 
in different ecological and cultural environments where they develop specific 
knowledge systems which are indigenous to a particular environment. It is on 
the basis  of this  consideration  that the  study examined  the case of  
indigenous  knowledge systems of the  Bakweri people  of  South  West 
Cameroon in  mitigating  contemporary  conflicts in their  area. 
 
2.10 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The review of existing literature in the previous section has revealed that 
inasmuch as initiatives to transform African conflicts need to be endogenous 
and rooted in African cultures, the continent is part of an increasingly globalised 
world characterised by heterogeneous communities. It is thus imperative to 
consider an interface between AIKS and other knowledge systems as a more 
sustainable approach to transforming contemporary African conflicts. It is within 
this framework that the theory of endogenous development, the postcolonial 
theory, the modernisation theory and the concept of integralism are used in the 
study. Nel (2006:27) posits that ―when we speak about theories, we have in 
mind coherent sets of concepts, statements and arguments, in which people 
set out and defend their most fundamental assumptions about issues‖.  
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The endogenous conflict transformation framework as advocated by Makwere 
and Mandonga (2012:2) maintain that ―endogenous conflict transformation 
methods are unique, informal, communal, restorative, context specific and 
diverse‖. As an Afrocentric approach, they have been practised for extended 
periods of time and have evolved within African societies rather than being a 
product of external importation. Contemporary conflict transformation initiatives 
in most African countries, including the Bakweri local communities of 
Cameroon, have been predominantly state-driven and negotiated from an elitist 
state-centric perspective. Hiroshi (2007) argues that within the ideology of the 
modern nation-state, only the government has sovereignty over war and peace-
making. Conventional conflict transformation studies and practices have tended 
to uncritically adhere to the state-centric ideology. Ordinary people tend to be 
excluded from conflict transformation-related responsibilities. Besides, 
community-based approaches should be acknowledged since they are more 
accessible and understood by large proportions of people within African local 
communities. The challenge for African researchers and academics is thus ―to 
affirm and activate the holistic paradigm of indigenous knowledge to reveal the 
wealth and richness of indigenous languages, worldviews, teachings, and 
experiences, all of which have been systematically excluded from 
contemporary educational institutions‖ (Battiste, 2002:1).  
 
This approach, which aims at empowering AIKS, has been captured by the 
postcolonial theory. For instance, Mapara (2009:141) argues that ―literature by 
the colonisers distorts the experience and realities of the colonised, and 
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inscribes the inferiority of the colonised while at the same time, promoting the 
superiority of the coloniser‖. Postcolonial theorists are of the view that 
colonialism and subsequent neo-colonial mechanisms have undermined 
African IKS by marginalising these systems of knowing in the search for 
sustainable solutions to developmental challenges (Nazarea et al., 1998). In 
combating the residual effects of colonialism on cultures, post-colonialism 
explores ways in which societies can move forward based on mutual respect. It 
is aimed at deconstructing colonial structures which valorised Western norms, 
silenced the subaltern and perpetuate the dependency of Africa in particular 
and the third world in general (Childs and Williams, 2014).  It is thus imperative 
to reclaim African identity by valorising and celebrating African values and 
endogenous mechanisms. 
 
The case for indigenous approaches to conflict transformation in Africa has 
been dented by a constant and recurring struggle between the masses and the 
corrupt elite who highjack the state for their narrow interests. Moreover, African 
local societies are witnessing a growing encroachment of universalised norms 
and new forms of conflict such as terrorism and cyber-crime. Besides, Bakweri 
local communities in Cameroon have become increasingly heterogeneous due 
to changes in migration patterns. It is within this predicament that the 
modernisation school has resurfaced as an alternative to the endogenous 
approach. It holds that ―African societies are in the process of becoming 
‗modern‘ rational entities in which efficiency and scientific logic replace 
traditional values and belief systems‖ (Chazan et al., 1999:15). As a 
Eurocentric approach, modernisation theorists argue that through mentorship 
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and assistance from developed countries, African countries will abandon their 
‗backward‘ ways, will evolve to an age of mass consumption and be integrated 
into the global village. It is within this context that some Bakweri local 
communities in Cameroon have witnessed their customs and traditions being 
overshadowed by Western language, music and state-based institutions.  
 
That notwithstanding, the fact that the modernisation theory inherently 
condemns AIKS as being too local and outmoded, is an indication that the 
approach is incomprehensive in resolving conflicts even within contemporary 
Bakweri local communities. As Nayoo (2007:167) argues, ―many theories 
imported from the West have not been able to find innovative solutions to 
Africa‘s developmental dilemmas, including conflicts‖. Even though 
modernisation theorists pride themselves as being embedded in scientific 
rigour and abstract formulations, conflict is context-specific to the realities and 
verities of the case study. Besides, conflicts cannot be sustainably resolved by 
ignoring the ‗other‘. It is within this backdrop that a more sustainable approach 
would be a fusion of both African endogenous and Eurocentric approaches.  
 
Jeffries‘ (1999) concept of Integralism provides valuable insights in this regard. 
According to the theory, it is erroneous to assume that everything must exist in 
bivalence as social reality actually exists in multi-valence. There is local in the 
global and vice versa. ―No ‗traditional‘ society can hope to make progress 
without knowledge from outside. No knowledge system is so ‗complete‘ that it 
needs nothing from outside its domain. More correctly, one is embedded in the 
other‖ (Akpan, 2011: 121). The concept focuses on how to incorporate natural 
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science with supernatural conceptions of faith and belief systems. It seeks to 
resolve the schisms between scientific logic of modernisation theory and the 
philosophical and religious aspects of the endogenous approach and AIKS. To 
do this, Integralism focuses on the ethical and moral principles of major 
religions. Principles of hospitality, altruism, charity and reciprocity are 
emphasised. Integralism maintains that methods of cognition are not just 
through sense and reason, but also through intuition. Conflict transformation 
approaches should thus not only be limited to forensic science and rationality, 
but also through the morality and ethics of religion and culture. This will not only 
reduce the ―insensitivities‖ of law and retribution, but will also address the 
problem of irrelevance of AIKS. It is thus by integrating Eurocentric and 
Afrocentric mechanisms that both knowledge systems ―would be united in the 
goal of understanding the human condition as the basis for personal, social and 
cultural reconstruction‖ (Jeffries, 1999:39). 
 
2.11 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter has presented contestations regarding the relevance of 
Eurocentric and Afrocentric mechanisms in transforming African conflicts. It is 
argued that attempts at labelling AIKS as local, partly emanates from the 
tendency of bifurcating knowledge systems and hence, overlooking the fact that 
reality exists in multi-valence. This bifurcation of knowledge systems has been 
translated into a mono-cultural discourse on globalisation, a discourse that 
merely glorifies Western culture and marginalises the ‗other‘. As Asante 
(2006:153) argues, ―a globalisation that seeks to have Chinese adopt French 
architecture, Japanese believe that European renaissance art is more 
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important than Japanese classics, English music more ‗classical‘ than African 
music and Italian dance more ‗classical‘ than Indian dance, and so forth, 
remains a bad idea. The ultimate objective is not dialogue, but control, 
prediction and subjection‖. Eurocentrism is thus an ideology of cultural 
annihilation as it undermines other knowledge systems in its drive to epitomise 
Western values and institutions. Afrocentrism on the other hand, has usually 
been expressed as a reaction to Eurocentrism. In its penchant of resisting 
Western encroachment, Afrocentrism has largely failed to acknowledge its own 
challenges in the era of globalisation.  
 
Indigenous people, the world over, have had to reckon with the encroachment 
of Eurocentric values into their natural habitats. Often, they have had to give up 
their land, natural habitats, forests and ways of life, so as to adapt to the 
logging, fishing, fracking, mining and construction activities of multinational 
corporations and governments alike. This sacrifice, at times, comes in 
exchange for little more than lite beer and blue jeans. From the Bakweri people 
of the South West Region of Cameroon, the pygmies of Equatorial Africa, the 
Khoisan of the Kalahari to the Aborigines of Australia, indigenous people have 
been exploited, branded, stripped of their land and their traditional practices 
have been demonised as primitive, barbaric and resistant to change, all in the 
name of globalisation which is in fact, Westernisation. In spite of this, 
Westernisation unfortunately, has not provided sustainable solutions to the 
world‘s growing conflicts. Instead, the domineering and exploitative nature of 
Eurocentrism has exacerbated intrastate conflicts which have grown in 
incidence across Africa since the so-called ―Wind of Change‖ blew across the 
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continent in the 1960s. While Modernisation theorists have blamed Africa‘s 
plight on the inadequacies of the African to take advantage of Western 
benevolence, critics have argued that Eurocentric arrogance is the root of 
Africa‘s as well as global conflicts.     
 
The way forward is thus to have a multicultural discourse. It is within the 
framework of such pluralism that an argument can be established here that no 
society is too simple and local to be complex. Alternatively, no knowledge 
system is too advanced and complex that it lacks simplicities. Inasmuch as 
there are complexities within the simple, there are also simplicities within the 
complex. Akpan (2011:121) aptly maintains that ―no society can be so 
‗advanced‘ that it no longer has need of ‗local‘ knowledge. No ‗traditional‘ 
society can hope to make progress without knowledge from outside‖. Since 
problems cannot be resolved by ignoring the ‗other‘, integrating African 
indigenous knowledge systems with western-based knowledge mechanisms 
should be a more sustainable path to contemporary conflict transformation. It is 
thus within the context of these contestations that Nakata (2002:28) 
summarises that: 
―The whole area of indigenous knowledge is a contentious one. From 
what constitutes ‗indigenous‘ to whose interests are being served by the 
documentation of such knowledge, there lies a string of contradictions, of 








The aim of this study was to investigate African indigenous knowledge systems 
in contemporary conflict transformation with specific reference to chieftaincy of 
the Bakweri people of the South West region of Cameroon. The relevance of a 
case study in methodology cannot be underestimated. A case study is a 
research strategy that involves an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
phenomenon within its real-life context. The case study approach provides a 
systematic and in-depth way of looking at event, collecting data, analysing 
information and reporting the results (Babbie, 2007). As a result, the researcher 
gains a sharpened understanding of why the research issues happened as they 
did, and what might become important to look at more extensively in the future 
(Bless et al., 2006).  
 
According to Soy (1997) ―researchers from many disciplines use the case study 
method to build upon theory, produce new theory, dispute or challenge theory, 
explain a situation, and provide a basis to apply solutions to situations, explore, 
or describe an object or phenomenon. The advantages of the case study 
method are its applicability to real-life, contemporary, human situations and its 
public accessibility through written reports‖. This study deals with conflict and 
human subjects are its primary variable. Evans (2008) argues that:  
―the basic point about conflict is that it is always context-specific. Big 
overarching theories – whether cast in terms of clash of civilisations, 
ancient tribal enmity, economic greed, economic grievance, or anything 
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else – may be good for keynote speeches, and are certainly good for 
academic royalties. They may also be quite helpful in identifying particular 
explanatory factors that should certainly be taken into account in trying to 
understand the dynamics of particular situations. But they never seem to 
work very well in sorting between those situations which are combustible 
and those which are not. For that you need detailed, case by case 
analysis, not making assumptions on the basis of experience elsewhere, 
or what has gone before, but looking at what is under your nose, right 
now‖. 
 
This Chapter outlines and discusses the methodology used in the study. It 
highlights the research site and research design which includes data collection 
methods and the strategies for ensuring validity and reliability. The data 
analysis methods are also presented. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH SITES 
Data was collected from the following communities: Molyko, Soppo, 
Bokwaongo and Koke. These villages are situated within the district of Buea, 
Cameroon. The local communities in these villages have for long been utilising 
indigenous mechanisms such as the chieftaincy, traditional healers and rituals 
to transform conflicts such as land disputes, marital conflicts, inheritance and 
succession disputes. They are also exposed to the rapid encroachment of 
globalisation which is accompanied by heterogeneous cultures. 
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3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to determine the contribution of African Indigenous Knowledge 
Systems (AIKS) in contemporary conflict transformation, a qualitative research 
design was adopted in the study. Qualitative research allows for a more flexible 
interaction between the researcher and community members using qualitative 
research methods such as in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and 
participatory observation. Qualitative research allows the researcher to 
investigate research participants in their natural settings and in order to make 
sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to 
them (Pierce, 2008). The study thus employed a combination of ethnographic 
and phenomenological research designs. According to Hammersly et al. 
(1983:2), ―the ethnographer participates overtly or covertly in people‘s daily 
lives for extended periods of time watching what happens, listening to what is 
said, asking questions. In fact collecting whatever data are available to throw 
light on issues with which he or she is concerned‖. On the other hand, 
phenomenology seeks to develop an articulate understand of human 
experience as perceived by the subjects themselves. As Schutz (1962:69) 
states, ―the observational field of the social scientist – social reality – has a 
specific meaning and reference structure for the human beings living, acting 
and thinking within it. By a series of common sense constructs they have pre-
selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of 
their daily lives‖. The study was thus grounded both on observation, as well as 
on the narratives as told by respondents through in-depth interviews and focus 
group discussions.       
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3.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
The following subsections present the research methods that were employed to 
collect data for this study. Both primary and secondary sources of data were 
used. . While primary sources involved key informant interviews, participant 
observation, and focus group discussions, secondary sources included books, 
journal articles and internet sources.     
 
3.4.1 Key Informant Interviews 
Conducting interviews is a traditional method of social scientists for extracting 
information through well-placed individuals in the society and institutions. It is 
part of the ethnographic approach, often used in situations where access to 
official records or data is weak or non-existent. Where official records exist, it is 
used as a means to gain further insight by questioning key informants about 
specific social, political and economic problems. Social scientists also use this 
approach within the field of social interactionist or ethno-methodological 
research. Key informant interviews consist of asking questions that are mainly 
semi-structured or open-ended, allowing detailed, full answers from 
respondents. This approach contrasts with quantitative questionnaires, which 
allow only controlled and structured responses within narrow parameters 
(McNamara, 2007). 
 
In this study, interviews formed a large part of the research approach to data 
collection. Distinct from the use of a survey method, according to Mackenzie 
and Knipe (2006), the epistemology of the qualitative interview aligns itself 
more with a constructivist paradigm than a positivist one. This was important for 
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this study as it gave the researcher an opportunity to be actively involved rather 
than being just a passive listener. The interviews were both semi-structured as 
well as open-ended, and the researcher focused more on asking questions and 
listening to participants. Such a free-flowing style, using convergent 
interviewing techniques with emphasis on listening and observing, ensured that 
the experiences and opinions of interviewees were properly captured. Similarly, 
in this study the researcher at all times attempted to allow the interviewees to 
tell their stories/experiences in detail on approaches to conflict transformation. 
During the interviews, the researcher was mindful of the fact that it was 
necessary to gain insights into the key concepts of the study as the 
interviewees were telling their stories and sharing their experiences and views. 
As a result, the researcher only used the interview guide to direct the interview 
discussions, but never restrained any additional information that happened to 
arise.  
 
At all times, richness of data was sought from participants as they were 
encouraged to talk openly about their experiences to enable insights through 
words and not in numbers. In consultation  with  the community  leadership  a 
total number  of  50  respondents  (25 men and 25 women) were purposively  
selected  for the  study. They included both Bakweri and non-Bakweri residents 
in the study communities.  These were knowledge holders and practitioners, 
who were directly involved in conflict situations relating to the study community. 
The respondents included local chiefs, quarter heads, members of sacred 
societies, magistrates, police officers, university students, etc. Age and 
education were also considered as vital factors in selecting the respondents. 
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Education was important as it indicated a certain degree of familiarity with 
contemporary state structures and their role in conflict transformation. Age on 
the other hand was important as the elderly Bakweri respondents were more 
familiar with the role of indigenous institutions in conflict transformation in the 
study communities. 
 
3.4.2 Participant Observation  
Interviews alone were deemed insufficient for the study, and they were 
supplemented by participant observation in order to improve the validity of the 
findings. Begold (2007) defines a participatory approach as a methodology that 
argues in favour of the possibility, the significance, and the usefulness of 
integrating research partners in the knowledge-production process. In this 
study, the participatory approach provided the study community with the 
opportunity to be participants in the research process. In addition to serving as 
informants, knowledge holders were involved in the identification and selection 
of the study case, definition of the problem and interpretation of data from their 
own cultural perspective. The approach was meant to fill the power gap 
between the researcher and the researched community. Participant 
observation was also used because it has the advantage as outlined by 
Kawulich (2005, para. 8) to provide the researcher with ways to check for non-
verbal expressions of feelings, to understand how participants communicate 
with each other and check how much time was spent on various activities. 
Participant observation particularly, has been used in an array of disciplines as 
a tool for data collection about people, processes, and cultures in qualitative 
research (Wolcott, 2001). It was also used to increase the validity of the study. 
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In this case, observations assisted the researcher to have a better 
understanding of the study area. Similarly, it assisted mainly to develop a 
holistic understanding of the use of community-based knowledge systems in 
contemporary conflict transformation.  
 
Against this backdrop, the researcher spent time in the study area, collecting 
data. During this time, and through the assistance and cooperation of 
community leaders, the researcher participated in various activities related to 
the research problem such as community meetings and court sessions. The 
researcher visited police stations and government offices such as those of the 
Divisional Officer and the State Counsel along with complainants. The 
researcher was fully aware of the fact that one of the limitations in using 
participant observation as a technique is that sometimes, researchers are not 
easily accepted in the communities where they are conducting their research. A 
number of issues such as one‘s appearance, ethnicity, age, gender and class 
may affect the researcher‘s acceptance in the community (Kawulich, 2005). 
Another limitation of participant observation is that the researcher can immerse 
into an unfamiliar culture and study the lives of other people as a full time 
community member during the period of the research. This is limiting because 
sometimes, researchers have to change their ways of lives in order to fit within 
the community of the study. However, this was not the case with this study 
since the researcher is familiar with the culture and the way of life within the 
study area.   
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3.4.3 Focus Group Discussions 
Focus group discussions were conducted with selected groups made up of 6-
10 community members. Yates (2004) states that a focus group differs from an 
in-depth interview in that, it is a group rather than a one-to-one interview. Also, 
getting the participants to discuss among themselves was a fast and easy way 
of collecting qualitative data in less time than would be needed for individual 
interviews. Three focus group sessions were conducted with each group 
consisting of between six and ten participants for an average duration of one 
hour each. These participants were selected based on their knowledge of either 
the indigenous knowledge systems of the Bakweri and/or state-centred 
mechanisms of conflict transformation in the study communities.   
 
One limitation levelled against focus group discussions is that the focus groups 
are placed in an artificial environment which can influence responses 
generated. This is due to the fact that researchers using the ethnographic 
technique will situate themselves in the real environment that is unreachable for 
focus groups. In focus groups, people are grouped in a meeting room, thus 
they may behave differently from how they behave when they are not watched 
and it might affect the quality of research results (Morgan, 1996). The overall 
objective of using a variety of data collection methods was to explore people‘s 
knowledge and experience on the research problem. The combination of 
interviews, participant observation and focus groups discussions provided a 
better understanding of the research problem from the community‘s perspective 
through interaction.  
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3.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data gathered for this study was analysed qualitatively. Sarantakos (1998) 
states that data analysis involves making sense out of information gathered 
from research and bringing out meaning from data. Qualitative data in the form 
of digital voice recorded interviews was transcribed and translated from the 
lingua franca of the study communities where applicable, into English. Due to 
the heterogeneous nature of the study communities, the lingua franca used 
was Pidgin-English, an uncodified and easily modified language adapted from 
the English language. Interviews, focus group discussions and participant 
observation notes were typed and analysed through content analysis. In 
content analysis, the researcher classifies key ideas in a written 
communication, such as a report or an article. A researcher can also do content 
analysis of different forms of recorded information. It is a systematic method for 
analysing textual information in a standardised way that allows evaluators to 
make inferences about that information. Classifying numerous texts and words 
in much fewer content categories is a central idea in content analysis (Weber, 
1990:12). Information obtained from key informants, focus group discussions 
and participant observation was analysed by categorising the data into themes 
targeted at answering the research questions.  
 
3.6 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF DATA 
In research validity is described as the degree to which a research study, 
especially the research instruments used, measure what they are  intended to 
measure.  There are two main types of validity, internal and external.  Internal 
validity refers to the validity of the measurement itself, whereas external validity 
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refers to the ability to generalise the findings to the target population.  Both are 
very important in analysing the appropriateness, meaningfulness and 
usefulness of a research study.  The use  of  different research instruments and 
sources  of information  in this  study of  Indigenous Knowledge  Systems and 
Contemporary  Conflict Transformation  Among the  Bakweri People  of South 
West Cameroon,  such as in-depth interview views, focus group discussions 
and participant observation  was meant  to  cross-reference  them and ensure  
that the data were valid and  the instruments were reliable. As already 
indicated, different sources of information   were used in the employment of 
these research instruments. The responses of interviewees were cross 
referenced to ensure consistency in the narration of facts. 
 
Also, in order to enhance the validity and reliability of this study, the researcher 
observed the certain maxims advanced by Fals-Borda (1995) who cautions as 
follows:  
―Do not monopolise your knowledge nor impose arrogantly your 
techniques, but respect and combine your skills with the knowledge 
of the researched or grassroots communities, taking them as full 
partners and co-researchers. Do not trust elitist versions of history 
and science which respond to dominant interests, but be receptive to 
counter-narratives and try to recapture them. Do not depend solely 
on your culture to interpret facts, but recover local values, traits, 
beliefs, and arts for action by and with the research organisations. Do 
not impose your own ponderous scientific style for communicating 
results, but diffuse and share what you have learned together with 
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the people, in a manner that is wholly understandable and even 
literary and pleasant, for science should not be necessarily a mystery 
nor a monopoly of experts and intellectuals‖. 
  
3.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
According to Bak (2004:28), one of the goals of ethics in research is to ensure 
that no one is harmed as a result of research activities. In support of this view, 
Strydom and Venter (2002:45) maintain that ―research should be based on 
mutual trust, acceptance and cooperation, and well accepted conventions and 
expectations between parties involved in a research project‖. The fact that 
human beings are objects of study in the social sciences brings unique ethical 
problems to the researcher. For researchers in the social sciences, the ethical 
issues are pervasive and complex, since data can be obtained at the expense 
of human subjects. Given the fact that data for this study was obtained from 
both primary and secondary sources, numerous ethical issues were observed 
throughout the study as follows:  
 
 Informed Consent Obtained and Voluntary Participation 
 The consent of all respondents was duly obtained before conducting the 
interviews and focus group discussions. Where applicable, the researcher 
obtained permission from relevant gate-keepers such as local chiefs and 
quarter heads to conduct research in the local communities.  The Respondents 
were informed that their participation in the study was entirely voluntary. They 
had the choice to participate, not to participate or to stop t h e i r  participation 
in the study without incurring any penalties for taking such an action. 
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Participants were thus, given choices of withdrawing from the study whenever 
they felt that they had lost interest to participate. The researcher obtained 
approval from participants to record the interviews and conversations. This 
enabled the interviewer to focus on the interviewees and their responses. That 
notwithstanding, the researcher still took down notes on key issues raised 
during interviews. Questions pertaining to the interviews were listed on the 
informed-consent sheet that each interviewee was required to sign. Moreover, 
all ethics protocols of the University of KwaZulu-Natal were duly observed.   
 
 Anonymity and Confidentiality of Participants Ensured 
In addition to obtaining the consent of participants, the researcher ensured that 
their views were presented anonymously. Neither the names nor identities 
of participants were disclosed in any form throughout the study. Also, an 
environment of comfort and trust was ensured throughout the study. This was 
necessary in order to facilitate the greatest flow of views and insights from each 
participant. To protect participants, their genuine names were kept anonymous 
and pseudo names used when referring to their experiences. 
 
 Guarded Against Plagiarism 
Plagiarism constitutes a serious offence in all academic institutions as it 
involves the use of someone else‘s works or ideas without due 
acknowledgement and hence, a theft of their intellectual property. In order to 
avoid plagiarism, all authors whose works and ideas were consulted during this 
study, have been duly acknowledged in the forms of in-text citations and in the 
list of references.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS AMONG BAKWERI COMMUNITIES IN 
BUEA, CAMEROON 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The District of Buea is the capital city of the South West region of Cameroon. 
Along with other towns and villages in the Fako Division, Buea is also the home 
of the Bakweri people and the seat of their paramount chief. Buea was part of 
the section of Cameroon which was under the British colonial administration. 
Due to the region‘s fertile volcanic soils, the Cameroon Development 
Corporation (CDC) was established by the British colonial administration in 
1947 to produce tropical agricultural cash crops such as bananas, tea and oil 
palms. The CDC, being one of the largest employers in the country, led to the 
influx of migrants from other parts of the country to Buea in particular, and the 
Fako Division in general (Dibussi, 1999). This influx increased Buea‘s 
heterogeneity. Primary data gathered during data collection revealed that Buea 
also hosts the University of Buea (established in 1992), which until the 
establishment of the newly created University of Bamenda in 2011, had been 
the only English-speaking University in Cameroon. The growing number of 
students (which currently stands at over 18 000) has been accompanied by an 
influx of businesses such as cyber cafes, restaurants, taverns and night clubs, 
to service the growing population.  
 
The Bakweri people are the dominant ethnic group in the district of Buea (at the 
foot of Mount Fako). They are scattered across about one hundred villages in 
the Fako Division. It is estimated from the last survey conducted in 1996 that 
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there were about 50 000 Bakweri people in the Division. Each village is headed 
by a chief though they were all united by their totem, the elephant (Fanso, 
1989). They have a rich history and culture, including the chieftaincy and 
indigenous games such as the Palapala wrestling competition, dance groups 
and secret societies (Ngoh, 1996).  
 
4.2 TYPES OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS WITHIN BAKWERI 
COMMUNITIES 
There has been a gradual but progressive shift from traditional to contemporary 
forms of conflict among the Bakweri people in Buea. Information gathered from 
key informant interviews shows that traditional conflicts used to involve issues 
related to witchcraft, land disputes and stray animals trespassing through 
people‘s farms. People accused of witchcraft, for instance, were given herbal 
tonic to drink. If the accused vomited after consuming the herbal tonic, s/he 
was exonerated, but if the accused‘s stomach got swollen after consuming the 
herbal tonic, then s/he was declared guilty. No contemporary case of witchcraft 
was documented during the data collection process. There are traditional 
conflicts that are still inherent within contemporary Bakweri communities, 
though their nature, scope and mechanisms to transform them have evolved 
over time. They include land disputes, marital squabbles and inheritance / 
succession disputes. In addition, due to the increasing heterogeneity of Buea, 
new forms of conflict are emerging within the society (such as religion and 
corruption). However, the most protrusive type of conflict within Bakweri 
communities that all participants identified with during the field study was land 
ownership and associated disputes. 
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4.2.1 Land Disputes  
Land is without doubt, an important natural resource not just for the Bakweri 
people, but for all African indigenous communities. In the study communities, 
land is utilised for a multiplicity of reasons, including subsistence agriculture, 
grazing of domestic animals such as goats, hunting and human settlement. For 
instance, Baiphethi et al. (2009) stress the need to harness subsistence 
agriculture in African local communities to enhance sustainable food security, 
especially for rural livelihoods. It was revealed that all land in Cameroon was 
categorised as state land, including native land registered under customary 
law. As a result of this, any land can be expropriated by the state for public use. 
However, directly controlled state land includes land that had been 
expropriated for public use or land around ―property which by nature or 
intended purpose, is set apart either for the direct use of the public or for public 
services‖ (See Ordinance N°.74-2 of 6 July 1974 to establish rules governing 
State lands). That notwithstanding, data sourced from interviews with 
community leaders, revealed that there were two main categories of contested 
land in contemporary Bakweri communities. There is the native land and the 
CDC land surrender.  
 
Native land covers privately-owned land that had been used by the Bakweri 
people for among others, settlement and subsistence agriculture. Prior to the 
procurement of native land, the seller of the land has the responsibility to prove 
ownership of the land. In case of family land, the seller has to provide evidence 
that the family members have given the seller permission to sell the land. The 
evidence can include statements of approval from witnesses from the seller‘s 
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family and appropriate documentation. The standard procurement process of 
native land involves the signing of an agreement to buy / sell land contract 
between the buyer and the seller. The form includes among others, the 
dimensions of the land, the owner of the land, the amount of the sale of the 
land and the signatures of witnesses, including the chief of the village, and in 
some cases, the quarter head. As revealed in the in-depth interviews, following 
the validation of the sale by the chief (his kinsmen and witnesses both from the 
buyer‘s and seller‘s side), the transfer of land at the village level was declared 
complete. The new owner then had the authority to carry out any activity on the 
land, including farming and construction. 
 
The two main categories of land ownership rights and access in Cameroon are 
under customary and statutory laws. Access to land under customary law is 
limited to the validation of a sale and transfer of land after the signature of the 
transfer documents by the chief. However, after the finalisation of the transfer 
at the village level, ownership under state law requires the new owner to 
register the property at the Lands Department (at the office of the Divisional 
Officer). If s/he chooses to do so, a cadastral survey will then be conducted by 
the Lands Department and a land certificate will subsequently be issued by a 
regional delegate in the Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure through the 
office of the Senior Divisional Officer. Section 1 of Decree No. 76/165 of April 
27, 1976 recognises the land certificate as the only official certificate of land 




Moreover, Belaunde et al., (2010:20-21) note the lengthy and costly process 
involved in the acquisition of a land certificate in Cameroon. It was found during 
the course of the study that the standard procedure for obtaining a land 
certificate involves the following: a complete application, including a sworn 
professional surveyor‘s report; a professional valuation surveyor‘s report; and 
an attestation of non-indebtedness from the local Department of Lands (all of 
which may be costly to acquire). The application then goes through the 
Divisional Officer, Land Consultative Board, Divisional Chief of Service for 
Lands, Chief of the Provincial Service of Lands and the Central Service of Land 
in Yaounde, a process that often takes five years on average. Belaunde et al. 
(2010) further note that due to this bureaucratic red tape involved in the 
processing of land certificates, only about 11 per cent of private land in 
Cameroon is registered with the state. Much of privately-owned land is thus, 
simply registered under customary law, at the village level by the chief. The 
absence of land certificates by land owners paves the way for conflicts. 
 
It was common to find non-Bakweri people being holders of huge and 
numerous plots of native land in the District of Buea. This is due to the fact that 
for a long time, the area had been exposed to and accommodative of non-
natives. Moreover, during the German colonial era, over 100 000 hectares of 
land was expropriated across the South West region for large-scale plantation 
agriculture due to its fertile volcanic soil, and Bakweri people were forced out to 
less fertile reserves. During focus group discussions, it was revealed how in 
protest to the expropriation, the Bakweri people showed little enthusiasm to 
work on the plantations and were branded by the Germans as apathetic and 
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lazy. This stereotype still persists nowadays. To address the problem of 
shortage of labourers, the colonial administration sought to recruit workers from 
other parts of Cameroon. While initially, most migrant workers returned to their 
local communities after short spells of work on the plantations, an increasing 
number of them gradually decided over time, to settle in the South West after 
retirement (Konings, 2009:19). It is this settler population that resorted to 
acquire plots of native land from the indigenous people, historically sold to them 
at almost give-away prices. As one participant remarked:  
―Before the establishment of the University of Buea in 1992, land in 
Buea was almost worthless. You should know that the Bakweri 
people are a very clean, proud and accommodative people. So they 
used to sell land to foreigners for almost nothing to finance their 
generally laid-back lives. That attitude has still not changed. What 
has changed, however, is that a huge chunk of native lands is now in 
the hands of non-Bakweri people and that is a problem.‖          
 
The other category of land is the one under the Cameroon Development 
Corporation (CDC) land surrender. The South West region of Cameroon, with 
Buea being its capital, is the hub of the agricultural corporation, the CDC. The 
Bakweri people had for long, laid claims to the land on which the Corporation 
had expropriated to establish its estates and called for among other things, ―an 
official recognition that the CDC land historically and legally belonged to the 
natives of Fako Division‖ (Dibussi, 1999:4). This movement for the recuperation 
of Bakweri land (expropriated by the colonial administration) was spearheaded 
by a group called the Bakweri Land Claims Committee (BLCC). In-depth 
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interviews with community leaders and other knowledge holders and supported 
by Kofele-Kale (2007:106) revealed that the arbitrary and uncompensated 
alienation of some of the most fertile Bakweri lands was strongly resisted by 
this group, the reclamation of which has remained a major point of contention 
since then. There has been a series of lengthy complaints and court battles 
lodged by the BLCC starting from the United Nations Organisation in 1947 to 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples‘ Rights in 2007. The 
government of Cameroon subsequently embarked on a drive to ‗surrender‘ 
CDC lands to Bakweri chiefs in the Fako Division. The process of surrendering 
land back to the Bakweri people escalated the land crisis in the District of Buea 
in particular, and the Fako Division as a whole (Kofele-Kale, 2007). 
 
The CDC land surrender was specifically meant to return an initial 25 000 acres 
of land that had been expropriated by the Corporation back to the Bakweri 
people (Konings, 2011). Since local chiefs are custodians of the village, the 
CDC has been progressively ‗surrendering‘ land back to the chiefs for 
redistribution to Bakweri indigenes within their respective villages. However, the 
redistribution process was highly unregulated. There were no clear guidelines 
and policies regarding the redistribution of the surrendered land. Consequently, 
the chiefs, on their part, have over the past few years, embarked on an 
egregious drive to sell land surrendered to them by Corporation (meant to be 
redistributed to the Bakweri people). This is partly due to the small number of 
Bakweri indigenes vis-a-vis the surrendered land. Instead of being part of the 
solution, the Bakweri chiefs became the catalyst behind the problem of land 
redistribution among Bakweri communities. As one interviewee observed: 
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―To be crowned a Bakweri chief these days is a source of newfound 
wealth. What we are witnessing these days is a reckless sale of land 
by Bakweri chiefs to sustain luxurious lifestyles. This practice is 
more prevalent among young chiefs who have recently embarked on 
a drive to buy Toyota Rav4s as a show of affluence.‖    
 
Focus group discussions revealed that the sale of land is a particularly 
profitable exercise in Cameroon, specifically in Buea. Besides serving as the 
capital city of the South West region, Buea also hosts the University of Buea 
with an ever-growing student population (which currently stands at about 18 
000 students) (University of Buea, 2015). The consequence has been the 
transformation of erstwhile conservative villages, to heterogeneous and modern 
political and economic hubs, with enormous potential for businesses to thrive. 
This has resulted in a scramble for land, much of which is under the custody of 
local chiefs, having been surrendered to them under the CDC land surrender 
programme.  
 
It was revealed during the study that conflicts usually escalate when the same 
piece of land is sold and resold to different unsuspecting buyers. This is 
particularly common, especially among Cameroonians in the diaspora who buy 
and leave land undeveloped, with the expectation that its value will appreciate 
in the future. Due to greed, the practice of selling land to numerous buyers is 
common not just with local chiefs but also with individual landowners. This is 
particularly so given the lengthy process involved in the procurement of a land 
certificate. Since there are no land certificates for most of the land sold in Buea, 
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it is common for fake documents to be generated by individuals professing 
ownership of land which, in actual fact, does not belong to them. In support of 
this, Ndang and Bau (2010) maintain that conflicts over land ownership in the 
Fako Division of Cameroon ―are usually instigated by disagreements on family 
succession, greed and double dealing, resulting in feuds, bloodshed and 
prolonged court cases‖. This paves the way for the numerous land disputes in 
the district as revealed during data collection. It was revealed that the Court of 
Appeal in Buea has received hundreds of land-related cases since 2010.  
 
It was also revealed in the study that traditionally, the Bakweri chiefs played a 
key role in the process of land procurement in Buea. The local chiefs had to 
establish facts regarding rightful ownership in the case of native land. They 
were also signatories to the offer to purchase / sell land form. However, in the 
case of the land surrendered by the CDC, the chiefs are directly in charge of 
land redistribution or land sale. That notwithstanding, the sale and transfer of 
land had to be endorsed by the office of the Divisional Officer for the purpose of 
issuing land certificates. Several participants concurred that local chiefs collude 
with government officials, mostly in the office of the Senior / Divisional Officer, 
to convert the CDC Land Surrender into a money-making scheme and for self-
aggrandisement. There are numerous narratives of government officials from 
the mayor right through to the governor of the Province, ‗grabbing‘, owning and 
selling land that was meant to be redistributed to the Bakweri people. This 
practice was condemned in a memorandum by Ngongi (2013) addressed to the 
Senior Divisional Officer for Fako wherein, he notes, among others as follows: 
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―Today, the people of Fako are faced with the challenges of the 
overwhelming influx of economic migrants, who pose a considerable 
threat to their very survival as minorities in their own ancestral lands. 
Coupled with this is the reckless and illegal sale by FAKO chiefs of 
indigenous lands surrendered by CDC. The obvious absence of any 
strategy by the people of Fako who are faced with this very serious 
and increasingly intractable problem, is evidenced by the way they 
are increasingly marginalised in the management of the affairs of the 
Division - politically, economically, socially, and, to a certain extent, 
even culturally.‖     
 
Presidential Decree No. 003/08/02/1982 forbids administrators to own land in 
the areas of their jurisdiction.  Administrators, who are indigenes of their areas 
of jurisdiction, are the only exception to this degree. Land ownership and sale 
by state administrators is thus, in direct contravention of this Decree. Numerous 
reports have documented this illegal practice. For instance, CameroonWeb 
(2014) reports that the Governor of the South West Province and the Senior 
Divisional Officer own numerous plots of land in Buea, with established land 
certificates in their names. Given the profitability of land sales in Buea and the 
key role that chiefs play in this process, conflicts have also escalated regarding 
the appointment and succession of Bakweri chiefs. Some participants 
elaborated on how state officials colluded with local elites to create villages that 
never existed and appoint chiefs to apply for land under the CDC land 
surrender programme. Much of the land that is subsequently allocated to these 
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newly-created villages is then shared between the chiefs and the administrators 
that appointed them. According to one participant:   
―Since the CDC land surrender started, you have a situation where 
villages that never existed are being created and others are split for 
the purposes of applying for and acquiring land. Considering the fact 
that administrators are involved in the allocation of that land, much of 
the land that is subsequently allocated, is shared between the chief 
who has been appointed by the administrator and the administrator. 
The chief then proceeds to sell off the land instead of allocating it to 
people who are supposed to be the villagers. This is a very serious 
conflict.‖ 
 
It was also discovered that the village of Bolifamba was split into two and 
named Upper and Lower Bolifamba, with two second class chiefs appointed by 
state administrators. A cadastral site plan for a village called Ewili was also 
drawn up and an application made to the state requesting for land under the 
CDC land surrender programme. Respondents also maintained that defunct 
Bakweri villages such as Maungu, Liwo and Wonjoku have re-emerged in 
anticipation that they will benefit from the CDC land surrender programme. 
Ambe (2014) notes that ―tens of hectares of CDC surrendered land near Bulu 
Village meant as a layout for Wonjoku in Bova II, have allegedly been sold out 
by those who applied for the land surrender with the apparent connivance of 
local administrators‖. This irregularity has further led to conflicts between the 
Bakweri people, spearheaded by BLCC and the government. Since its 
formation in 1946, BLCC has been clamouring for the acknowledgment that the 
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Bakweri people are the legitimate owners of land under the control of the CDC. 
The group ―has been at the forefront of the Bakweri campaign for 
compensation for, and restitution of, their lands initially expropriated by the 
Germans at the end of the 19th Century, and taken over by the Government of 
Cameroon, immediately after the reunification of British and French Cameroons 
in 1961‖ (Bakweri Land Claims Committee, 2007).  
 
Land sale by Bakweri chiefs to predominantly non-natives, puts the indigenous 
knowledge systems of the Bakweri people at risk of extinction as loss of land 
entails loss of culture and associated traditional or indigenous practices. One 
community leader maintained that ―if you lose your land, your culture becomes 
overshadowed by that of the new owners of the land‖. However, there were 
divergent views on this issue. Some Bakweri people have called for an 
immediate cessation of what they consider as the illegal sale and transfer of 
land to non-natives. Others maintained that the CDC land surrender is meant to 
serve as a source for the economic empowerment of Bakweri people and not 
that of non-natives. Reinforcing the stereotypical notion that the Bakweri people 
are lazy and not industrious, one participant remarked as follows:  
―Cameroon is for us all. The Bakweri people cannot claim that they 
are entitled to a part of this country more than we are, Regional 
integration is a reality. Besides, they are lazy. Look around you, 
most of these buildings here in Molyko are owned by non-natives. 
We built this city.‖ 
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This is particularly true in a survival of the fittest capitalist society like 
Cameroon where money ‗speaks‘. The status quo, therefore, is one wherein, 
non-natives are perceived as invaders on Bakweri land on the one hand and 
non-natives on the other hand, are claiming a right to land based on the power 
of their pockets, and in turn, perceiving the Bakweri people as proud and lazy. 
This has created a tensed relationship between the Bakweri natives and non-
natives. 
 
4.2.2 Contemporary Marital Disputes        
Like in other African societies, marriage among the Bakweri people is an 
important rite of passage. The family plays a key role in the socialisation 
process by providing emotional and economic support to couples and children 
alike. Marriage is so revered to the extent that both men and women are 
socialised into believing that it is the ultimate goal in life. Traditionally, marital 
problems in Africa remained and were resolved within the confines of the 
family, kinship groups and village elders (Mutongi, 1999). However, in 
contemporary times, disgruntled couples were increasingly resorting to legal 
mechanisms such as the courts of law to resolve family disputes and divorce 
has become a common phenomenon. It was revealed that there is a high 
incidence of divorce and separation among Bakweri communities. This comes 
as no surprise in an increasingly Westernised society which albeit to a limited 
extent, advocated the rights and independence of women and increasingly 
upheld principles of gender equality.  
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It was found that marital disputes have been part and parcel of Bakweri society 
long before the advent of the western modern state. However, contemporary 
marital disputes arise largely because of the patriarchal nature of the Bakweri 
society, in particular, and Cameroon in general. As Atanga (2012) notes, 
patriarchy in Cameroon is evident in practices such as polygyny, female genital 
mutilation and the low education of the girl child across numerous regions. 
Polygyny, which is an institutionalised gender-asymmetric form of partnership 
which allows a man to get married to more than one wife (Reniers et al., 
2012:1076), is allowed in both traditional and contemporary Bakweri customs, 
as well as the common law system of state administration in Cameroon. The 
Civil Status Registration Ordinance No. 81 – 02 of 29 June 1981 recognises 
polygamy as legal in Cameroon. The law also requires customary marriages to 
be registered at the local council. Most of them, however, are not registered, 
paving the way for conflicts.  
 
Polygyny is a customary practice which is common among the Bakweri people 
even though the advent of modernisation, higher costs of living, coupled with 
Christianity, have slowly overshadowed the practice. Focus group discussions 
with community members and other knowledge holders revealed that the 
practice is currently being challenged by changing values, the spread of 
Christianity, the growing appeal of the western way of life and also the rising 
costs of having large families. It is allowed in Bakweri customary law on 
condition that the first wife accepts to it and is involved in choosing any 
subsequent wife. It was also observed that some people get married again 
without divorcing in monogamous relationships. That notwithstanding, most 
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Bakweri participants interviewed, confessed to having numerous concubines. A 
Bakweri participant maintained as follows:  
―A real man should have many women as our fathers used to do. As 
long as you can take care of their needs, there is nothing wrong with 
that. Besides, the number of available women is more than men. So 
they do not have a choice.‖ 
 
However, it was revealed that Bakweri women do indeed have choices in a 
country that has been classified by the United Nations Data (2013) as having 
an equal male to female ratio. According to one participant, the polygamous 
nature of Bakweri society is a source of infidelity and makes Bakweri marriages 
prone to separation and divorce. Most male participants were of the opinion 
that Bakweri women were generally promiscuous with one maintaining that ―I 
can never get married to a Bakweri woman‖. The problem of divorce among the 
Bakweri has been highlighted by Ardener (1996) who traces its origins to the 
exposure of Bakweri women to immigrants who were working on the CDC 
plantations a few decades ago. Bakweri women tended to engage in 
concubinage or promiscuous relationships with immigrants as they were 
generally considered to be more hard-working and affluent than indigenous 
Bakweri men who resisted working on the plantations.     
 
It was established that the neighbouring town of Tiko (20 kilometres away from 
Buea), with its famous Tiko market, is historically known as a key point where 
Bakweri women used to go and work as prostitutes. The high immigrant 
population working in the plantations, coupled with Ibo traders from Nigeria, 
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made prostitution a profitable business for these women (Ardener, 1996). 
Nowadays, the stereotype still remains that Bakweri women are promiscuous in 
their penchant for wealth. To a certain extent, this statement holds true as it is 
common to find Bakweri children either not knowing their fathers or having 
different fathers from the same mother. As Quirk (2006:54) notes:   
“Bakweri women demand disposable husbands from the small 
proportion of men who have resources, and divorce them as soon as 
they‘ve sucked them dry and a richer fellow is available. Bakweri 
women treat men as work horses and unashamedly cite economic 
ineptitude as the reason for divorce.‖ 
 
It is partly as a result of this quest for material wealth by Bakweri women that 
the rate of promiscuity and subsequently, divorce or separation among the 
Bakweri is high. Men assert their sexism over women due to the patriarchal 
nature of the society, while women also assert resistance due to their exposure 
to modernity and competition among men to woe them. To further exacerbate 
gender tensions, most women within Bakweri communities were increasingly 
becoming economically empowered, resulting in some husbands to feel 
emasculated. One female respondent boastfully maintained that ―I‘ve got a job, 
a car and a piece of land. I can take care of myself and my children. I won‘t 
tolerate any shit from my husband.‖ Assertions and notions like these abound 
among most middle and upper class Bakweri women. Within a predominantly 
patriarchal African society, such a mind-set was a recipe for frequent marital 
conflicts because it was generally considered as attempts to emasculate men 
of their dominance and manhood.        
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During focus group discussions, it was revealed that marital conflict situations 
were further exacerbated by the fact that Bakweri men often tended to consider 
their women as their personal property due to payment of the dowry or bride 
price. As Sigswoth (2009:12-13) argues, ―men‘s conception of who they are 
and what type of behaviour they should display is inherently linked to their 
position in society: their notions of their own masculinity (or the qualities, 
behaviour and appearance traditionally associated with men) are directly linked 
to how steeped in patriarchy their particular society, culture or community is‖.  
 
Against this backdrop, it was observed that in spite of the perceived high levels 
of promiscuity in the study communities, most young women were still looking 
forward to getting married and having children. This was reinforced by 
traditional social pressures placed on women to go through this rite of passage. 
This social pressure was not placed on men because as one respondent 
remarked, ―a man can still procreate even at the age of 70. Women on the 
other hand, are generally infertile by the age of 35‖. Getting married after the 
payment of the bride price under customary law thus gives the bride the pride 
that she is highly valued by her husband and gives her respect within the 
society as a married woman. Women often tended to compromise and yield to 
these social pressures, with the result being dysfunctional marriages and 
subsequently, divorce. 
 
Moreover, the emancipation of women (economically and politically) has led to 
contestations in spaces that were traditionally occupied by men. Atanga 
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(2010:26) notes that ―Cameroonian women have gradually shifted from being 
housewives only to having additional public domain occupations‖. It is thus 
common nowadays, to find female lawyers, doctors, cops and politicians in 
Buea and its environs. They challenge the dominance of men by maintaining 
that ―what a man can do, a woman can do better‖. This assertiveness does not 
augur well in a traditionally patriarchal society because when resisted by men, 
it results to separation and divorce. Under Bakweri customary law, the woman 
is expected to refund the bride price to the man. Failure to do so will lead to any 
subsequent marriage by the woman to be declared null and void.    
  
4.2.3 The Proliferation of Pentecostal Churches and Associated Conflict 
Situations 
The proliferation of Pentecostal churches and associated conflict situations in 
Cameroon as in other African countries is increasingly becoming a serious 
concern across most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The Preamble of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon states that ―the State shall be 
secular. The neutrality and independence of the State in respect of all religions 
shall be guaranteed; freedom of religion and worship shall be guaranteed‖. Law 
No. 90-053 of 19 December 1990, amended by Law No. 99/011 of 20 July 
1999, deals with Freedom of Association in Cameroon. According to section 22 
of this Law, religious congregations consist of either ―any group of natural 
persons or corporate bodies whose vocation is divine worship‖ or ―any group of 
persons living in community in accordance with a religious doctrine‖.  
 
 106 
In spite of the advent of Christianity, since the colonial era and other forms of 
religious tolerance in post-independence Cameroon, the Bakweri people still 
practise their customs and institutions, including African traditional belief 
systems. These include traditional dances, the Pala Pala traditional wrestling, 
Bakweri language and names, rites of passage with regard to marriage and the 
chieftaincy. Key informant interviews reveal that over two decades ago, 
Bakweri local communities were predominantly exposed to traditional Christian 
mission churches which were the Catholic, Baptist and Presbyterian churches. 
To a lesser extent, there were a few mosques, though Christianity constituted 
and still constitutes the majority of religions in the District. Statistics indicate 
that while about 40% of Cameroonians are Christians, 20% are Muslims while 
40% practise African indigenous beliefs (CIA World Factbook, 2015). However, 
even though most Bakweri participants identified themselves as Christians, 
they also acknowledged that they recognise and widely practise their traditional 
beliefs and customs.      
 
Relations between the government and religious groups are governed by the 
Law on Religious Congregations. It requires all religious groups to apply to, get 
approval from and be registered with the Ministry of Territorial Administration 
and Decentralisation before they can legally operate. However, the law does 
not require the registration of indigenous groups, making Bakweri traditional 
groups to freely and legally operate. Religious tolerance in Cameroon is evident 
in the proliferation of mostly Pentecostal churches over the past decade and 
the government‘s nonchalant attitude towards the exponential growth of these 
churches in the country (Fombad, 2013). Most of them, however, are not 
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registered due to the lengthy procedures involved and the absence of punitive 
actions for operating without being registered. Due to its economic and political 
relevance, Buea and its environs have witnessed a fair share of the growth in 
Pentecostal churches. These include: God's Act of Covenant Ministries; 
Wisdom Ministries; Christ Embassy; Winners‘ Chapel International; 
Transformer Ministry; and even sects such as the Ancient Mystical Order Rosæ 
Crucis, commonly known as the Rosicrucian Order.  
 
As Weno et al. (2013) note, ―They often start in small houses, garages, 
dilapidating or uncompleted structures as prayer groups. Suddenly, the 
founders and its foremost converts start using megaphones and other loud 
sounding gadgets to attract other souls that need to be saved.‖ These convert-
seeking Pentecostal churches mushrooming in Buea, challenge the existing 
order through crusades and door-to-door preaching. They claim to performing 
miracles such as delivering people from demon possession, healing the sick, 
praying for prosperity, husbands for unmarried women, children for the barren 
and jobs for the unemployed. As part of the modernisation process, an 
increasing number of people attend these churches. It was observed during the 
study that there was even an exodus of people from established mission 
churches (such as Baptist, Catholic and Presbyterian), whose methods of 
preaching were considered by converts as monotonous and boring, to these 
Pentecostal churches. One respondent, commenting on the proliferation of 
Christian churches, stated as follows:  
―It was first Brother Paul, Brother Peter, Sister Ruth; then Pastor John, 
Pastor Peter, Pastor Dora; then Apostle Ezekiel, Bishop Festus, 
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Archbishop Ezeulu, Cardinal Tumi, Pope Francis, Ambassador Theo, 
Primate of Zion David, Overseer Samson, Wiseman John, Prophetess 
Cynthia, Prophet TB, Evangelist Thomas; to each his own. Then I run 
into this: Jesus Holiness Saint Daniel Dikeji Miyerijesu, the Demon 
destroyer also known as Osuakpeje (world leader) and Bishop of the 
world.‖ 
 
The researcher observed that some of the new churches operated television 
and radio stations which ran programmes that condemned African traditional 
customs and practices, such as the elephant dance and traditional healers, 
referring to them as devil worship. These created conflict situations between 
Bakweri traditional practices and the new churches. At times, the conflict arose 
due to the persistent noise and even all-night prayers generated by these 
churches. In an instance observed in Buea, three different churches were 
located in the same building. Since they are highly unregulated and are tax-free 
organisations, some have been transformed into money-making schemes. 
Evangelists promised church members deliverance and heaven on earth and 
extorted money from unsuspecting or gullible coverts with the latter hoping that 
miracles would be performed. There were even instances whereby, the sick 
were advised to refrain from taking medication and ―trust in the Lord for divine 
healing‖.  
 
One critic observed that ―they preach deliverance and miracles without 
salvation. Ironically, the more churches are formed, the more crime, corruption, 
alcoholism and promiscuity prevail in the society. So what is the point?‖ While 
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critics considered these churches as merely opportunists and businesses that 
prey on the vulnerable and hopeless by preaching a gospel of ―double-double‖, 
followers maintained that it is written in the Bible that the children of God will be 
persecuted, just like Jesus Christ was. There was thus, conflict between some 
of these Pentecostal Christians and the other which constitutes the agnostics, 
the atheists and the followers of African traditional religions.   
 
4.2.4 Corruption and Associated Conflicts  
Corruption refers to behaviour that deviates from the normal duties of a public 
role as a result of private interests and pecuniary gains. It includes conduct that 
violates rules against the exercise of influence (Nye, 1967:419). Corruption is 
endemic in Buea, in particular, and Cameroon as a whole. It is evident in all 
facets of public and private life and manifests in bribery, fraud, nepotism, graft, 
kickbacks, favoritism and misappropriation of state funds. In 1998 and 1999, 
the anti-corruption watchdog, Transparency International, ranked Cameroon as 
the most corrupt in the world. The 2014 Corruption Perception Index ranks the 
country as 136 out of 176 countries in a ranking from least corrupt to most 
corrupt in ascending order (Transparency International, 2014). It is an 
institutionalised vice that is widespread across Bakweri communities given its 
economic and political significance in the country. Being a highly centralised 
state, ―the civil service, army, police, customs, judiciary and even the health 
and education sectors are heavily politicised…the dividing line between party 
and the state is blurry‖ (Ferim, 2012:101). It was found that corrupt practices 
within Bakweri communities and the district of Buea as a whole, were glaring 
and very obvious. One of the most pronounced corrupt practices was in relation 
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to the procurement of land amplified by the CDC land surrender programme. 
There were numerous narratives involving fake signatures, fabricated stamps, 
sale of land to several buyers and a generally corrupt state administrators 
acting as accomplices in the process.  
 
Focus group discussions revealed that besides land disputes, there was a 
generally corrupt state administration wherein bribery and corruption were the 
order of the day. The researcher observed that the easiest way to obtain 
prompt service from any state department was either through bribery or 
nepotism. The rich and influential people, more often than not, trample on the 
masses since they are, along with state employees, bosses in a system 
dominated by patronage. There are usually many police road blocks throughout 
Buea District. These are meant to check among others, the road worthiness, 
registration and insurance of vehicles, including the infamous identity card 
inspection of all occupants. They typically include a nail-riddled plank, attached 
to a rope and thrown across the road with a couple of police officers flashing a 
touch light at on-coming vehicles during night patrols. This check is often 
waived if a police official or some high-ranking state administrator was one of 
the occupants of the vehicle. Initially meant to ensure road worthiness of 
vehicles and enhance regional security, these frequent and numerous checks 
are openly a money-extortion scheme by the police. Depending on the degree 
of the offence, a minimum bribe of 500 francs (about one US dollar) could 
easily exonerate the crime.  
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Bribe-able offences usually include driving without a driver‘s license, expired 
insurance, no identity card document and overloading. However, in some 
instances, where all of these requirements were complied with, charges are 
then extended to absence of a spare wheel, malfunctioning hooter and even a 
rude driver, all in a bid to extort a bribe. As one participant maintains:  
―It is pointless to pay any of these vehicle fees because at the end of the 
day, all the police want is a bribe, with or without proper documentation. 
Besides, they insist that insurance is compulsory but it takes forever for 
an insurance claim to be processed.‖                   
 
These corrupt activities create discontentment among the citizenry and is a 
breeding ground for conflict. As a form of structural violence, corruption in Buea 
and Cameroon as a whole remains latent in that it ―rarely produces clear cut 
events such as victories, triumphs and disasters; it simply lingers on as a slow 
torture for victims. However, this should not create the illusion of its capacity to 
escalate suddenly and viciously. When that escalation occurs, it often seems to 
international observers to have come out of a clear blue sky‖ (Smith, 2004:5).  
 
4.2.5 Crime 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, Buea, the home of the Bakweri people, is 
one of the main economic hubs and capital city of the South West region of 
Cameroon. Buea is not only a town with extensive banana and tea plantations, 
but is home to one of the only two English-speaking state universities in the 
country. Information obtained from observational studies reveal that most parts 
of the district which can be classified as semi-urban are heterogeneous due to 
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the influx of migrants from other parts of the country and even beyond (either 
for studies or for work purposes in the region). This is coupled with a growing 
university population, the proliferation of small businesses such as cyber-cafés, 
clothing and retail shops, barbecue joints and taverns. There is also a 
mushrooming of privately-constructed accommodation, mostly for students, 
commonly referred to as mini-cités. As is characteristic of Africa‘s emerging 
cities, the dynamic blend of business activities and a vibrant population in an 
increasingly urbanised environment is a fertile ground for the upsurge of crime 
(Cities, 2002).  
 
It was revealed that some unemployed university graduates engage in cyber-
crime, commonly referred to in the study communities as fayman or 419 
scammers. It involves duping unsuspecting people out of usually huge sums of 
money through internet fraud. The term originates from Section 419 of the 
Nigerian Criminal Code which outlines the penalty for ―advanced fee fraud‖. 
One of the internet scams which the researcher came across (circulated in the 
study communities) was as follows: 
Subject: Nigerian Astronaut Wants To Come Home 
Dr Bakare Tunde 
Astronautics Project Manager 




Garki, Abuja, FCT NIGERIA 
 
Dear Mr Sir, 
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REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE-STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
I am Dr Bakare Tunde, the cousin of Nigerian Astronaut, Air Force 
Major Abacha Tunde. He was the first African in space when he 
made a secret flight to the Salyut 6 space station in 1979. He was 
on a later Soviet spaceflight, Soyuz T-16Z to the secret Soviet 
military space station Salyut 8T in 1989. He was stranded there in 
1990 when the Soviet Union was dissolved. His other Soviet crew 
members returned to earth on the Soyuz T-16Z, but his place was 
taken up by return cargo. There have been occasional progress 
supply flights to keep him going since that time. He is in good 
humor, but wants to come home. 
 
In the 14-years since he has been on the station, he has 
accumulated flight pay and interest amounting to almost 
15,000,000 American Dollars. This is held in a trust at the Lagos 
National Savings and Trust Association. If we can obtain access to 
this money, we can place a down payment with the Russian 
Space Authorities for a Soyuz return flight to bring him back to 
Earth. I am told this will cost 3,000,000 American Dollars. In order 
to access the trust fund we need your assistance. 
 
Consequently, my colleagues and I are willing to transfer the total 
amount to your account or subsequent to disbursement, since we, 
as civil servants are prohibited by the Code of Conduct Bureau 
(Civil Service Laws) from opening and/ or operating foreign 
accounts in our names. 
 
Needless to say, the trust reposed on you at this juncture is 
enormous. In return, we have agreed to offer you 20 percent of the 
transferred sum, while 10 percent shall be set aside for incidental 
expenses (internal and external) between the parties in the course 
of the transaction. You will be mandated to remit the balance 70 
percent to other accounts in due course. 
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Kindly expedite action as we are behind schedule to enable us 
include down payment in this financial quarter. 
 
Please acknowledge the receipt of this message via my direct 
number 234 (0) 9-234-2220 only. 
Yours Sincerely, Dr Bakare Tunde 




Other scams involve pretending to sell a rare animal online to a foreign buyer 
and convincing an investor of the availability of a machine that can be used to 
print money. In addition, the thousands of students residing in the mini cités in 
Buea are usually equipped with gadgets such as cell phones, laptops and 
tablets. Their rooms are thus a target for criminals to break in and steal both 
their personal effects and their money, as it is customary for people to keep 
huge sums of money in their rooms (it is not common for people to have bank 
accounts). Feelings of insecurity were so high within certain segments of 
society that mob justice is a common practice in Buea and Cameroon as a 
whole. Orock (2014:409) demonstrates how ―anxieties associated with the 
nature of insecurity and related incidents of violent crime animate such frequent 
incidents of mob justice in Cameroon‖. There were numerous instances 
whereby a mob took the law into their own hands. This is usually because they 
perceive the judicial system either as corrupt accomplices to criminals, or as 
not competent enough to mete out justice. Suspected thieves were thus either 
beaten to death or tortured until rescued by security officials.       
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4.3 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
The main objective of this chapter was to identify and discuss the most 
conspicuous types of conflicts inherent in contemporary Bakweri communities, 
specifically in the District of Buea. According to the findings (using both primary 
and secondary data), the main conflicts in the study communities are land 
disputes, marital disputes, corruption and the proliferation of churches. The 
major causes of land disputes include the growing economic importance of 
Buea which is the capital city of the South West Region of Cameroon. The 
establishment of the CDC in 1946, the University of Buea in 1992, coupled with 
the District‘s favourable climatic conditions made Buea a key hub for 
businesses to flourish and non-natives to settle. The CDC land-surrender to 
Bakweri chiefs has exacerbated land conflicts in Buea. These chiefs collude 
with state administrators in order to obtain and illegally sell land meant to be 
distributed to the Bakweri people to non-natives. There are thus conflicts 
between the Bakweri people, Bakweri chiefs, state administrators and non-
natives.  
 
Marital disputes in Bakweri communities are largely due to a number of factors 
such as patriarchy, polygamy, the emancipation of Bakweri women in the age 
of gender equality and the presumption that Bakweri women are generally 
promiscuous. Bribery and corruption (which is inherent in Buea) is a reflection 
of a generally corrupt state.  This has resulted in a disillusioned citizenry and is 
a breeding ground for a social uprising by the masses against the state. 
Moreover, it was also found that the generally lax regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms governing religious congregations in Cameroon has led to the 
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proliferation of Pentecostal churches in Buea. These churches challenge the 
ritualistic teachings of established mission churches, preach to the populace 
through loud music and all-night prayers, make promises of deliverance and 
miracles to its followers and condemn indigenous practices such as spiritual 
doctors and the elephant dance as devil worship.  
 
Given the prevalence of conflicts in the study area, in particular, and Cameroon 
in general, there is a need to x-ray the efficacy of existing mechanisms used to 
transform such conflicts. This is important as far as establishing the extent of 
the sustainability of peace or the advent of war is concerned. After all, as 
Howard (2003:29) argues, conflict is a phenomenon which if we fail to abolish, 
it might well abolish us‖. This task is thus the focus of the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INDIGENOUS AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 
MECHANISMS IN BAKWERI COMMUNITIES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a general consensus among scholars and activists of peace and 
conflict studies that the overarching goal of peace building is to enhance the 
indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence (Canadian 
International Development Agency, 2002; Galtung, 1996). This is not to say 
non-indigenous mechanisms cannot efficiently and sustainably transform 
conflicts. However, neo-colonial institutions, for instance, which are usually 
associated with the liberal peace model, should be utilised with caution in the 
resolution of African conflicts. Ewusi (2014) advocates that a bottom-top 
approach which upholds African customs and values, offers a more sustainable 
solution to African conflicts. This approach falls in line with the theoretical 
framework of endogenous development offered by Makwere and Mandonga 
(2012) and the postcolonial theory adopted in this study.             
 
Most local communities in Africa have had and still utilise indigenous structures 
in transforming conflicts and enhancing sustainable community livelihoods. 
These structures have been instrumental in addressing local community issues 
such as land disputes, epidemics, pandemics, disaster management, forest 
conservation, animal husbandry, agriculture and even transitional justice. 
These indigenous structures also involve the role of women in peace-building 
within and between local communities. For instance, Tadese (2010:95) argues 
that in Somalia, ―only a woman can bring two separate clans together. When 
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two clans are connecting through marriage, it is the married woman who forms 
the backbone of the newly established community‖.  
 
Due to the negative consequences of any form of conflict, especially within 
local communities, societal structures such as neighbours, community leaders, 
clan heads, women organisations and state authorities usually play an 
important role in addressing conflicts. ―These mechanisms may be formal or 
informal, violent or peaceful, equitable or not. While specific mechanisms vary, 
communities rely to varying extents on the same basic procedural modes to 
handle disputes: avoidance, coercion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration and 
adjudication‖ (Castro and Ettenger, 2000). With this notion in mind, the next 
section investigates IKS of the Bakweri people of the South West region of 
Cameroon.     
 
5.2 INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS OF THE BAKWERI PEOPLE  
It was argued in Chapter Four that there are a variety of conflicts, ranging from 
land and marital disputes, to corruption and the proliferation of Pentecostal 
churches in the study area. It is argued that the fact that these conflicts have 
not escalated into violence or outright war is a possible indication that there is 
the existence of mechanisms to either manage and / or resolve them. 
Moreover, since conflict is part and parcel of human existence, all 
contemporary societies, including the Bakweri communities, have structures 
and processes that are instrumental in transforming them. Having been 
exposed to western forms of administration since the colonial era, Bakweri 
communities in Buea have for long utilised state-based structures to resolve 
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conflicts. This, however, does not mean that their indigenous mechanisms to 
prevent, manage and resolve conflicts have been lost or abandoned.  
 
Information gathered from in-depth interviews and participant observation 
revealed that there is a wide usage of IKS in conflict transformation which 
involves indigenous institutions and rituals used in preventing, managing and 
resolving conflicts among Bakweri communities. These communities just like 
other ethnic groups across Cameroon, have for long had indigenous structures 
in place used to transform conflicts and enhance social peace. For instance, 
there is the Liengu female cult wherein, initiates invoke water spirits to enhance 
the role of women in procreation, motherhood, conflict resolution, mentorship 
and the conservation of Bakweri culture. There is also the Nganya male cult 
which performs exclusively nocturnal rituals and dance to rid Bakweri villages 
of evil spirits. There are even indigenous games such as the Pala Pala 
traditional wrestling, whereby Bakweri youths demonstrate their physical 
prowess and dexterity through public wrestling competitions. This is important 
to maintain social cohesion and prevent conflict escalation as conflict 
transformation mechanisms should not only be reactive but also proactive.    
 
Another very significant institution that is culturally relevant to the ethos of the 
Bakweri people is the Maalé cult. Cults and secret societies are part and parcel 
of Bakweri society in particular and African indigenous societies as a whole. 
Their secrecy has aroused a lot of suspicion and speculation from outsiders, 
perpetuating guesses, conspiracy theories, exaggerations and even myths 
about their activities. Much of these conspiracy theories arise primarily because 
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in addition to the fact that these cults are secret with very restricted 
membership, their modi operandi often involves a certain degree of spirituality, 
rites and rituals. Their raison d‘être usually cuts across political and cultural 
agenda though at times these societies pursue economic and even criminal 
activities (Tanga, 2006). Even though secret societies among the Bakweri 
people such as the Nganya male nocturnal cult and the Liengu female cult are 
fast withering away, these structures can be instrumental in unifying the 
Bakweri people and offering them a culturally more relevant alternative to state 
structures in resolving disputes and maintaining social cohesion and peace 
(Ngoh, 1996). However, the most prominent and unifying of all Bakweri 
traditional cults is the Maalé.    
 
Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with community knowledge 
holders revealed that the Maalé (which means gathering of villages), evolved 
from the Nganya cult, following the need to perform certain rituals and 
cleansing ceremonies during the day. Membership of the Maalé is open to all 
Bakweri men who have been initiated to the cult through a secret ceremony in 
a shrine, following the payment of an initiation fee which is typically a goat or a 
pig. At the epicenter of the Maalé, is the elephant known in Bakweri as Njoku. 
The elephant personifies the gracefulness and pride of the Bakweri culture and 
is deeply rooted in the hearts and psyche of the Bakweri people. Eko (2004) 
concurs that ―the creature‘s sheer strength, size, loyalty to its (family) troupe, its 
calm, yet unpredictable temperament, proud indifference, and graceful 
demeanour are, to the Bakweri, the picture of physical and psychic behavioural 
perfection. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Bakweri, have a secret society 
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that venerates, imitates and personifies the attributes of the elephant. Members 
who have been initiated into the cult, are sworn to secrecy and as one 
participant maintained, ―we are so loyal and proud of being members of this 
society that we swear by nothing else than by the elephant‖.        
 
It was also found that what particularly makes the Maalé cult so famous and 
central to Bakweri culture is the Maalé elephant dance. This is clearly the most 
prominent and famous indigenous dance of the Bakweri people. It consists of a 
two-day celebration typically between January and March, wherein teams of 
participants from neighbouring Bakweri villages meet at a shrine of the host 
village to demonstrate their mystical powers. Throughout the entire ceremony, 
a witch doctor is tasked with withholding the rain which can easily disrupt 
festivities. On the day before the actual dance, representatives of the visiting 
villages arrive with their faces smeared with red earth or charcoal. At night, they 
demonstrate their mystical powers by competing to expose the host village‘s 
secret, hidden somewhere around the shrine. Whichever village exposes the 
hidden secret, emerges victorious otherwise, the host village retains the trophy. 
Later that night, Maalé members dance around a bonfire next to the shrine and 
for some mysterious reason, neither a single trace of the fire nor its ashes 
would be found the following morning as the grass upon which it was lit 
remained evergreen!   
 
The day of the Maalé dance is usually characterised by a lot of flair with the 
dancers demonstrating their dexterity. There are four hierarchical levels of the 
Maalé cult which in ascending order are the Lova, Vejuka, Tamba and Vekpa. 
 122 
Members of the Lova and Vejuka (which are the lower levels), have limited 
abilities and privileges. They are only permitted to eat and dance at the general 
festival.  Members of the Tamba and Vekpa (which are the upper two 
prestigious classes) are believed to possess mystical powers and abilities to 
handle the more sophisticated practices of the Maalé group. The dancers 
normally feed on raw cocoyams and plantains, crops whose toxicity normally 
cause irritation and are potentially fatal when eaten raw. However, due to their 
state of affinity with the spirit world, these plants have no effects on the 
dancers. During the dance, the dancers unleash the spirit of Njoku (the 
elephants that reside on the slopes of Mount Cameroon). Key informants 
maintained that some members at the highest level of the Maalé have 
elephants in the forest. The narrative goes that the elephant is rooted in the 
psyche of the Bakweri people as some of these elephant men do transform into 
elephants which they own. There is a close affinity between the psyche of 
these members and their respective elephants in the forest. Their fates are 
inextricably interlinked and as an informant remarked, ―it is commonly known 
that if your elephant is killed in the forest, you will also die‖.  
 
The Maalé traditional festival is not merely a dance. It is an embodiment of the 
spiritual unity of Bakweri cultures and people. The elephant represents the 
resilience of the people and during the two-day festival, the spirit of the Bakweri 
mountain god (Epassa Moto), who is believed to be half man, half stone, is 
invoked to enhance unity and social peace among the Bakweri people. 
Libations are traditionally poured to the ancestors and Epassa Moto is called 
upon to protect the Bakweri people from among others, natural disasters like 
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volcanic eruptions which occasionally occur and lava emitted by the Buea 
Mountain. During the festival, evil spirits are also driven from the village and 
children possessed with evil powers and mysterious illnesses are cleansed and 
healed. With the consent of their fathers, some are initiated into the cult. The 
paramount chief and other chiefs from represented villages usually grace the 
Maalé traditional festival and they all call upon unity and peace to prevail 
among the Bakweri people.    
 
An attempt was made in the study to establish the limitations of these 
indigenous structures in contemporary conflict transformation. Focus group 
discussions revealed that the Nganya, the Liengu and the Maalé have become 
anachronistic due to their incapacity to transform contemporary conflicts and 
enhance social peace in the study communities. Their reliance on supernatural 
forces is increasingly losing appeal and relevance in the increasingly 
cosmopolitan and heterogeneous subdivision of Buea. Moreover, the 
proliferation of Christian churches in the sub-division has led to new converts 
demonising these cults as devil worship with the consequence being fewer 
Bakweri indigenes being associated with them. Fewer Maale festivals are being 
organised and as these cults wither away, they are slowly reduced to myths 
and legends and consequently, overshadowed by state-based structures. 
There is thus a wide usage and dominance of state-based structures in 
resolving disputes in Bakweri communities. This is due in part to the 
heterogeneity of Buea, its political role as the provincial capital of the South 
West region of Cameroon, the encroachment of ‗modernisation‘ and attempts 
by the government to maintain a highly centralised state hence, overshadowing 
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the country‘s rich indigenous structures (Nkwi and Nyamnjoh, 2011). In spite of 
this apparent neglect of the indigenous systems of the Bakweri by the state, 
one institution that still stands tall as far as contemporary conflict transformation 
is concerned is the chieftaincy.    
 
5.3 THE BAKWERI CHIEFTAINCY AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION  
The legal framework governing traditional communities in Cameroon is Decree 
No. 77/245 of 15th July 1977. However, the Decree has been modified twice 
(Decree No. 82/241 of 24th June 1982 and Decree No. 2013/332 of 13th 
September 2013). The Law organises traditional communities, dividing them 
into First Class, Second Class and Third Class chiefdoms. This classification is 
based on territorial, demographic, economic and social importance. According 
to Chapter I, Article 7 of the Decree, chiefs are appointed by a hierarchy of 
state administrators depending on the class. It states that ―First class 
chiefdoms shall be set up by order of the Prime Minister, second class 
chiefdoms by order of the Minister of Territorial Administration and 
Decentralisation and third class chiefdom by the Divisional Officer‖.  
 
Although the law stipulates that traditional chiefs shall be chosen from within 
families traditionally called upon to exercise customary authority, the state may 
override the village‘s choice and select a candidate it believes will better serve 
the interest of the administration. This makes chiefs auxiliaries of state 
administration. As state administrators, the Law provides for chiefs to be 
reprimanded, suspended or deposed by the relevant state administrator. As 
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auxiliaries of the state, chiefs play an important role in publicising state 
directives, which is particularly important in rural areas characterised by low 
literacy levels. Within the context of the study, the role of the chief is 
underscored by the need to harmonise the diverse ethnic groups that are 
characteristic of Buea.    
 
Decree No. 77/245 of 15th July 1977 empowers chiefs to ―transmit the 
directives of administrative authorities to their people and to ensure that such 
directives are implemented‖; ―helping as directed by the competent 
administrative authorities, in the maintenance of law and order and in the 
economic, social and cultural development of the area under them‖; and also 
―collecting taxes and fees for the State and other local authorities, under 
conditions laid down by regulations. In addition to the aforementioned duties, 
chiefs must also carry out any other mission that may be assigned to them by 
the local administrative authority‖. The Decree further states that ―chiefs shall 
wear a distinctive badge and, if need be, an attire, the design of which shall be 
determined by order of the Minister of Territorial Administration‖. Additionally, 
Decree No. 2013/332 of 13th September 2013 provides for a monthly allowance 
of 200 000 FCFA (approximately 320 US dollars) for First Class chiefs, 
100 000CFA (approximately 160 US Dollars) for Second Class chiefs and 
50 000FCFA (approximately 80 US Dollars) for Third Class chiefs.     
 
The chieftaincy in the Buea sub-division is divided into three classes. There is a 
first class chiefdom which was under the paramount chief of Buea, Chief 
Samuel Lifafa Endeley who reigned from 1982 (but passed away on 7th July 
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2015). By the time the data collection process was completed, a new 
paramount chief of Buea had not yet been selected. Other villages in the Buea 
district such as Muea and Great Soppo are categorised as second class 
chiefdoms while there are scores of villages in Buea that fall under the third 
class chiefdom. The selection of Bakweri chiefs is done along patriarchal lines. 
Information sourced from community knowledge holders revealed that it is a 
norm for succession to the throne of a village to be passed from the father to 
the eldest son in the family. A woman can neither be crowned a chief, nor can a 
chief be chosen from the family of the woman. Therefore, if a chief dies without 
a male child, or if the king makers feel that none of a late chief‘s sons is fit 
enough to be crowned a chief, then the chief‘s brothers and their sons would be 
considered to fill the vacant throne. Moreover, neither can an adopted child nor 
a child born of a mother who was not of Bakweri origin become a chief. If an 
under aged son of a late chief is selected to succeed his father, he will be given 
due respect by the elders of the village. In fact, in the absence of the chief, a 
direct son of his inherits the throne no matter the age. The village traditional 
council would assist in managing the village until (he reaches) maturity (18 
years).          
 
The Bakweri chieftaincy is very central to all cultural, social and even political 
events within the village and is the custodian of tradition and customary law in 
the village. Besides, customary law is recognised by law No. 2006 / 015 of 29 
December 2006 on the organisation of the judiciary in Cameroon. A chief is 
known as Sango‟a Mboa, loosely translated as ―father of the village‖. Village 
traditional councils are thus the first point of call in resolving civil disputes within 
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local communities. Typically, a chieftaincy is subdivided into ‗quarters‘, 
comprising of key elders and a few influential and respectable men in the 
community. Marital disputes, for instance, are presided over by elders or 
married men who have some experience in terms of relationships. This is 
contrary to the principle in the courts of law whereby divorce cases can be 
presided over by any magistrate, irrespective of their marital status. The quarter 
head is appointed by the chief and the former, upon consultation with the latter, 
selects the members of the quarter council. Quarters in the study communities 
comprise of key individuals from the different but main ethnic groups residing 
within the community. The fact that some of the quarter heads are non-Bakweri 
natives, attests not just to the heterogeneity of the study communities, but also 
to the hospitable nature of Bakweri indigenes. A key feature of the role of the 
village in resolving disputes is that the jurisdiction of boundaries is limitless in 
Bakweri tradition. Any quarter within the village, for instance, can resolve any 
dispute that occurs within the village.  
 
Findings from participant observation revealed that cases brought before the 
quarter are on a voluntary basis and can be submitted by any one or both 
parties involved in a dispute. Such are usually related to debts, petty theft, 
divorce, quarrels and land disputes. These cases were registered and parties 
were thereafter, summoned to the office (typically, the house) of the quarter 
head for arbitration. Though no costs were involved in the registration and 
arbitration of cases, parties found guilty of an offence were required to abide by 
the ruling and pay a fine to the quarter for mediating in the case. Fines typically 
involved common items such as beer, chicken(s), goat(s) and pig(s) though 
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sometimes, it could involve a modest amount of money. The essence of 
judgements is usually to restore relationships and ensure sustainable peace at 
the communal level. Parties to a dispute were thus usually called upon to 
consume the fine meted out to the guilty party. Cases not resolved to the 
satisfaction of parties concerned could be petitioned to the chief who has the 
authority to make a final ruling on the matter at the village level.     
 
Article 13 of Decree No 2005/481 of 16 December 2005 empowers traditional 
leaders to serve on the Land Consultative Board. Rochegude and Plancon 
(2009) maintain that chiefs play an important role in terms of proposing uses for 
rural spaces, giving their opinions on land concessions, interpreting the law and 
adjudicating complaints over land titles. They also choose land for collective 
village property and make recommendations on the management of land 
governed by the national domain. The primary concern with regard to settling 
land disputes by the chieftaincy is to establish rightful ownership. Since some 
of the cases may involve fraudulent sale of land, disputes over family land and 
encroachment into boundaries, the chief, along with the village elders, play a 
key role in ascertaining rightful ownership and proper boundaries. Information 
gathered from participant observation revealed that the process involves 
inspection of boundaries and interviewing neighbours farming or residing 
around the land in dispute. Relevant documentation such as receipts of 
payment, attestations and land certificates were also scrutinised by the chief‘s 
council and witnesses cross-examined. Effective occupation is important in 
determining who the land in dispute will be finally awarded to. This implies that 
any party that had initiated some form of construction and development on the 
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disputed land, stood a better chance of the ruling being made in their favour. 
However, he/she might be required to pay damages and / or pay the rightful 
owner if it is established that the occupier is not the rightful owner of the land.  
 
It was observed during the study that it is generally more advantageous to 
utilise village structures to resolve disputes. These structures resolve disputes 
faster and at a far lesser cost compared to state administration. Obtaining land, 
for instance, through Bakweri customary law is cheaper than through the state. 
All that is paid is the amount agreed upon between the seller and the buyer, 
including a modest registration fee at the chieftaincy. Belaunde et al. (2010) 
argue that this is in sharp contrast to the statutory system, where land titles 
involve local, regional and state officials and unofficial fees throughout the 
registration process. Moreover, customary contracts cut down on the amount of 
time taken to obtain land, as opposed to the bureaucratic registration process 
which, despite recent efforts at streamlining the process, it may take up to five 
years. At times, cases taken directly to state structures were referred back to 
the village council for arbitration. As a general principle, however, it was noted 
that it is always advisable for all land transactions, for instance, to be witnessed 
and approved by the chief in order to avoid problems in the future. Besides, the 
resolution of conflicts is aimed at maintaining peace among community 
members.  
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5.4 THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INDIGENOUS AND CONTEMPORARY 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION MECHANISMS IN BAKWERI 
COMMUNITIES 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Buea serves as the political capital of the South 
West region of Cameroon and the seat of the paramount chief of the Bakweri 
people. In addition, Buea is the seat of one of the only two English-speaking 
universities in the country and also hosts numerous banana plantations and tea 
estates run by the CDC (an agricultural corporation established in 1947). The 
commune‘s political and economic prominence, coupled with its fertile volcanic 
soil and favourable climatic conditions, thus account for the influx of migrants, 
resulting in a quite diverse and heterogeneous population. Due to its political 
and economic significance, there is a growing interface between traditional / 
indigenous and contemporary, including state institutions in preventing, 
managing and resolving conflicts. These state-based structures are also 
prominent in Buea as indigenous structures were either lost in the era of 
colonisation or considered as inferior to Western ones and hence, marginalized 
(Kiwanuka, 1970). Moreover, due to the nature of contemporary conflicts such 
as crime and corruption within the study area, state-based structures appear to 
be better equipped to deal with such challenges than indigenous structures. 
Besides, the jurisdiction of customary law does not cover criminal cases.  
 
It is within this context that Jeffries‘ (1999) concept of integralism is relevant as 
it seeks to establish an interface between the local / indigenous and the global / 
Western. The relevance of integralism to this case is that it underscores the 
fact that Bakweri communities cannot make progress without global knowledge. 
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Similarly, contemporary state institutions cannot sustainably transform conflicts 
without inputs from indigenous Bakweri institutions. There are thus no absolute 
truths for instance, in conceptualisations of truth and morality, as they exist only 
in relation to the context in which they are applied. Since reality does not exist 
in bivalence, especially given the heterogeneity of Bakweri villages and towns, 
a more sustainable path moving forward is a multicultural and integral paradigm 
to conflict transformation. This should take into consideration the relevance of 
the Bakweri chieftaincy and associated indigenous knowledge systems, as well 
as contemporary state institutions.      
 
As far as state structures are concerned, Decree No. 2004 / 320 of 8 December 
2004 to organise the Government, as amended and supplemented by Decree 
No. 2007 / 268 of 7 September 2007 ushered in a new era for administrative 
and financial autonomy for local government in Cameroon. Decentralisation in 
Cameroon has its origins in the 1996 Constitution with Article 55 mandating the 
formation of regional and local authorities. The Decree empowers structures 
which are elected through direct universal suffrage even though administrative 
oversight is still being exercised by presidentially appointed officials. As Cheka 
(2007:186) notes, ―the creation of a Ministry of Territorial Administration and 
Decentralisation (MINATD) by Decree No. 2002 / 216 of 24 August 2002 
seems to translate the will of the state to advance the process of 
decentralisation while at the same time, taking into account imperatives of 
preserving national unity and social cohesion in a country characterised by 
social and cultural diversity‖. However, there is a multiplicity of legislation that 
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creates and outlines the functions of decentralised state structures which all 
have a role to play in conflict transformation.  
 
For instance, Law No. 2004 / 018 of 22 July 2004 lays down the rules 
applicable to councils. According to Article 2 of the law, a council is created by 
presidential decree. The law further states that the main objective of a council 
is local development and the amelioration of the standard of living of its 
inhabitants.  Decree No. 2008/377 of 12 November 2008 outlines the powers of 
administrative units and the organisation and functioning of their services. The 
creation of municipal councils falls within the legal framework of the 1996 
Constitution which was designed with one of the primary objectives to 
decentralise the erstwhile highly centralised state in Cameroon. According to 
Article 55 (2) of the Constitution, ―Regional and local authorities shall be public 
law corporate bodies. They shall have administrative and financial autonomy in 
the management of regional and local interests. They shall be freely 
administered by councils elected under conditions laid down by law. The duty 
of the councils of regional and local authorities shall be to promote the 
economic, social, health, educational, cultural and sports development of the 
said authorities.‖ However, Article 55 (3) states that ―the State shall exercise 
supervisory powers over regional and local authorities, under conditions laid 
down by law‖.  
 
Yanou (2009:690-691) asserts that ―the vesting of these enormous 
responsibilities for managing the development of local affairs in the hands of 
local administrators means that their actions impact directly on grassroots 
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peoples‖. In support of this view, Mbuagbo and Fru (2011:355) argue that ―the 
practice of having local governments that are elected directly by universal 
suffrage theoretically implies that locally elected leaders such as mayors will be 
accountable and answerable to their local constituencies. The provisions of the 
guidelines are important benchmarks for democracy and good governance so 
much embraced in official circles in Cameroon‖. However, given the different 
types of conflicts discussed in Chapter Four, the most relevant state-based 
structures involved in transformation of these conflicts are the following: the 
Land Consultative Board; the Senior Divisional Office; the State Counsel; the 
judicial police; and the courts of law. 
 
5.4.1 The Land Consultative Board 
Since land disputes are the most protrusive form of conflicts in Buea, the Land 
Consultative Board is perhaps one of the most important state-based structures 
as far as the transformation of land disputes is concerned. It is the first point of 
call as far as the registration of land for the acquisition of a land certificate from 
the state is concerned. The Board was established by Ordinance No. 74-1 of 
6th July 1974. As Fonjong et al. (2010:160) argue, this Ordinance was designed 
to ―ensure by way of legal enactment, a system of land registration which 
provided security of tenure to customary land owners‖.  Section 16 (2) of this 
Ordinance states that ―Consultative Boards presided over by the administrative 
authorities and necessarily comprising representatives of the traditional 
authorities shall be established for this purpose‖. It is thus the main legal 
instrument that regulates the acquisition and ownership of land in Cameroon.  
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However, Section 12 of Decree No.76/166 of 27th April 1976 spells out the 
composition of the Board. It includes the Divisional Officer who acts as the 
chairperson of the Board, representatives from the Department of Lands and 
Survey, a chief in the area where the land is situated and two village elders. 
The state, therefore, recognises the importance of traditional authorities in 
governance. The functions of the Board includes: making recommendations to 
the Senior Divisional Office on the allocation of land for agriculture and grazing 
purposes; assessing applications for the issue of land certificates; and settling 
land disputes referred to it by the courts. Instruction N°000006/Y.18 
MINDAF/D300/ of 29 December 2005 to guide the functioning of the Land 
Consultative Board also empowers the Board to conduct adequately publicised 
field visits to lands under investigation and or assessment and investigating any 
contested claims to land. The local chief and members of his council are 
members of the Board thereby, giving importance to indigenous structures of 
the Bakweri in the transformation of land conflicts.     
 
Chapters II and III of Decree N° 76 -166 of 27 April 1976 which establishes the 
terms and conditions of management of national lands, requires applications for 
a land certificate made to the Board to include an official application, certified 
copies of identity card or birth certificate and a site plan of the piece of land. 
Article 13 states that the Board shall convene at least once every three months 
and the agenda shall be posted on the notice board of the sub-divisional office. 
Instruction N°000006/Y.18 MINDAF/D300/ of 29 December 2005 requires 
minutes to be taken during the Board‘s sessions and for such minutes to be 
signed by all members of the committee. The surveyor member is also required 
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to produce a cadastral report which accurately captures the findings of the 
Board and signed by all members. The Instruction also compels the findings of 
the Board to be forwarded to the relevant authority no later than 30 days after 
the cadastral survey. Decree No. 2005/481 of 16 December 2005 supplements 
certain provisions of the decree No. 76/165 of 27 April 1976 which outlines 
conditions of getting a land certificate. These include structures such as the 
Ministry of Land Affairs, the governor of the province, the office of the divisional 
officer, the department of land affairs, the Land Consultative Board, the village 
chief where the land is situated and concerned residents. The chieftaincy, 
therefore, plays an important role in land disputes, both at the level of the 
village and at the level of the state (evident in this symbiotic relationship 
between traditional structures and the state). This interface is important as it 
recognises the fact that being knowledge holders and community leaders via 
traditional structures, are an important aspect in the sustainable resolution of 
conflicts.         
 
5.4.2 The Senior Divisional Officer  
According to Article 3 of Decree No. 2008/376 of 12 November 2008 on the 
administrative organisation of Cameroon, the Senior Divisional Officer (also 
known as the Prefect) is the administrative head of the Fako Division of the 
South West region of Cameroon, while the sub-division of Buea is under the 
authority of the Assistant Prefect. The Prefect is under the authority of the 
governor of the province. Both the appointments of the prefect and sub-prefects 
are made by presidential decree. The Prefect is tasked with ensuring the daily 
running of the security, economic, social and cultural echelons of the division. 
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Article 36 of the Decree outlines that the prefect is tasked with the maintenance 
of law and order and also the execution of development programmes in the 
division. S/he presides over or is represented in all meetings or commissions 
within the department which concern the state. Article 40 of the Decree entrusts 
the prefect with the powers to deploy the police force, the gendarmerie or the 
army to ensure public order and / or the security of the division. In addition to 
the maintenance of social peace and ensuring the smooth administrative 
functioning of the division, the prefect can be tasked to execute any other 
functions or tasks as is deemed appropriate by a relevant superior authority.  
 
Also, both the Prefect and assistant prefect are members of the Land 
Consultative Board and assist in the resolution of land disputes in the division 
and sub-division respectively. At the level of the state, the office of the prefect 
is thus the first point of call in the resolution of land disputes. This is common in 
Buea because of its heterogeneity. Parties to a conflict often resort to the state 
in the resolution of conflicts. However, in conducting its investigations regarding 
land disputes, the prefect engages local chiefs who are also members of the 
Land Consultative Board before making a judgment. The office of the prefect, 
therefore, has the powers to make judgments regarding land disputes albeit 
with inputs from the chieftaincy. Moreover, being auxiliaries of the 
administration, chieftaincy disputes are directly mediated upon and resolved by 
the office of the Prefect, especially in the case of third class chiefs who are 
directly appointed by the Prefect. Even in the case of first class chiefs (who are 
appointed by presidential decree), it is the responsibility of the prefect to make 
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a recommendation to the higher authority on any succession disputes 
regarding the institution.   
      
5.4.3 The Judicial Police 
Traditional structures did not have any jurisdiction over criminal matters as their 
powers were limited to civil cases. Investigations related to criminal matters 
were the exclusive jurisdiction of the judicial police. However, the chieftaincy 
and other traditional structures such as the village council and quarter heads 
could furnish relevant information to the judicial police to assist in an 
investigation. This was because traditional structures were more in touch with 
the people than state administrators. Part II, Chapter I of Law No. 2005 / 007 of 
27 July 2005 outlines the functions of the Judicial Police in Cameroon. Section 
78 of the law states that ―the duties of the judicial police shall be performed 
under the supervision of the State Counsel by judicial police officers, judicial 
police agents and all other civil servants or persons to whom judicial police 
duties are assigned‖.  
 
The law also outlines a rather wide category of officials who shall have the 
status of judicial police. These include officers of the gendarmerie, police 
superintendents and public servants temporarily performing the functions of 
head of an external service of national security. Sections 82 to 91 outline the 
duties of the judicial police. They include the following: investigating offences; 
collecting evidence; identifying offenders and accomplices and bringing them 
before the legal department; executing warrants and court decisions; checking 
the identity and situation of any suspected person and where necessary may 
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detain him in a special police custody for no longer than 48 hours; forwarding 
daily, a list of persons detained at their police stations to the competent State 
Council; and conducting search and seizures.   
 
Regarding the procedure for police investigations, the law requires that the 
judicial police may begin investigations following a written and / or oral 
complaint made to a relevant competent authority. Where a crime was 
committed, a judicial police officer is required to visit the crime scene and take 
measures to ensure the preservation of evidence. A judicial police officer has 
the right to summon and question any person whose statement is likely to lead 
to the discovery of the truth. Section 92 (b) of law No. 2005 / 007 of 27 July 
2005 states that ―the person summoned for questioning shall appear and 
answer any question and if he fails to appear, the judicial police officer shall 
inform the State Counsel who may issue a writ of capias against him. Such 
person shall be brought before the State Counsel‖. Judicial police 
investigations also involve search and seizures on premises and to remand 
suspects in police custody for no longer than 48 hours renewable once. 
Investigators could also request the services of experts capable of providing 
assistance in an investigation. Section 122 of the law states that a ―suspect 
shall not be subjected to any physical or mental constraints, or to torture, 
violence, threats or any pressure whatsoever, or to deceit, insidious 
manoeuvres, false proposals, prolonged questioning, hypnosis, the 
administration of drugs or to any other method which is likely to compromise or 
limit his freedom of action or decision, or his memory or sense of judgement‖. 
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All judicial police case files are required to be forwarded to the State Counsel 
without delay.  
 
5.4.4 The State Counsel 
The State Counsel is a magistrate in charge of all criminal investigations in a 
sub-division in Cameroon. S/he exercises oversight over and is superior to the 
judicial police. Sub-Chapter III of Law No. 2005 / 007 of July 2005 outlines the 
functions of the State Counsel in Cameroon. The law empowers the State 
Counsel to direct the judicial police to carry out all investigations or any 
additional investigations which s/he considers necessary, issues warrants of 
arrests against persons suspected of having participated in the commission of 
a felony and if necessary, directly request the assistance of the forces of law 
and order. However, when a felony is committed flagrante delicto (where a 
criminal has been caught in the act), the State Counsel is the competent 
authority to carry out the investigation. In this case, the powers of the judicial 
police cease immediately the State Counsel arrives at the crime scene, unless 
decided otherwise by the latter. Moreover, the State Counsel could at any time, 
visit a police post or a gendarmerie brigade and verify the conditions of persons 
in custody. During such visits, Article 137 (3) of the law stipulates that ―the 
persons whose release he orders of his own motion or by virtue of an order of 
habeas corpus, must immediately be set free, under pain of prosecution for 
unlawful detention against the judicial police officers in charge of the police post 
or gendarmerie brigade where custody takes place‖.  
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Section 111 of Law No. 2005 / 007 of July 2005 requires judicial officers to 
report to the State Counsel and get authorisation before carrying out 
investigations in the sub-division. The public can directly access the office of 
the State Counsel either through written information, oral complaint or written 
report by a competent authority. Once an arrested suspect is brought by a 
judicial police officer before the State Counsel, the latter shall proceed to check 
the suspect‘s identity, interrogate him and if need be, place him under 
temporary detention or release him on bail with or without sureties. Section 118 
of the law also states that ―no person may be remanded in police custody for 
the purpose of criminal investigation without the written approval of the State 
Counsel‖. In the case of criminal cases, Section 141 of the law provides for the 
―State Counsel to refer the matter to a judicial police officer for investigation‖, 
―decide to close the matter and inform the complainant of his decision‖ or 
―decide to institute criminal proceedings against the suspect‖. In the case of the 
latter, charges will be brought against the suspect and the matter referred to a 
court of law.          
   
5.4.5 The Courts of Law 
Cameroon is both a bilingual and bi-jural state, with the latter defined by Marie-
Claude and Maries-France (2014) as ―the coexistence of two legal traditions 
within a single state‖. As a bilingual state, Cameroon operates under a bi-jural 
system, comprising of both the French civil law and the English common law 
(which arose out of the ashes of Cameroon‘s colonial experience). Following 
the defeat of the country‘s first colonial power (the Germans in 1919), 
Cameroon was divided between the British and French, with both colonial 
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powers implementing different administrative systems. While the French 
implemented the policy of assimilation and the French legal system of civil law, 
the British implemented the policy of indirect rule and the legal system of 
common law. Following the independence of French-speaking Cameroon in 
1960, a plebiscite was held in 1961 whereby the English-speaking section of 
Cameroon (which had been administered as an integral part of Nigeria), opted 
to gain independence by joining French Cameroon (Mbaku, 2004). The 
reunification of the French and British Cameroons in 1961 gave birth to the bi-
jural system.     
 
Article 37 of the 1996 Constitution of Cameroon maintains that ―the Judicial 
Power shall be independent of the executive and legislative powers. 
Magistrates of the bench shall, in the discharge of their duties, be governed 
only by the law and their conscience. The President of the Republic shall 
guarantee the independence of judicial power. He shall appoint members of the 
bench and for the legal department‖. The functions, power and privileges of the 
judiciary in Cameroon is further enshrined in law No. 2006 / 015 of 29 
December 2006 on the organisation of the judiciary in Cameroon. Article 3 
stipulates that the organisation of the judiciary consists of the following: 
Customary Law Courts; Courts of First Instance; High Courts; Military Courts; 
Lower Courts of Administrative Litigation; Lower or Regional Audit Courts; 
Courts of Appeal; and The Supreme Court. Article 6 of the law states that 




However, the same section also provides for private hearings by stating that 
―any court may, of its own motion, or on the application of one or more of the 
parties, order a full or partial hearing in camera of a given matter where any 
publicity thereof may undermine State security, public or morality. In such 
case, hearing shall not be opened to the public and mention thereof shall 
be made in the decision which shall be public‖. The Ministry of Justice 
exercises oversight over the judiciary in Cameroon. Article 8 of the law 
maintains that ―justice shall be administered free of charge, subject only to 
the fiscal provisions concerning stamp duty and registration and those 
concerning the reproduction of the records of proceedings for appeals‖.  
 
There is a multiplicity of courts that deal with different categories of cases 
depending on their gravity. At the level of the sub-division, there is the Court of 
First Instance, with the High Court and Court of Appeal at the divisional and 
regional levels respectively. The sub-division of Buea thus, has one Court of 
First Instance which is in line with Article 13 of law No. 2006 / 015 of 29 
December 2006. It is the most commonly used court in Buea due to its relative 
accessibility and affordability. Chapters II and III of the law outlines the 
jurisdiction of these courts. According to Article 294 of Law No. 2005 007 of 27 
July 2005 on the Criminal Procedure Code, the court of First Instance has 
jurisdiction over a case when it is ―the court of the place of the commission of 
the offence; or the court of the place of residence of the accused; or the court 
of the place of arrest of the accused‖. Also, the Court‘s jurisdiction covers 
criminal matters with punishable offences of between 10 days and 10 years in 
jail. It also has the jurisdiction to hear civil, commercial and labour matters with 
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damages not exceeding 10 million Francs (approximately 20 000 US dollars). 
Conventionally, judgments in a court of First Instance are delivered by a single 
magistrate.  
 
It was revealed that lawyers play a key role in court cases regarding 
representing their clients. Where a party to a dispute is unable to afford a 
lawyer, s/he could apply to the Legal Aid Commission and based on the merit 
of the application, a lawyer could be appointed to represent the individual. 
However, the law provides for legal aid to be provided in criminal cases to any 
accused who cannot afford legal counsel. When one is appointed in cases 
where an accused cannot afford, the appointed lawyer is paid by the state. 
Article 8 of the law, therefore, states that ―statutory fees and expenses of 
counsel and other auxiliaries of justice, the cost of prosecution and the 
execution of court decisions shall be advanced by the party for whose 
benefit they are incurred. They shall be borne finally by the party who loses 
the action, except where there is a contrary reasoned decision of the court‖. 
Lawyers, therefore, play an important role in, among others, defending 
their clients accused of criminal offences, representing clients involved in 
land disputes, drawing up deeds of sale, defending clients accused of 
corruption and representing others involved in civil suits.  
 
5.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER     
This chapter has presented the role of both Bakweri indigenous knowledge 
systems as well state-based structures in conflict transformation in the study 
area. It was observed that the most resilient Bakweri IKS given the 
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encroachment of modernisation and state dominance, is the chieftaincy. These 
indigenous structures play an important role in resolving land and marital 
disputes, the preservation of some Bakweri customs and the consolidation of 
social peace and cohesion among Bakweri people in particular, and the district 
of Buea as a whole. It was also revealed that given the nature of contemporary 
conflicts and the limited jurisdiction of customary law in Cameroon (which does 
not cover criminal cases), state-based structures play a more dominant role in 
conflict transformation in the study area. These institutions include the Land 
Consultative Board, the Senior Divisional Officer, the State Counsel, the judicial 
police and the courts of law.  
 
Therefore, community members involved in conflicts within the study area have 
a wide range of structures and avenues for conflict resolution. They select a 
particular structure largely based on ―their knowledge about the options 
available to them, their perceived likelihood of success, and their relationship 
with an opponent‖ (Castro and Ettenger, 2000). However, it is imperative to 
evaluate the efficacy of both these indigenous as well as state-based 
mechanisms in transforming conflicts in the study area.  This is the focus of the 
next chapter.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CHALLENGES OF INDIGENOUS AND STATE-BASED MECHANISMS IN 
TRANSFORMING CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS IN BAKWERI 
COMMUNITIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter Five, there is an abundance of both indigenous as well 
as state-based mechanisms of transforming conflicts within Bakweri 
communities. It was found out that due to the political and economic relevance 
of Buea, the city, in particular, and the region as a whole have over the years, 
witnessed an influx of migrants from other parts of the country and even 
beyond. Bakweri villages and towns are thus characterised by an assortment of 
cultural and linguistic groups, making the region a melting pot of cultures. As a 
result of this, state-based structures such as the Land Consultative Board, the 
Senior Divisional Officer, the police and the courts of law, have played an 
important role in the transformation of conflicts. That notwithstanding, Bakweri 
indigenous mechanisms such as the chieftaincy and the Malay have also 
played an important, albeit a lesser role in transforming community conflicts. 
However, several challenges were identified in this interface of both indigenous 
and state-based mechanisms in the process of transforming contemporary 




6.2 CHALLENGES OF THE CHIEFTAINCY AND ASSOCIATED 
INDIGENOUS MECHANISMS IN TRANSFORMING CONTEMPORARY 
COMMUNITY CONFLICTS      
As discussed earlier, the chieftaincy remains the most resilient traditional 
institution in contemporary Cameroon and Bakweri societies in particular. It was 
revealed that the strategic role of this institution is generally recognised and 
respected by both the Bakweri as well as non-Bakweri people. That 
notwithstanding, it was also  found that the nature of the state in Cameroon, 
coupled with the heterogeneous nature of Buea, in particular, and the entire 
region as a whole, have diluted the sacredness of the Bakweri chieftaincy. 
There are inherent weaknesses in the institution alongside other Bakweri 
indigenous mechanisms as a whole. These weaknesses greatly hamper the 
ability of these mechanisms to transform contemporary community conflicts.   
 
6.2.1 Appointment of Chiefs by State Administration 
A point of departure to these inherent weaknesses of the Bakweri chieftaincy is 
the fact that though the villagers of each Bakweri village are responsible for 
selecting a chief, the final arbiter in the appointment process is the state. 
Decree No. 77/245 of 15th July 1977 which governs traditional authorities in 
Cameroon grants powers to the Divisional Officer to appoint third class chiefs, 
while second class chiefs are appointed by the minister of Territorial 
Administration and Decentralisation. First class chiefs, on the other hand, are 
appointed by order of the Prime Minister. To further exacerbate the problem, 
once appointed, chiefs do not act independently of the state as they are 
considered auxiliaries of the administration. The relevant state authority could, 
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therefore, relieve traditional authorities of their powers as and where they deem 
necessary. Bakweri chiefs are thus inferior to and in some cases, puppets to 
state administrators. This reduces the social and cultural role of traditional 
leaders to merely a government institution (Mthandeni, 2002).  
 
Equally, customary law in Cameroon is subservient to common law which 
guides the operations of the state. Land titles, for instance, are considered a 
more legitimate claim to land before the justice system than ownership under 
customary law. It was revealed during focus group discussions that this lack of 
independence and the inferior status of Bakweri traditions vis-à-vis state laws, 
compounds the ability of Bakweri chiefs to perform their functions without fear 
or favour. This is because they can only survive if they operate within the 
dictates of the political elite. This is particularly applicable in the highly 
politicised system in Cameroon with deeply entrenched patron-client networks 
(Orock et al., 2015). Nyamnjoh (2003) maintains that as auxiliaries or 
administrative extensions of many post-colonial governments, chiefs have 
become ‗vote banks/brokers‘ for politicians keen on cashing in on the imagined 
or real status of chiefs as true representatives of their people. During the focus 
group discussions, it was also revealed that the level of cooperation between 
Bakweri chiefs and state officials greatly determined the level of powers 
wielded by chiefs.  
 
This was particularly applicable in the case of third class chiefs whose 
enthronement has to be endorsed and legalised by the Divisional Officer to 
whom they report. It was also discovered that there were instances where 
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some individuals were crowned as Bakweri chiefs by state administrators even 
though they did not qualify according to customary law. As one participant 
maintained, ―much of the land allocated through the CDC land surrender 
programme to Bakweri chiefs is shared between these chiefs and the 
administrators who appointed them‖. This reinforces perceptions that the 
institution is corrupt and incapable of transforming contemporary conflicts. 
Focus group discussions and key informant interviews revealed that there were 
several instances where Bakweri chiefs sold land to non-Bakweri natives. 
There were also allegations and even newspaper reports of Bakweri chiefs 
colluding with state administrators to sell CDC land meant for Bakweri 
indigenes. This created conflict between the chieftaincy, the state and the 
Bakweri people and undermines the capacity of these institutions to act as 
arbiters in land disputes.  
 
6.2.2 Educational Level of Members of Bakweri Traditional Authority 
The low educational level of most members of the Bakweri Traditional Authority 
has further compounded the efficacy of the institution to transform community 
conflicts. It was revealed that most quarter heads had not gone beyond primary 
school. Some of them, however, had extensive experience working for the 
government albeit with a standard six certificate. Most of the chiefs, however, 
had considerably higher levels of formal education (some of them have 
university degrees). There seems to be no correlation between levels of 
education and the interpretation of customary law. However, the fact remains 
that within contemporary Bakweri communities, there is a thin line between 
traditional institutions and state-based institutions. Since the two complement 
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each other, it is important for administrators in the traditional council to have a 
good understanding of the complexities of state administration.  
 
It was also revealed that most of the conflicts in the study area come from 
university students, university graduates, civil servants and business people. 
These people are very familiar with the functioning of state-based institutions. It 
was noted during the focus group discussions that most people, sometimes, 
tend not to resort to the Bakweri traditional authority for conflict transformation 
because it is constituted of ‗old‘ people who have limited knowledge of the law. 
Most of the participants during the focus group discussions maintained that a 
great majority of quarter heads were not familiar with modern information 
communication technologies. In order words, they were functional illiterates 
who possessed inadequate skills necessary to interpret and function in the 
rapidly modernised Bakweri society. As Phillips and Schweisfurth (2007:60) 
maintain, ―there is a positive relationship between an educated population and 
national development in all its forms, and that education can be used as a 
'weapon' against poverty and other forms of underdevelopment‖. The 
chieftaincy was thus, perceived as an archaic institution that was not 
conversant with the evolving developments of the modern world.       
 
6.2.3 Limiting Practices with Regards to Natural Justice of Equality and 
Fairness 
It was revealed that some aspects of Bakweri customary law are at variance 
with contemporary norms of natural justice. As stated by a key informant, 
polygyny, for example, is allowed in Bakweri customs on condition that the first 
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wife consents to it. Customary marriages are also expected to be registered at 
local councils run by the state for purposes of succession. Most of them, 
however, were not registered and people got married over and over under 
customary law without being divorced from earlier marriages. Moreover, if a 
Bakweri man marries a woman and later divorces after having about five 
children, custom requires this woman to refund the bride price. This practice is 
repugnant to modern principles of natural justice, good conscience and equity.  
 
Closely linked to the sexist nature of some aspects of the customs of the 
Bakweri is the fact that women are not, according to Bakweri tradition, allowed 
to be chiefs. It was observed during data collection that all the local chiefs and 
quarter heads were males. There was no woman who occupied any of these 
positions throughout the local communities. This reinforces perceptions that 
Bakweri customs are patriarchal and sexist and thus not in sync with 
contemporary values with regard to gender equality. Given this context, all 
female participants in the study maintained that they preferred the resolution of 
marital disputes through state institutions such as the court of law. This is due 
largely to the perception that Bakweri traditions on marriage practices are 
sexist and patriarchal. Participants maintained during the focus group 
discussions that this patriarchal nature of Bakweri customs generally prompted 
the majority of Bakweri women to seek recourse in state-based mechanisms as 
they believed that the latter is guided by the rule of law. As Boege (2011:451) 
maintains, ―custom is often pitted against women‘s rights and seen to be in 
conflict with women‘s aspiration for more equality and self-determination in 
many traditional societies‖.            
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6.2.4 Rent-Seeking in the Bakweri Chieftaincy 
The political and economic significance of Buea has transformed the region into 
a hub of business opportunities where rent-seeking and profit maximisation 
have become the norm. These changes have paved the way for the Bakweri 
chieftaincy to become a particularly profitable institution. This is particularly so 
because of the central role it plays in the transformation of conflicts related to 
land (land is a much sought after commodity in the region). Since the conflict 
resolution process has become an increasingly profitable exercise, it was found 
that at the community level, the outcome of the resolution of cases were largely 
determined by the size of one‘s pockets. One of the participants in the study 
maintained that ―Bakweri chiefs have become stooges to foreigners due to 
money‖.  
 
Focus group discussions revealed that problems were either settled based 
purely on pecuniary interests or on what is commonly referred to as a ―man-
know-man‖ basis. The latter refers to a nepotistic system in which the chief and 
his counsel would make judgements that were favourable to their cronies. This 
is compounded by the fact that Quarter heads do not receive any allowance or 
stipend for their role in conflict transformation. Instead, they rely on fines and 
donations from community members to sustain and enhance their offices. This 
also paves the way for rent-seeking. This personalisation of the conflict 
transformation process at the community level undermined the efficacy of the 
Bakweri chieftaincy, resulting in disgruntled parties resorting to recourse or 
arbitration in state-based institutions such as courts of law.  
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Numerous narratives were also advanced by participants during the focus 
group discussions outlining how Bakweri chiefs abuse their institutions and 
jurisdiction over community land to make profits and enrich themselves. It was 
also revealed that there were instances where chiefs had sold vast amounts of 
land meant to be distributed to Bakweri indigenes under the CDC land 
surrender programme. Participants also disclosed how Cameroonians in the 
diaspora would import sports utility vehicles and trade them in exchange for 
land. It was revealed that there were instances where land that had been sold 
to an individual, was resold to another party who offered to pay higher than the 
first buyer. In some cases, the money of the first buyer was refunded while in 
some cases, another plot of land would be given to the first buyer to 
compensate for the loss of the initial land. It was also revealed that there were 
situations where disgruntled parties took the matter to court.  
 
A case was reported of the chief of one Bakweri village who suddenly died after 
collecting millions of francs CFA from potential land buyers. It was revealed by 
participants during the focus group discussions that most of the potential 
buyers who had been promised land by the deceased chief had no verifiable 
receipts as proof of payment and they subsequently lost their money. These 
narratives are evidence that Bakweri chiefs and associated traditional 
institutions were keen on cashing in on their status as land brokers, making the 
institution a source of symbolic capital. This form of corruption is an entrenched 
flaw of the chieftaincy as it indicates that governance at the local level is not 
sufficiently guided by principles of accountability, transparency, rule of law and 
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genuine citizen participation (Kyambalesa, 2006). This practice of land sale 
undermines the cultural worth and sacredness of the Bakweri chieftaincy since 
the institution is generally perceived as merely a gateway to self-
aggrandisement and self-enrichment. This has greatly undermined its capacity 
and potential as a neutral and sacred arbiter in contemporary conflict 
transformation.     
 
6.2.5 The Impact of Community Heterogeneity on Bakweri Culture 
It was revealed that the efficacy of the Bakweri chieftaincy in transforming 
contemporary conflicts is compounded by the heterogeneity of local 
communities in Buea. As discussed in Chapter Four, the encroachment of 
globalisation into local Bakweri communities has made the district a melting pot 
of cultures. As a key informant noted, the Bakweri people are so few that some 
of their villages have been taken over by non-indigenes. For instance, it was 
revealed that Bakweri people only make up about 20 per cent of one of the 
villages known as Tole. As a result, the local chief of Tole does not have 
authority over the majority of the people. It is the majority that may decide to 
respect the chief or not. This has diluted Bakweri indigenous knowledge 
systems. One participant even maintained that ―civilisation has impregnated 
Bakweri culture‖. As postulated by the modernisation theory, African indigenous 
knowledge systems would fade away and Western science and logic will 
replace African customs and traditions (Chazan et al., 1999). It was noted 
during the focus group discussions that there was a general agreement among 
participants that Bakweri customs and traditions are not as influential in 
contemporary times as they used to be.  
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For instance, key informants revealed that in the past, it was a taboo to shake 
the hands of a Bakweri chief as they were customarily greeted with a bow. It 
was observed that this was no longer the case as even the researcher shook 
the hands of some Bakweri chiefs. This practice is still strictly observed in the 
more conservative chiefdoms in the neighbouring North West Region of 
Cameroon, which still predominantly retains a strong adherence to traditional 
practices. Furthermore, the Bakweri chiefs were expected to maintain a certain 
demeanour and always to dress in traditional attire when in public. The 
traditional attire consists of a loincloth called sanjah, which is tied around the 
waist, a white long sleeve shirt and a specially designed traditional cap weaved 
with fibrous materials and adorned with beads.  
 
According to the key informants interviewed during the study, the loincloth and 
white shirt (which are the traditional attire of the Bakweri people) were 
introduced during the advent of European imperialism. This is in sharp contrast 
to the neighbouring North West Region of Cameroon whose people still retain a 
traditional wear which is distinctive to their indigenous culture. This is an 
indication that colonisation eroded certain aspects of the culture of the Bakweri 
people. Some participants also lamented what they considered a corrosion of 
Bakweri indigenous knowledge systems, citing examples of how Malay 
traditional dancers at times consumed alcohol on the night of the dance, which 
was contrary to the spirit of the Malay. The efficacy of the people‘s indigenous 
knowledge systems such as the chieftaincy, the Malay and the Pala-Pala 
dance have thus been greatly eroded by modern state-based structures.      
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Due to the heterogeneous nature of the study area and the encroachment of 
globalisation, it was revealed that non-Bakweri people would prefer to resort to 
state-based institutions for conflict transformation. Most of these non-indigenes 
were of the view that the role of the Bakweri chieftaincy should be limited to 
traditional or cultural matters only. This is rather surprising as some of the 
quarter heads were non-Bakweri people. When probed further, participants 
declared that even in cases where some quarter heads were non-Bakweri 
people, they still have to report to the chief who is always a Bakweri person. 
The non-utilisation of indigenous structures was particularly obvious in conflicts 
between Bakweri people and non-Bakweri people. It was revealed during the 
focus group discussions that where the financial status of the parties to a 
dispute was equal, non-Bakweri people would always prefer to seek recourse 
in state-based institutions. As a key informant remarked, ―it is highly unlikely for 
a non-native to win a case against a Bakweri man if the matter is handled by a 
Bakweri chief. After all, it is in the nature of men to give preference to their own 
ethnic group‖. It is with such common perceptions among the majority of non-
Bakweri people in the study communities that courts of law, for instance, are 
usually flooded with cases on land disputes.     
  
6.2.6 The Impact of Pentecostalism  
The efficacy of Bakweri IKS in transforming contemporary conflicts and 
enhancing social peace has also been compounded by the spread of 
Christianity. Information obtained from key informants (including local chiefs 
and quarter heads) revealed that all participants identified themselves as 
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Christians. This was not a surprise to the researcher given the proliferation of 
Pentecostal churches and established mission churches such as Baptist, 
Catholic and Presbyterian in the study area. It was also observed that there 
was widespread religiosity within the study area and an almost standard 
response to a question like ―How are you doing?‖ would elicit a response like 
―I‘m fine by the grace of God‖. This piousness was also evident, especially on 
Sundays with the massive church attendance in most of the Christian churches 
in the study area.  
 
Participant observation (through interaction with community members) revealed 
that labelling oneself as anything other than a Christian could easily result in an 
individual being branded as a follower of Satan. Even participants who admitted 
to practising indigenous traditions such as those who occasionally partook in 
the elephant dance, also maintained that they were Christians. This view is 
supported by Eko (2004) who argues that the Maalé secret society survives in 
less than ten Bakweri villages because the Christian missionaries who started 
missions in Bakweri land (Baptists, Catholics and Presbyterians) generally 
considered the Maalé and the Nganya as heathen cults that were sending their 
adherents straight to hell. Within this context, it was noted through focus group 
discussions that such indigenous practices are gradually fading away as they 
were increasingly associated with demon worship, due to their metaphysical 
nature.  
 
This widespread religiosity and steadfastness in church-going within the study 
area is actually an irony as it was observed that it was not necessarily 
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translated into virtues such as tolerance, compassion, forgiveness and peace. 
The researcher noted that the vast majority of participants had been involved in 
some sort of illicit activity such as fake documentation, bribery and cheating. It 
was also noted that Internet scams, the sale of fake land as well as the 
proliferation of taverns where alcohol was drunk until stupor and transactional 
sex were very common in the study area. When questioned about the low 
levels of spirituality in the area despite the fact that most people attend church, 
one participant remarked as follows:  ―a church is not a fellowship of saints but 
a hospital for sinners‖. It was thus deduced that the church was not necessarily 
perceived as an avenue for reform and positive transformation within the study 
communities. Rather, it was perceived as a platform wherein tithes were paid 
on Sundays, and ―men of God‖ would pray for forgiveness of sins and 
performance of miracles without any form of atonement, repentance or 
deliverance. It was thus observed that in spite of the proliferation of churches, 
crimes such as robbery, Internet scams and forgery were still widespread in the 
study area.        
 
6.2.7 The Upsurge of Contemporary Forms of Crime 
The upsurge of contemporary forms of crime challenges the traditional capacity 
of Bakweri indigenous mechanisms in transforming contemporary community 
conflicts. Decree No. 77/245 of 15th July 1977 which outlines the powers 
conferred by law on Bakweri traditional authorities, limits the jurisdiction of the 
chieftaincy to civil cases. Though traditional authorities in Cameroon were 
required to assist the state in resolving conflicts, they, on their own, are not 
allowed to pass judgments on any party to a dispute. In this light, the Bakweri 
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chieftaincy could only make non-binding rules and recommendations which 
could be easily ignored or challenged by parties to a conflict. The only forms of 
punishment that could be meted out were fines such as alcohol, goats, 
chickens and requesting an individual to be absent from certain social or 
cultural events. The complex nature of some conflicts such as cyber-crime, 
armed robbery and murder within the study area were outside the legal 
jurisdiction of the Bakweri chieftaincy.  
 
It was noted that contemporary forms of conflicts were on the rise in the study 
area. As discussed in Chapter Four, the economic and political significance of 
Buea has transformed the region into a strategic location for businesses to 
flourish. This has also come along with both blue and white collar crimes such 
as armed robbery, corruption and cyber fraud. Due in part to the localised 
nature of Bakweri traditional authorities and their limited jurisdiction to civil 
cases, they are not capable of transforming such conflicts. It was noted that 
armed gang attacks on business premises and on private university hostels 
were common in the study area. An interview with a key informant revealed that 
the chieftaincy is not equipped with the forensic technology and investigative 
skills required to tackle such complex forms of contemporary conflicts. It was 
noted during the interviews that most quarter heads were elderly people with 
low levels of formal education and limited knowledge of modern information 
communication technologies. Due to the upsurge of such cases in the study 
area, the Bakweri chieftaincy was by and large, an irrelevant mechanism in the 
transformation of these forms of contemporary conflicts. These cases fall within 
the jurisdiction of the state.   
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6.3 LIMITATIONS OF STATE-BASED MECHANISMS IN TRANSFORMING 
CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY CONFLICTS     
As noted in the previous section, Bakweri indigenous mechanisms are 
handicapped by the multiplicity of challenges in their attempts to transform 
contemporary community conflicts. Given these challenges, it was observed 
that state-based mechanisms play an important and more dominant role in the 
transformation of contemporary conflicts within Bakweri communities. This 
does not mean, however, that they are without challenges. Several challenges 
were identified that taint the state‘s capacity to effectively and sustainably 
transform conflicts in the study area. These challenges are discussed below. 
 
6.3.1 Multiplicity of Administrative Regimes 
A point of departure to these inherent weaknesses of state-based mechanisms 
is with regard to the state itself in Cameroon. It was noted during focus group 
discussions that state-based structures such as the police, the courts of law 
and the office of the Divisional Officer were laden with extreme administrative 
red tape. Participants, for instance, explained that due to numerous 
adjournments, cases in a court of law, for example, could easily take up to five 
years to be resolved, reinforcing the maxim that ―justice delayed is justice 
denied‖. This government bureaucracy is rooted in the highly centralised state 
apparatus in Cameroon. The government operates under an administrative-
hegemonic regime type characterised by a centralised executive bureaucracy. 
Rule by decree emanating from the presidency is common and all political 
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operations and decision-making are guided by the executive. This government 
bureaucracy has led to duplication of functions, waste of time and resources 
and consequently, inefficiency. Evidence of administrative red tape was noted 
in the complicated and cumbersome process of obtaining a land certificate, for 
example. Javelle (2013) maintains that government departments are 
characterised by poor record-keeping and document management in 
responsible government departments, incomplete geographic information, and 
the use of different spatial referencing systems. This has resulted in 
overlapping land titles which were often challenged in the court, resulting in the 
cancellation of titles. 
 
This centralisation of powers around the executive stationed in the capital city 
of Yaounde is thus a hindrance to the state‘s capacity to efficiently transform 
conflicts within the study area. It also undermines attempts to advance an 
endogenous approach to conflict transformation as indigenous structures are 
dominated by the state. It was revealed through focus group discussions that in 
a country where the president ruled by decree, most instructions affecting all 
spheres of government were issued from the centralised bureaucracy. The 
powers of the centralised state are wide-ranging from conducting elections to 
the appointment of all civil servants, including local chiefs. This has left Bakweri 
traditional structures with little or no powers to effect any meaningful change at 
the community level. This situation has transformed the country into a neo-
patrimonial and authoritarian state (Konings, 2011). This red tape is evident in 
the multiplicity of state-based structures in transforming conflicts in the study 
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area. Their roles are often interwoven, duplicated and consequently, not 
understood by the majority of community members.  
 
For example, a key challenge raised by participants during the focus group 
discussions as well as by key informants during interviews was the multiplicity 
of law enforcement regimes in the study area in particular, and the country as a 
whole. With regard to opening a case docket for investigation, complainants 
had the option of either resorting for recourse at the police station or the 
gendarmerie. The police force is almost exclusively for the maintenance of 
domestic law, order and administration. The gendarmerie is a Para-military 
force that has the dual mandate of being both a military and a civilian force. 
Key informants revealed that about 30 per cent of the gendarmerie is made up 
of a civilian division as the force is often tasked with investigating criminal 
cases. The other 70 per cent is the defence force which is responsible for 
border patrol and wars. Following investigations, both the gendarmerie and the 
police are required to obtain a warrant from the state counsel before any 
arrests could be made. It was also noted that another Para-military force 
(known as the Rapid Intervention Battalion commonly known as BIR), was also 
involved in the maintenance of law and order. Key informants indicated that the 
force was created in 2001 to tackle criminal gangs and highway robbers in the 
Northern parts of the country. However, the researcher noted that the Battalion 
conducted regular patrols in the study area during the data collection phase.      
 
Given the above, it was noted during focus group discussions that there was a 
lack of understanding and uncertainty among community members regarding 
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which state mechanisms to use in the transformation of community conflicts. 
Even though one key informant argued that the jurisdiction of the gendarmerie 
was limited to criminal cases (where firearms were used), some participants 
argued that it was entirely up to a complainant to choose which structures to 
use. It was also noted that complainants sometimes directly obtained warrants 
of arrest from the office of the State Counsel, thereby bypassing both the 
gendarmerie and the police. This ambiguity and duplication of functions of 
these state structures undermined their capacity to sustainably transform 
community conflicts.  
 
6.3.2 The Cost of Red Tape 
Bozeman (2000:12) highlights the corrosive effects of bureaucracy on 
government‘s performance and argues that red tape involves ―rules, 
regulations, and procedures that remain in force and entail a compliance 
burden but [do] not advance the legitimate purposes the rules were intended to 
serve‖. As noted above, the entire civil service in Cameroon is laden with 
extreme red tape. This has led to waste of time and consequently, more 
expense incurred by parties to a dispute as per the maxim ―time is money‖. For 
instance, it was revealed by key informants that the process of obtaining a land 
certificate involved time-consuming processes from the cadastral survey by the 
Land Consultative Board, through the office of the Senior Divisional Officer to 
the chief of the Provincial Service of Lands and the Central Service of Land in 
Yaounde. It was revealed that this process could take up to five years for such 
certificate to be issued. This process involves considerable cost to the applicant 
as on numerous occasions, state officials in the relevant offices have to be 
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bribed to ―facilitate‖ the processing of the application. This is in sharp contrast 
to traditional Bakweri structures where registration of land simply involves the 
chieftaincy. Key informants also revealed that in order for an employee to be 
integrated into the Civil Service, the individual has to compile relevant 
documents and send to Yaounde, the political capital, for processing. It was 
common knowledge that these documents could take several years to be 
finalised during which time the concerned individual would be working without 
pay. The same procedure is applicable for the payment of pensions where 
retired civil servants spend years, frequently travelling to Yaounde to ―chase‖ 
the release of their pension money.   
 
Additionally, a particularly costly practice which most participants in the study 
area considered as attempts by a predatory state to milk its citizens of income 
is the requirement to certify documents for all official purposes. Certified 
documents are needed, for instance, for applications to all state institutions, 
including public examinations. They are also required to be affixed on birth 
certificates, certificates of non-conviction, application for vehicle licencing, 
identity cards, passports, the issuance of land certificates, among others. At 
times, applicants are required to certify documents from a birth certificate to 
copies of all degrees, including a ―certificate of attestation of a true copy of all 
certificates‖. To certify each document, an applicant needs to purchase a fiscal 
stamp which ordinarily, costs 1000 FCFA (which is approximately two dollars) 
each, if purchased at the Treasury. These processes make compiling 
documents in Cameroon a particularly costly exercise. Due to the high costs 
involved, the certification exercise is often shrouded in corruption. It was 
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observed that some government officials at police stations and in the office of 
the Senior Divisional Office, for instance, sell fiscal stamps to the public at 
higher costs. Key informants also maintained that lawyers, for instance, would 
at times, request for cases to be adjourned, with the expectation that their fees 
would increase the longer a case takes to be resolved. This high expense 
involved in utilising state structures was a drain of financial resources and 
thereby, not a sustainable solution to the transformation of community conflicts.  
 
6.3.3 Dominance of the French Bureaucratic System  
The centralised bureaucracy of Cameroon is dominated by the French system 
even though Bakweri local communities are English-speaking. It was noted that 
several French-speaking administrators were appointed to work in the study 
area. For instance, key informants maintained that there were several French-
speaking judges with little or no knowledge of the English language working 
within Bakweri communities. On numerous occasions, they delivered 
judgments in French to parties to a dispute who had little or no understanding 
of the language. This has usually elicited severe criticisms from local 
community members who argue that these are attempts by the French-
dominated government to assimilate the English-speaking community. Such 
concerns have long been reiterated by a secessionist group called the 
Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) (formed in 1995 with the aim of 
restoring the Federated state or the secession of Anglophone Cameroon from 
the Republic) (Jua, 2004:327).  
 
 165 
It was noted during focus group discussions that this is a decades-old 
perception which authors such as Konings (2003:80) have referred to as an 
―onslaught by the Francophone-dominated post-colonial state on Anglophone 
identity and colonial heritage‖, including associate indigenous institutions. 
There have even been moves from the Ministry of Higher Education to 
harmonise all academic programmes at state universities in the country, 
including those of the University of Buea. Key informants also reiterated that 
there were attempts underway by the government to subvert the English 
common law system within Bakweri communities in favour of the French civil 
law system. Differentiating between civil and common law, Yanou (2009:693) 
argues that ―the absence in civil law practice of oral testimonies by witnesses, 
cross examination of witnesses and rules against hearsay evidence which 
provide safeguards for the proper determination of cases under common law, 
devalues civil law practice in the eyes of English-speaking litigants‖. It was 
noted during data collection that top ranking politically-appointed state 
administrators in the study area such as the state counsel, the Divisional 
Officer and even the Governor of the region were all Francophones. Coming 
from a different linguistic and cultural context, these individuals had insufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the customs and traditions of the Bakweri 
people.                  
 
Information gathered from focus group discussions revealed that this absence 
of culturally-relevant state administrators undermined the community‘s trust in 
the state‘s capacity to transform contemporary community conflicts. This was 
partly the reason behind an ultimatum given by Anglophone lawyers to the 
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head of state in 2015, urging him to return the country to a two-state federation 
(Cameroon Postline, 2015). Anglophone lawyers argue that they were forced to 
make some submissions in French within English-speaking communities. They 
have also lambasted the appointment of French-speaking administrators with 
no working knowledge of English, to work in English-speaking communities. 
Some of these French-speaking administrators make speeches in French even 
though Bakweri communities are English-speaking. This goes against one of 
the maxims of sustainable conflict transformation which maintains that 
mechanisms of resolving conflicts should serve communities in a language 
which they understand.   
 
6.3.4 Big Man Syndrome and Nepotism in the Civil Service 
The nature of the Cameroonian Civil Service is also another key challenge to 
state mechanisms in transforming conflicts within Bakweri communities. It was 
observed that the civil service is characterised by the ―big man‖ syndrome. 
Hyden (2006) considers it as a highly personalised form of autocratic rule with 
little restraint from democratic institutions. It was observed in the study area 
that state officials generally exude an aura of self-importance and arrogance, 
leading to a culture of impunity in the civil service. Instead of working for the 
welfare of the communities, they have become bosses in their respective areas 
of jurisdiction and ordinary community members have to submit themselves to 
the dictates of these state officials. Officials in government departments, at 
times, snub and insult community members who generally queue outside 
government offices requesting for services. The masses were trampled upon 
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and attention was promptly given to the rich, influential or those who had the 
relevant connections.  
 
Middle and top-ranking police officers for instance, were observed driving 
around in police cars meant to be used for police business. On several 
occasions, the researcher observed police cars being used to transport children 
from schools and women from markets. Key informants informed the 
researcher that these were family members of police officers. The researcher 
also found police officers in police uniforms, consuming alcohol in bars in the 
study area. There was a general agreement during the focus group discussions 
that the private cars of these ―big men‖ were never checked during road traffic 
inspections. It was common for these cars to drive around without any form of 
documentation. This ‗big man syndrome‘ is very common in the study area and 
it has become standard practice for bus drivers to reserve a front-row seat in 
the vehicle for any law-enforcement officer. The presence of a uniformed officer 
of the law automatically prevents the vehicle from being checked by road traffic 
officers, who would simply offer a salute and wave for the vehicle to drive on. 
Such nepotistic system commonly referred to as ―man-know-man‖ within the 
local communities, is definitely a flaw in state-based structures.  
 
6.3.5 Underequipped and Low Pay Leading to Low Morale and Corruption 
in the Civil Service 
Inadequate infrastructure, it was revealed, constitutes another obstacle in 
discharging official duties in the study area.  Even though a key component of a 
state-based mechanism such as a court of law in conflict transformation is to 
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establish proof beyond reasonable doubt, it was observed that police stations in 
the study area lacked Western scientific equipment such as DNA testing and 
finger print machines. It was also observed that very few government offices, 
including police stations had computers, not to talk of internet connection. 
Finger print samples for instance, were highly centralised and collected at 
police stations and sent to the capital city (Yaounde) for processing. This time-
consuming process renders the state largely inefficient in transforming 
contemporary community conflicts.  
 
Moreover, due to the absence of a computerised data base, certificates of non-
conviction (referred to in South Africa as police clearance) were simply issued 
to all applicants immediately upon payment of the prescribed fee. No attempt, 
whatsoever, is made to verify the criminal status of the applicant. This 
underequipped nature of civil service was also observed in terms of the number 
of police stations in the study area. There was no police station in an area 
called Bonavada (an area comprising of about 13 Bakweri villages). During the 
focus group discussions, a participant remarked that on several occasions, 
where the police were phoned to urgently address conflicts in some Bakweri 
villages, the callers were told by the police that there was no petrol in their cars 
to dispatch officers to the crime scene.   
 
This lack of adequate infrastructure is further exacerbated by the low pay rates 
among police officials. Key informants revealed that the salary of a police 
constable in the country is less than $200 per month. The low pay is translated 
into disgruntlement and low morale in the civil service, leading to widespread 
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corruption. A key informant maintained that some of the reasons for the 
endemic corruption in the study area in particular and Cameroon as a whole, 
were the low salary scales and low morale of civil servants. This view is 
supported by Kyambalesa (2006:108-19) who attributes the causes of 
corruption not only to governance not sufficiently guided by principles of 
accountability and transparency, but also to low pay, low morale and 
bureaucratic red tapes. These features were starkly evident in the study area in 
particular and Cameroon as a whole.  
 
Government bureaucracy was thus characterised by a patron-client network 
where state officials abused their offices for personal gain. Bribery and 
corruption were widespread from the office of the Divisional Officer, throughout 
the police force and associate state institutions. All participants maintained that 
state-based structures were mechanisms for extorting money from community 
members. For instance, there were widespread allegations of bribes being paid 
to government officials in the office of the Divisional Officer, either for the 
issuing of land certificates, or to influence the outcome of land disputes. 
Participants also maintained during the focus group discussions that it was 
common for rich and influential people to bribe law enforcement officials and 
request certain individuals to be arrested and detained. It was also a common 
phenomenon for law enforcement officials assigned to regulate traffic and 
ensure compliance with the rules of the road, to extort bribes from motorists. 
This is very glaring in the study area as the researcher personally observed 
road traffic officials soliciting bribes from motorists on several occasions. This 
endemic corruption by government officials is indicative of the fact that if the 
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situation is not addressed, state institutions will remain inefficient with regard to 
the transformation of community conflicts. 
 
6.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This Chapter has identified challenges to both Bakweri indigenous mechanisms 
as well as to state-based contemporary mechanisms of transforming conflicts in 
the study area. The multiplicity of challenges that impede the role of these 
structures in conflict transformation was discussed in the Chapter. With regard 
to the Bakweri chieftaincy, it was revealed that the appointment of Bakweri 
chiefs by a politicised state administration, coupled with the low levels of 
education of quarter heads in the study area, constitute obstacles to efficient 
conflict transformation. It was also revealed that some aspects of Bakweri 
customs (for instance, the treatment of women during divorce) could be 
considered as repugnant to contemporary principles of natural justice. Other 
obstacles to the role of the chieftaincy in conflict transformation include the 
heterogeneity of the study area which undermines Bakweri culture and the 
perception that the Bakweri chieftaincy has been reduced to a rent-seeking 
institution. The spread of Pentecostalism and the upsurge of crime were also 
identified as obstacles to the capacity of the Bakweri chieftaincy to transform 
contemporary community conflicts.           
 
In spite of these shortcomings of Bakweri indigenous mechanisms, the 
numerous challenges faced by state-based structures in transforming 
contemporary conflicts in the study area were also discussed. It was observed 
that several administrative regimes have been put in place resulting in the 
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duplication of functions and wastage of state resources. Also, these state-
based structures were dominated by French-speaking administrators, who 
often operated in the French language (which is not properly understood by 
most community members). In addition, the politicised civil service was largely 
characterised by the ―big man‖ syndrome wherein power and wealth were 
abused for personal gains leading to nepotism within state-based structures. 
Moreover, the underequipped state structures were staffed by lowly paid staff, 
resulting in low staff morale, corruption and an overall high cost for parties 
seeking recourse in state-based structures. Given these challenges, it is 
imperative to advance recommendations in this study on how the Bakweri 
chieftaincy and associated indigenous mechanisms could be interfaced with 
state-based contemporary institutions to effectively and sustainably transform 
contemporary conflicts within the study area.        
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to investigate the relevance of African Indigenous 
Knowledge Systems (AIKS) in Contemporary Conflict Transformation with 
specific reference to the chieftaincy of the Bakweri people of the South West 
Region of Cameroon. The specific objectives were to: investigate the types of 
conflicts among Bakweri communities of the South West region of Cameroon; 
analyse the role of the Bakweri chieftaincy in the transformation of 
contemporary conflicts; examine state-based structures and mechanisms used 
to transform these conflicts; and discuss the limitations of the Bakweri 
chieftaincy and associated indigenous mechanisms as well as state-centred 
mechanisms in transforming contemporary community conflicts. 
 
It was revealed that even though there were various contemporary conflicts 
within Bakweri communities, the most prominent among them is land dispute. 
The centrality of land to conflicts within these communities is due to the fact 
that the socio-economic and traditional values of the communities are hinged 
on agriculture. Even contemporary business activities were based on land 
issues. The region attracts not just economic migrants seeking to cultivate the 
region‘s fertile volcanic soils and work in plantations, but also civil servants 
deployed by the state to work as administrators within Bakweri communities. In 
addition, Buea also plays host to one of the country‘s only two Anglo-Saxon 
universities, thereby, attracting students from across the country and beyond. 
The city is a key hub for business opportunities, with numerous investors 
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procuring land to construct hostels for the growing population. Moreover, the 
CDC land surrender programme, led to the release of thousands of hectares of 
land to Bakweri chiefs meant to be distributed to Bakweri people. Due to the 
small number of Bakweri people vis-à-vis the surrendered land, coupled with 
the profitability of the sale of land (which was a hotly sought-after commodity), 
most of the local chiefs have embarked on an unscrupulous sale of land to non-
Bakweri people. Conflicts, therefore, arose between the Bakweri people and 
the local chiefs due to the sale of land meant for distribution to Bakweri people. 
Conflicts also emanate from the fraudulent sale of the same piece of land to 
multiple buyers and the sale of land by illegal owners who are out to dupe 
unsuspecting potential investors. 
 
Another type of conflict within Bakweri communities has to do marital disputes. 
It was revealed that the patriarchal and sexist nature of Bakweri traditions are 
some of the major causes of disputes within the study area. Bakweri women 
were customarily, not allowed to be chiefs while the men were allowed by 
custom, to get married to more than one wife. Moreover, the payment of a 
dowry upon marriage made most Bakweri men to perceive women as their 
property. Within this context of patriarchy, most Bakweri men either tended to 
involve in polygyny, or had multiple concubines, paving the way for infidelity 
and consequently, marital conflicts. These conflicts were further exacerbated 
by the fact that in contemporary times, Bakweri women, who were generally 
perceived as having a penchant for promiscuity, now have access to economic 
opportunities to take care of their needs. As a result, these women generally 
challenge the dominance of men and engage in promiscuous relationships. 
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Within the context of the patriarchal society, this was a sure recipe for marital 
conflicts such as divorce.      
 
Another key finding of this study is the fact that there were conflicts within 
Bakweri communities which arose as a result of the proliferation of Pentecostal 
churches. It was revealed that the majority of Bakweri people still observe 
customary practices such as language, dance and rites of passage with regard 
to marriage. However, it was observed that in spite of this, most community 
members still identify themselves as Christians. Key informants revealed that 
traditional Baptist, Catholic and Presbyterian mission churches which used to 
dominate within Bakweri communities had been overshadowed by the upsurge 
of Pentecostal churches. These convert-seeking churches condemned Bakweri 
traditional practices such as the elephant dance and traditional healers, as 
demon worship. They conducted night vigils and ministered through the streets 
with loud speakers. Since they operated in a highly unregulated environment, 
some of them extorted money from followers in return for promises of miracles. 
There were thus conflicts between these Pentecostal churches and those who 
are not swayed by their preaching.  
 
Another glaring and obvious form of conflict in the study is corruption. 
Considering the political and economic significance of Buea, corruption is 
endemic in the study area in particular and Cameroon as a whole (corrupt 
practices were evident in all facets of public life). There was a generally corrupt 
relationship between most local chiefs and state administrators in the 
procurement and sale of land surrendered by the CDC. It was also found that 
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road traffic officers extorted bribes from non-compliant motorists for offences 
such as driving un-roadworthy vehicles, driving without a licence and 
overloading. Also, services in all government departments were promptly 
delivered if the concerned official was offered a bribe. The widespread 
corruption has resulted in discontentment among community members as it is a 
form of structural violence, making these communities a breeding ground for 
conflict.  
 
Crime was identified as another type of conflict inherent within the study area. 
This is largely due to the fact that Buea is a hub of economic activities as well 
as the political capital of the South West region. Besides, the town also attracts 
thousands of students seeking to study at the University of Buea (one of the 
two Anglo-Saxon universities in the country). The growing and heterogeneous 
population, coupled with the proliferation of small businesses such as bars, 
cyber-cafés and clothing shops have become breeding grounds for criminal 
activities. Information obtained from key informants and through focus group 
discussions revealed the proliferation of online scams conducted within the 
numerous Internet cafés in the study area with the aim of duping unsuspecting 
investors of their money. Another form of criminal activity in the area was house 
robbery. It was very common for the rooms of university students to be broken 
into and their personal effects such as laptops, cell phones and money stolen. 
It was common practice for the public to take the law into their hands and 
commit crime (such as beating up suspected criminals, sometimes to death).                       
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With regard to the mechanisms used to transform these conflicts in the study 
area, it was found out that both Bakweri indigenous mechanisms as well as 
state-based mechanisms play an important albeit unequal role in contemporary 
conflict transformation. It was revealed that Bakweri indigenous structures such 
as the Liengu female and the Nganya male cults, as well as the Maalé played 
an important role in the conservation of Bakweri culture and in enhancing social 
peace. However, it was found out that these indigenous structures are 
increasingly losing their relevance as mechanisms of transforming 
contemporary community conflicts. This is largely due to the heterogeneity of 
Buea and the upsurge of Pentecostal Churches that demonise Bakweri 
traditional intuitions. In spite of this, it was revealed that the chieftaincy remains 
the most resilient and relevant Bakweri indigenous institution in terms of conflict 
transformation.  
 
It was further revealed that the law governing traditional communities in 
Cameroon entrusts the powers to appoint chiefs on a hierarchy of state 
administrators depending on whether they were first, second or third class 
chiefs. This classification is based on territorial, demographic as well as socio-
economic importance of the area of jurisdiction. The appointment, however, is 
done following the selection of the desired chief by the king makers of the 
village, usually according to the dictates of Bakweri customary law. Following 
the official endorsement by the relevant government official, the chiefs would 
then serve as auxiliaries of the state, and receive a monthly salary according to 
their categories. They are tasked with implementing state policy in terms of 
economic, social and cultural development at the level of the community. Their 
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roles also include assisting the state in the maintenance of law and order, 
collecting taxes and fees and to perform any other task as assigned by the 
relevant state authority.    
 
The selection of Bakweri chiefs is done along patriarchal lines implying that 
women are not allowed to be chiefs. It is customary for the throne to be passed 
from the father to eldest son. As custodians of customary law in the village, 
Bakweri chiefs play a very central role in all cultural, social and political events 
within the village. In order to facilitate this role, the chieftaincy is divided into 
quarters headed by influential and respectable men within the community and 
appointed by the chief. It was revealed that some of the quarter heads are non-
Bakweri people largely due to the heterogeneity of Bakweri communities. 
These indigenous institutions play a key role in the resolution of conflicts, 
especially with regard to marital disputes and land conflicts, as well as lesser 
issues such as quarrels, debt repayment and petty theft. Community members 
generally utilise these structures to resolve conflicts as they were speedily and 
timeously revolved. Besides, there is little cost involved, which typically, 
involves payment of fines such as beers, chickens and goats, or a modest 
amount of money. Moreover, decisions taken by the Bakweri chieftaincy are 
usually aimed at restoring relationships as it was common for parties to a 
dispute to be called upon to consume the fine meted out on the guilty party. 
This is also to ensure sustainable peace at the community level. Cases not 
resolved to the satisfaction of any concerned party at the quarter level, could be 
petitioned to the chief of the village, who would then make a final ruling on the 
matter at the village level.        
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On the role of state-based institutions in resolving community conflicts, it was 
revealed that there is an abundance of structures and that they play a more 
prominent role in resolving conflicts than the Bakweri chieftaincy and 
associated indigenous institutions. This is partly due to the nature of 
contemporary conflicts such as cyber-crime and armed robbery which are 
beyond the jurisdiction of the chieftaincy. It was also noted that the prominence 
of state-based institutions over the Bakweri chieftaincy is due to attempts by 
government to centralise political power around state bureaucracy. State-based 
structures are thus, more superior to indigenous structures. Within the context 
of the study, these structures include the Land Consultative Board, the 
Divisional Officer, the Judicial Police, the State Counsel and the courts of law.  
 
It was also found out that the Land Consultative Board is one of the most 
important state-based structures involved in the transformation of land disputes 
as it is the main legal instrument in the regulation and acquisition of land within 
Bakweri communities. The Board works closely with local chiefs in initiating the 
process of the acquisition of land certificates as well as adjudicating land 
disputes at the level of the state. The Board is headed by the Divisional Officer 
who is the administrative head of the Fako division. The students revealed that 
Divisional Officers, (who are all appointed by presidential decree), are tasked 
with the daily administration of the Division. They perform duties such as the 
appointment of third class chiefs, settlement of land disputes, the maintenance 
of law and order and the execution of developmental programmes within the 
division.     
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Another key state-based structure that is instrumental in the transformation of 
community conflicts is the judicial police. It was found out that the judicial 
police, which include the gendarmerie, police superintendents as well as 
certain categories of public servants, have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal 
matters. The judicial police are tasked with collecting evidence, compiling case 
dockets, conducting arrests and bringing suspects to the courts of law for 
prosecution. The line manager of judicial police officers is the State Counsel 
who acts as a magistrate in charge of all criminal investigation and state 
prosecutions in the sub-division. The Sate Counsel is in charge of issuing 
warrants of arrest, ordering the release of detainees and referring cases to the 
courts of law for prosecution. With regard to the courts of law, the 
administration of justice within the study area at the state level is vested in the 
Court of First Instance, the High Court and the Court of Appeal. It was revealed 
that both private and state-appointed lawyers (through the Legal Aid 
Commission) play a key role in representing their clients. 
 
One of the major findings of the study is the fact that in spite of the important 
role which both the Bakweri chieftaincy as well as state-based institutions play 
in the transformation of contemporary community conflicts, these structures 
have a multiplicity of limitations, thereby, compounding their efficacy. One of 
the inherent weaknesses of the Bakweri chieftaincy is the fact that the 
appointment of chiefs in the study area and Cameroon as a whole, is done by 
the state. This makes third class Bakweri chiefs, for instance, subservient to the 
Divisional Officer who is tasked with endorsing their appointments and thus, 
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impacts negatively on their ability to act independently. The efficacy of the 
Bakweri chieftaincy is further compounded by the fact that customary law is 
inferior to common law in Cameroon. It was thus noted that the generally 
corrupt Divisional Officers collude with most Bakweri chiefs to sell CDC 
surrendered land, thus undermined the role the chieftaincy as a credible 
indigenous institution in contemporary conflict transformation.  
 
Also, it was revealed that the low levels of education of members of the 
Bakweri traditional council compounded its efficacy to transform contemporary 
conflicts. Most participants maintained that quarter heads, who are the first 
point of call with regard to dispute resolution at the community level, have not 
gone beyond primary school education. It was revealed that these indigenous 
structures were not a preferred alternative for conflict transformation among the 
vast number of functional literates within the community such as university 
students, graduates and civil servants. This non-preference for Bakweri 
traditional institutions among this category of people was partly because these 
institutions were perceived as being run by ‗old‘ people who had little 
knowledge of the law and inadequate understanding of the complexities of the 
modern world.       
 
This is situation was exacerbated by the general perception among participants 
that some aspects of Bakweri customary law are repugnant to the natural 
justice of equality and fairness. Specific traditional practices with regard to 
marriage are perceived as gender biased as they give privileges to men at the 
detriment of women. For instance, it was found that under Bakweri custom, 
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men are allowed to marry as many women as possible and upon divorce, a 
woman is expected to refund the bride price. Moreover, women are not allowed 
to be chiefs since the Bakweri chieftaincy is hereditary along patrilineal lines. It 
was also found out that the majority of female participants resorted to state-
based structures for conflict transformation thereby, undermining the Bakweri 
chieftaincy and associate indigenous institutions.  
 
Another key limitation of the Bakweri chieftaincy in transforming community 
conflicts is the fact that the institution is very corrupt and has been transformed 
into a rent-seeking organisation. The profitability of land procurement, coupled 
with the central role played by Bakweri chiefs in all land transactions, corrupted 
the chieftaincy and reduced it to an institution for self-enrichment. Participants 
disclosed that there were numerous cases of land transactions and land 
dispute settlements based predominantly on pecuniary interests and to a lesser 
extent, on nepotism. This inherent weakness of chiefs has further been 
aggravated by the impact of community heterogeneity on Bakweri culture. 
Bakweri local communities have become so heterogeneous that some villages 
are now made up of more non-indigenes than Bakweri people themselves. In 
this contemporary era of globalisation, this diluted Bakweri customs undermine 
the powers of Bakweri chiefs as modernisation replaced AIKS with Eurocentric 
institutions. It was noted that some practices that were traditionally considered 
as taboo, had become a norm within Bakweri communities. These undermine 
the value of Bakweri traditions with most community members resorting to 
state-based institutions for conflict transformation.   
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Moreover, the relevance of Bakweri IKS in transforming contemporary conflicts 
is compounded by the impact of Pentecostal churches. These churches 
demonise Bakweri indigenous practices such as the Nganya, labelling them as 
heathen cults. It was also found that since the majority of community members 
identify themselves as Christians, it undermined Bakweri indigenous practices 
as most community members resort to churches for miracles and deliverance. 
This neglect for Bakweri IKS is further impaired by the fact that contemporary 
forms of crime such as armed robbery, murder and cyber-crime are outside the 
jurisdiction of traditional authorities. These make state-based structures to 
overshadow Bakweri indigenous institutions in the search for sustainable 
solutions to contemporary conflict transformation.  
 
However, this dominance of state-based structures is not an indication that they 
are more effective in transforming contemporary community conflicts than 
Bakweri ingenious structures. In fact, it was revealed that state-based 
structures have a multiplicity of limitations in resolving conflicts within the study 
area. Primary among them, is the excessive administrative red tape 
characteristic of the civil service in Cameroon. The lengthy process involved in 
the adjudication of cases in the courts of law, the centralisation of political 
power, rule by decree and a multiplicity of law enforcement regimes as flaws in 
state-based structures to effective and sustainable conflict transformation were 
discussed in the study. These lengthy processes and centralisation of power 
have also led to significantly higher costs incurred by community members.  
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To further compound matters, it was further revealed that the civil service in the 
study area was largely dominated by employees from the French sub-system 
even though Bakweri communities are predominantly English-speaking. At 
times, French-speaking judges, for instance, delivered judgments in French. 
There are calls for the state to harmonise all academic programmes in the 
country‘s state universities. This has led to concerns among community 
members that these are attempts by the French-dominated state to undermine 
and eradicate Anglophone identity and heritage. The absence of culturally-
relevant state-based mechanisms is not a sustainable approach to 
contemporary conflict transformation within the study area.    
 
Another limitation of state-based structures identified in the study is the 
personalised and nepotistic nature of the civil service in the study area.  The 
study explored how government officials abuse power and state resources and 
generally exude an aura of arrogance and self-importance at the detriment of 
those whom they are supposed to serve. This is further compounded by the 
fact that state-based structures were generally characterised by underequipped 
infrastructure resulting in low morale and corruption in the civil service. 
Inadequate police stations, the absence of DNA testing equipment, computers 
and lack of internet connection were common scenes in almost all government 
offices in the study area. It was also revealed that the low salaries of 
government officials usually translate into widespread corruption in the civil 
service and the surest means of obtaining prompt services was through bribery. 
These underpaid government officials, generally extorted bribes from people 
they are supposed to be serving, resulting in widespread disgruntlement among 
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community members. State-based structures have thus become inefficient 
mechanisms in the sustainable transformation of conflicts within the study area.                                     
 
In conclusion, it is important to note that the Bakweri people of the South West 
Region of Cameroon have a rich history of indigenous knowledge systems 
which they have used in the past to transform conflicts. Cults such as the 
Nganya, the Liengu, the Malay along with its renowned elephant dance, have 
been instrumental in the maintenance of social peace and harmony within 
Bakweri communities. However, these IKS are withering away as they have 
been marginalised by the state in the search for sustainable solutions to 
transforming contemporary community conflicts. As Logan (2008:iii) maintains, 
―traditionalists regard Africa‘s traditional chiefs and elders as the true 
representatives of their people, accessible, respected, and legitimate, and 
therefore, still essential to politics on the continent‖. ―Modernists,‖ by contrast, 
view traditional authority as a gerontocratic, chauvinistic, authoritarian and 
increasingly irrelevant form of rule that is antithetical to democracy‖. However, 
both the Bakweri chieftaincy and state-based institutions have a dismal 
performance with regard to the transformation of contemporary conflicts within 
the study area.  This has created a tense situation of structural violence which 
risks escalating into violent conflicts if not timeously addressed. However, it will 
be erroneous to mistake the weaknesses of chiefs as individuals for the 
irrelevance of the chieftaincy as an institution. It holds great potential for the 
protection and promotion of culture, as well as for the sustainable 
transformation of contemporary conflicts. This is evident across numerous parts 
of Cameroon such as in the North West Region and the Grand North Regions 
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of the country where the people have been able to retain their powerful 
chiefdoms. Besides, traditional leaders across Africa generally command more 
respect among the wide majority of people than among politicians.        
 
However, there seems to be an increasing trend for Africa‘s IKS to be 
overshadowed by Eurocentric mechanisms in the search for sustainable 
solutions to conflicts. This is as discourses of modernisation have overtaken 
contemporary debates and dismissed AIKS as too primitive and archaic to have 
any relevant solution to contemporary conflicts. Even though AIKS have 
several limitations in terms of transforming contemporary conflicts, Eurocentric 
mechanisms have not offered sustainable solutions to the continent‘s 
numerous conflicts. It is for this reason that Afrocentric paradigms such as 
endogenous development and postcolonial theory advocate for a reassertion of 
AIKS as a key variable for sustainable conflict transformation on the continent. 
However, bearing in mind the fact that AIKS are not a panacea for the 
transformation of all types of contemporary conflicts, a more relevant approach 
should be an integral paradigm which recognises that one knowledge system 
should not be subservient to another. That notwithstanding, AIKS should be 
taken as a point of departure.              
   
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings and conclusions drawn from the study, the following 
recommendations are advanced: 
 It is imperative for the appointment of chiefs to be the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the concerned villages and relevant Bakweri traditional 
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authorities. This will give local chiefs, the flexible provision to discharge 
their duties without fear or favour as they will no longer be hired or fired 
by politicians. This will also ensure that chiefs are not left at the mercy of 
government officials. If this is done, it will assist in reducing collusion and 
the subsequent corruption between traditional authorities and the state. 
 It is important for local community members to perceive the chieftaincy 
as a sacred institution instrumental in maintaining peace and unity. In 
order to achieve this, Bakweri chiefs need to revisit their ethical practices 
with specific reference to the sale of land surrendered by the CDC and 
rent-seeking in the chieftaincy. Review processes could be in the form of 
workshops featuring eminent intellectuals and elites within Bakweri 
communities. These should be targeted at reforming local chiefs and 
changing negative perceptions of community members regarding the 
institution.  
 There is a need for the Bakweri chieftaincy to be more reflective of the 
challenges of contemporary times. In order to do this, there is a need for 
Bakweri chiefs to surround themselves not just with individuals who are 
conversant with customary law, but also with people who are well versed 
with the complex structures, processes and issues of the contemporary 
world. These are issues related to knowledge of common law and 
information communication technologies. This will go a long way in 
ensuring that the institution becomes relevant to the current generation 
of youths.  
 Given the heterogeneous nature of Bakweri communities, the chieftaincy 
has to focus on building a more cohesive society not just based on 
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customary law but also on common law. This institution should reflect 
the diversity of the society and serve as a key component of 
decentralisation. It needs to incorporate educated leaders capacitated 
with the powers to handle criminal cases and mete out judgments 
through restorative justice, taking into special consideration, the rights of 
women. The state needs to capacitate the chieftaincy to handle not just 
civil cases, but also criminal cases. In order for this to happen, the 
government needs to enact legislation that grants a new role for 
traditional authorities and empower them as a critical institution of local 
government and not merely as puppets of the state administration. 
 The government needs to recognise and preserve the IKS of Bakweri 
communities in particular, and English-speaking communities as a 
whole. There is a need to promote Anglophone heritage and to 
recognise the equal status of English and French rather than pushing for 
the French bureaucratic system to dominate even in English-speaking 
communities. This will go a long way in forestalling violent conflicts 
through the upsurge of secessionist movements such as the SCNC.    
 There is a need for an institutional overhaul of the entire civil service in 
the study area, in particular, and Cameroon as a whole. Government 
officials need to be held more accountable for their arrogant and 
apathetical work ethics through stringent monitoring and evaluation 
processes. This can only be possible through a commitment from senior 
ranking government officials from the president to cabinet ministers, to 
capacitate government departments with adequate infrastructure, reward 
public service excellence and punish dissident civil servants. These will 
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go a long way to foster a constructive attitudinal change in the public 
service and build trust and confidence in government.        
 
7.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY TO KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
The  study  contributes  to knowledge  production  in  the global pool of 
knowledge  with regard to contemporary conflict  transformation by advancing 
the  theoretical  premise that  while  it recognizes  the  importance  of  
advancing  Afrocentric paradigms in  addressing  contemporary  conflicts  in 
Africa, there  is need to  acknowledge that Africans live in diverse  ecological 
and cultural  environments. Under such diverse circumstances they face 
different life challenges including conflicts and hence develop specific 
knowledge systems to meet these challenges. These  specific  community-
based  knowledge  systems which we categorize as Indigenous Knowledge 
Systems (IKS)  need to be  researched and shared so that  they contribute to 
the  global pool of  knowledge. As already mentioned colonialism and other 
forms of western imperialism created a situation that Eurocentrism has   
dominated global knowledge and tends to universalise knowledge including    
experiences, practices and solutions to global issues from a western 
perspective.  It is on the basis of this  consideration  that  the study  undertook  
to  investigate the Indigenous  Knowledge Systems the   Bakweri People  of 
South West Cameroon on Contemporary Conflict  Transforming  
 
Opportunities for further research are also identified in the study. There is a 
need to investigate why and how the North West Region of the country still 
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retains strong chiefdoms and functional IKS in conflict transformation whereas 
those of the Bakweri people of the South West Region are withering away. 
 
It is also important to conduct research on the concerns raised by groups such 
as the SCNC and Anglophone lawyers regarding the marginalisation of the 
heritage of English-speaking provinces by the dominant French bureaucratic 
system. This appears to be one of the most potential sources of violent conflicts 
in the country.      
 
Moreover, there is a need to conduct research on whether attempts at 
promoting IKS and the rights of indigenous people have been translated into 
ethnicity, racism, xenophobia and the politics of exclusion of the other. This is 
as world politics appears to be moving towards conservatism with the United 
Kingdom, for instance, voting to leave the European Union following concerns 
about immigration. Moreover, American president, Donald Trump, has called 
for a ban on all Muslims entering the United States, for a wall to be built 
between the United States and Mexico and for the deportation of all illegal 
immigrants. Even South Africa has had a fair share of xenophobic violence, 
especially in townships with the government launching operation Fiela in 2015 
which saw the arrest and deportation of thousands of illegal immigrants. There 
is thus a need for further research to be conducted regarding whether there is a 
correlation between the promotion of IKS and xenophobia or intolerance.  
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APPENDIX TWO: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS ON 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AMONG BAKWERI PEOPLE – 
CAMEROON 
Dear Participant, 
My name is Valery Buinwi Ferim (213572245). I am a PhD candidate studying 
at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Howard College. The title of my research 
is: ―African Indigenous Knowledge Systems (AIKS) in Contemporary Conflict 
Transformation: A Case Study of the Bakweri people of the South West Region 
of Cameroon‖. The aim of the study is to investigate the extent to which the 
indigenous knowledge systems of conflict transformation of the Bakweri people 
are relevant to contemporary conflicts in the community. I am interested in 
interviewing you so as to share your experiences and observations on the 
subject matter. 
 
Please note that: 
• The information that you provide will be used for scholarly research 
only. 
• Your participation is entirely voluntary. You have a choice to 
participate, not to participate or stop participating in the research. 
You will not be penalized for taking such an action. 
• Your views in this interview will be presented anonymously. Neither 
your name nor identity will be disclosed in any form in the study. 
• The interview will take about one hour. 
• The record as well as other items associated with the interview will 
be held in a password-protected file accessible only to myself and 
my supervisor. After a period of 5 years, in line with the rules of the 
university, it will be disposed by shredding and burning. 
• If you agree to participate please sign the declaration attached to this 
statement (a separate sheet will be provided for signatures) 
 
I can be contacted at: School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-
Natal, Howard College Campus, Durban. Email: ferimflint@gmail.com  
Cell: +27 737 836 552 
My supervisor is Prof. Hassan Kaya who is located at the Research Office 
of the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville campus. Contact details: email: 
kaya@ukzn.ac.za   Phone number: +27 312601794  
The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact 
details are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Research Office, Email:  ximbap@ukzn.ac.za,Phone number +27312603587. 
 
Thank you for your contribution to this research. 
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APPENDIX THREE: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
I am a Ph.D. student in Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies in the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. I am currently doing a research 
project titled ―African Indigenous Knowledge Systems (AIKS) in Contemporary 
Conflict Transformation: A Case Study of the Bakweri people of the South West 
Region of Cameroon‖. This study is purely for academic purposes and thus, no 
harm will come to respondents from participating in this project. Your identity 
will remain anonymous if you desire. Also note that your participation is entirely 
voluntary and you are at liberty to withdraw your participation at any time you 
wish to do so, with or without specific reasons. Your subjective as well as 
objective responses to the questions below are important in the 
accomplishment of this study. For ease of reference, this discussion will be 
tape-recorded. This interview will take approximately 30 minutes.  
Are there any questions about what I have just explained? 
Are you willing to participate in this interview? 
 
__________________         __________________           __________ 








2. What is your Age Group? 
21 – 30  
31 – 40  
41 – 50  
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51 – 60  
61 +  
 








4. What is your Educational Level? 
None  
Primary Education  
Secondary Education  
Tertiary Education  
Adult Education  
 




Other (specify)  
 
7. What is your Employment Status? 
Farmer  
Teacher  
Government Employee  
Other (specify)  
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B. General Questions 
1. Questions on Types and Causes of Community Conflicts 
1.1. What constitutes a conflict situation in the life of this community? 
1.2. What are the different types of conflict which exist in the community? 
1.3. What are the main causes of conflicts in the community?  
1.4. How do contemporary conflict situations in your community differ from 
those in the old days? 
2. Questions on indigenous Conflict Transformation Principles and 
Mechanisms  
2.1. Who are those community members involved in handling conflicts in the 
community?  
2.2. Where do they learn the knowledge and skills of handling these conflicts? 
2.3. What indigenous mechanisms are in place to handle the different types of 
conflicts in the community to ensure that they do not take place again? 
2.4. What are the advantages of utilising these indigenous mechanisms in 
resolving conflicts in your community?  
2.5. What are the limitations of utilising these indigenous mechanisms in 
resolving community conflicts in modern times?   
2.6. What is the perception of community members towards these indigenous 
mechanisms of conflict transformation? 
2.7. How can these indigenous mechanisms of handling conflicts be improved? 
3. Questions of state-centred conflict transformation mechanisms 
3.1 What mechanisms does the government use in transforming conflicts in 
your community? Elaborate. 
3.2 How accessible are these formal conflict transformation mechanisms to 
community members?      
3.3 What are the advantages of these formal mechanisms to conflict 
transformation in your community?   
3.4 Are there any disadvantages to these formal mechanisms to conflict 
transformation in your community?  
4. Questions on interfacing both indigenous and modern state-centred 
mechanisms 
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4.1 In what ways can indigenous and western conflict transformation 
mechanisms be improved by combining them? 
Thank you very much for taking your time to answer my questions. 
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APPENDIX FOUR: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION SCHEDULE 
 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION SCHEDULE 
Name of community: .............................…….. Date: ...............…………………. 
Place of meeting: ...............................……….    Time: …….......................……… 
Introduction 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this focus group discussion.  
The purpose of this discussion is to understand your views and experiences 
about the role of indigenous mechanisms and their relevance to contemporary 
Conflict Transformation within your community. You have been chosen to 
participate in this focus group discussion because you are residents of the local 
community which have been chosen as the case study.  
 
Procedure: 
This session will take approximately one hour. All remarks made here will 
remain confidential and anonymous and will not be traced to individual 
participants. Your honesty and specificity will be much valued as they are 
crucial to the success of this focus group. Please provide examples wherever 
and whenever necessary. Feel free to share stories and personal experiences. 
As facilitator, I will be asking questions to guide the discussion, but will not be 
participating or offering my own comments or reactions. Please refrain from 
repeated what others have said. Rather offer your own unique view or 
elaborate on what others have said. If you hear comments or ideas with which 
you disagree, do not hesitate to explain your own viewpoint or opposing view. 
The idea is to hear everyone's opinion, not necessarily to reach an agreement. 
There is no correct or incorrect answer. For ease of reference, this discussion 
will be tape-recorded. To ensure high quality transcription, it will be supportive if 
you speak one person at a time, and try to speak clearly and with more volume 




The opinions and experiences documented in this discussion will provide 
empirical data on the nature and scope of conflicts within your local community. 
It will also generate invaluable inputs on approaches to conflict transformation 




During the discussions and recordings, you will be allowed to use aliases if you 
desire to remain anonymous. All recordings and transcripts will only contain the 
names that you chose during the discussions. You anonymity will be observed 
and respected through all stages of this research. 
 
Compensation: 
You will not be compensated for participating in this study. Light refreshments 
may be provided to ―break the ice‖ if the need arises.    
 
Freedom to Withdraw: 
You are free to withdraw from the discussion at any point in time without being 
prejudiced by the researcher.     
 
Consent: 
If you have understood the contents of this document and wish to participate in 
this study, kindly fill in your initials, signature and date at the spaces provided 
below. You will be provided with a copy of this form. 
 





__________________________  ______________________________ 
 
Date: ______________  
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APPENDIX FIVE: SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT 
NB: 1 is for interviewer and 2 for respondent.  
1: No harm will come to you as a result of your participation in this research. 
This research is being used mainly for academic reasons. Just in case you 
need to follow up, all the contact details of myself, my supervisor and the higher 
degrees committee are all on this form. This research has also obtained ethical 
clearance from the university of KwaZul-Natal. Let me not waste your time. 
Let‘s go straight to questions on this form. I have a checklist here that we will 
go through. Let me just say Respondent One. Gender? Male of course? 
2. Yes 
1. These days you have countries where there is bisexual, male, female, 
transgender but these are not allowed in Cameroon. 
2. yeah, it‘s not allowed. 
1. What is your age? 
2. 27th July 1956 
1. Marital status? 
2. Married with children. 
1. Your educational level? Primary, secondary, tertiary or adult education? 
2. Primary. 
1. Religious affiliation? 
2. Christian. 
1. Even though it is possible to be both an African and a Christian, hahaha! 
Your employment status? 
2. I work with the Ministry of Justice. 
1. Currently? 
2. Retired but I still work as part time. 
1. Still with the ministry of Justice? 
2. Yes, ENAP part time. That is the School of Penitentiary Education. 
1. Ok. Now we are going to go through these questions. What constitutes 
conflict in the life of your community? This community is basically called Soppo. 
What are the different kinds of conflict that exist in Great Soppo? 
2. We have – one of the common ones is divorce. 
1. OK. Just list them. 
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2. Quarrelling, land matters, some issues like for example if I give you 
something, deed of trust, and you fail. Betray someone‘s trust. I think those are 
the simplest issues in the community.  
1. Are the conflicts that exist today different from those that used to exist in the 
past say 20 years ago or has conflict changed over time? E.g. quarrelling and 
land matters, are they still the same today? 
2. There are almost the same but with a bit of difference. What I mean is that 
the native laws and customs are not really applied again because we have now 
the Brigades and all those kinds of things. People trans pass to go to the 
Brigade without going to see the chief of the community.  
1. Ok. But in terms of conflict itself, before we go to the procedures, are there 
the same things that used to happen or are there new forms of conflict e.g. 
corruption, cyber-crimes, are those things common in your community? 
2. There are very common. What has stopped is the stray of animals going into 
people‘s farms. Like we used to have a village a fence and people were 
assigned to take care of the fence. That is to tie it up so that animals don‘t go to 
other people‘s farms. Now when an animal trans passes and destroys, e.g. a 
pig, the animal is killed then carried to the chief‘s compound. Then the person 
who has the animal has to take part. The person who has killed the animal also 
has to take part. The person who‘s area of the fence the animal has passed 
has to be punished for not taking care but those things they no longer exist.  
1. What about witchcraft?  
2. Witchcraft is something that depends on the region. It originates from men. 
You know wickedness too is part of witchcraft. 
1. Ok. 
2. Those are the things that in those days we had our herbs. When they say 
you have witchcraft, they will go look for those hers, the village will be seated. 
They will squeeze those herbs and then you will drink. When you vomit, it 
means you are free. If you drink then your stomach swell, you do not vomit 
instead, you purge, they will then go and hang you up.  
1. So those things don‘t exist anymore? 
2. No they no longer exist because the law within the community has a limit 
now and people‘s powers to judge and kill are no longer there. There are courts 
now, but not even the Court of First Instance. Supreme Court or High Court 
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judge must take a decision. Those are the only Courts that can say kill and you 
can go on appeal. 
1.  Who are the community members who are involved in handling conflicts in 
the community? 
2. By virtue of what we call the organigram of the community, we have the 
Quarter and Chiefs. There is a difference between the Council and Judicial 
Council. You have a Quarter Council but there is a small community set aside 
to look into matters. For example if in judging a case of divorce, I will not take a 
person who has not been married. Traditionally, we do not take people who are 
not married. We need people with experience. But in court, you can meet a 
magistrate who is a bachelor or a spinster and will still try your matter. But 
locally we don‘t do that because we need your experience  
1. Ok. So basically within the community, those are the structures that are in 
place? 
2. Yes. Quarter heads and chiefs. Quarter heads try simple matters for 
example, if there is quarrelling or house rents, trespasses, you go to the 
Quarter head. If the Quarter head is unable to solve your matter, you can go to 
the Chief.  
1. So the highest structure is the chief? 
2. Yes, the chief who works together with the DO 
1 How many chiefs are there in Great Soppo? 
2. One and thirteen Quarter heads.  
1. These people who resolve these conflicts, where do they learn the skills in 
handling these conflicts? 
2. I like that question. The question is like when you go to the Court of First 
Instance, you can meet the magistrate who refuses to hear your matter 
because he is taking sides. Likewise too, in the quarter, being a quarter head 
does not give you the knowledge of procedures of matters or cases. So the 
Bakweri man has the choice of choosing where he has to go. For example, a 
women can divorce in Great Soppo and go to Ekona Lelu to sue the husband 
to come take his dowry. So the issue of divorce was in Great Soppo but the 
issue of taking the dowry was refunded in Ekona Lelu. So jurisdiction of issues 
does not matter to the Bakweri man. But in the Court of First Instance in Buea, 
for example if someone stole plantains in Buea, you cannot go and judge him in 
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Tiko. They will say the jurisdiction of the crime is in Buea. But with the Bakweri 
man, you can go anywhere of your choice. So the Bakweri man within the 
community for example you can be in Quarter 12 and you come and due your 
matter here, it will go. It‘s your choice but you cannot make an appeal in 
another Quarter. It has to go to the chief. You cannot leave the Court of First 
Instance with the same matter then you go to Tiko. You must go to a higher 
court if at all you are not satisfied.  
1. How are the Quarter heads appointed? 
2. They are appointed by the chief. 
1. Is it based on seniority, skill or is it up to the jurisdiction of the chief? Are 
there any criteria? 
2. There are criteria, the chief cannot appoint a drunkard, the chief cannot 
appoint a chief, the chief cannot appoint a banga (marijuana) smoker. You 
must have a good standing. You must be well known in the community and the 
community must also love you, otherwise when you call them for a meeting, 
they might not even come. You must be helpful to your community. Don‘t be 
too proud. You must be able to also judge cases fairly. You see a lady coming 
inside here. This lady was because of 1000FCFA, they nearly fought. Instead 
of the lady returning the money that she was given to plait a child, she took the 
money and ate it and was insulting the women. All attempts of taking back the 
money were in vain. So they had to approach my territory. 
1. That is the betrayal of trust that you were talking about earlier. 
2. Yes, that is right. I insisted that the money must be paid today and I had to 
remain with her phone so she should go and look for this money. That is the 
money in front of you. She tested the phone in front of you and I gave here 
back her phone. So that is how we operate on minor issues. 
1. Ok. Are there any advantages of using these local structures, indigenous 
mechanisms in resolving conflicts within your community? Are they advantages 
of going to the Quarter head of chieftaincy? 
2. When I say Quarter heads are the arms of the chief, that is to reduce his 
work. If you take Great Soppo with 22.000 inhabitants and maybe 1000 people 
have matters within the chief, we will be unable to solve the problem. So if the 
matters are within the Quarters, it reduces the work of the chief. If the person is 
not satisfied he could go up.  
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1. So it‘s some sort of decentralization and it can solve matters speedily.  
2. Yes. 
1. So do people prefer going to these structures or going to court? 
2. Sometimes if you go to court, they will send you back. If you start at the 
State Counsel or gendarmerie or DO, they will ask if the village has tried this 
matter before.  
1. Ok. So the preference is for you to start at the local level but there are 
obviously more complex cases that go to the courts straight. 
2. Very, very. We have cases that are above local level. We do not try criminal 
matters though sometimes we do. For example if a boy steals a banana in a 
farm, it‘s criminal though the case is not so strong. We can try it at the village, 
the problem is paying for that banana three times what he would have paid if he 
sold it at the market and then stop him from doing all those types of nonsense. 
1. So it‘s about correction? 
2. That‘s right. 
1. What are the perceptions of the community members about these 
indigenous structures? 
2. It‘s ok for them, you know. You think if there is an election today in this 
village, I will have 100 per cent? I am sure some people here today lost their 
cases and they hate me for that, hahaha.  
1. That‘s true. But just for the fact that they keep on using these structures 
means they appreciate. 
2. Yes, it calms down the atmosphere.  
1. Are there any problems say with the utilization of these indigenous structures 
as far as resolving conflicts is concerned? 
2. There are some colleagues who are not good in solving matters. They try 
but! You see, when you try a matter, try to look at the important matters. Give 
chances for cross examination, give chances for statements. What I am trying 
to say is intimidation. Maybe you forgot to. It‘s like that person only came to 
listen to you or the verdict which is bad by human rights. Give chance for 
someone to air out and ask him a few questions so that by the time they say it 
does not favour you, you yourself know where you went wrong. By the time the 
time you go to court, the examining magistrate will say I tried and picked one of 
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two points in my verdict and I will be proud. More especially the set-up of my 
work. 
1. What I want to find out is what are those problems? Is it that some of the 
people are not well-equipped with solving matters? 
2. That is right. If they go to the chief, their rulings are off set. But when you see 
a ruling that goes to the chief, maybe instead of 10.000FCFA, they have to put 
5.000 on top, it means I was good. I did something good. 
1. Ok. Besides the people who are not well equipped, are there any other 
problems that you think these structures are facing?  
2. Yah. They are facing some challenges. It is like a mockery when the chief 
changes their decisions. It means you did not know, you are not mature. What 
we are trying to do is to call all Quarter heads let us be together and learn one 
common system so that Great Soppo is one. I am not proud to be better than 
my colleagues that way. 
1. What about things like funding? Do you get any funding to run these 
Quarters? 
2. Not actually. Like you see, as a budget from the Council? No. You budget 
yourself, you know how to play your cards. Certain fees are fines. 
1. So how are the Quarters run financially? 
2. There a fines, sometimes contribution from the community members. That is 
why I said the Council must have mature people. Like when you talk to 
someone in the community to contribute, give sweet talk then you will get 
something. You don‘t just talk to someone rudely.  
1. Ok. So you don‘t get any grants from the state? 
2. No. It‘s only the chief who has a salary from the state if he is not a civil 
servant as per category of his rank. Maybe he is a first class, second class or 
third class.  
1. So the chief has a salary but the palace does not send any grants to the 
Quarters? 
2. No, they don‘t. Sometimes they give what is called incentives for cleanliness 
or the way he handles his Quarter. The chief might say this Quarter is good and 
gives them maybe 30.000FCFA and a diploma (award certificate) so that other 
Quarters can also do the same.  
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1. Since you are more versed with the indigenous structures, let‘s just quickly 
run through this other section. What mechanisms does the government use to 
resolve conflict in your community? 
2. We have the brigades whether they are police or gendermes, DO customary 
courts which is equivalent to the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal, 
High Courts, State Counsel office for convocations. 
1. Do people also choose any of these structures? 
2. Yes they do. Sometimes they blame them. What you are taking your friend 
up there is too small. When they bring the convocations here for me to go out 
and give, I call the two people back and ask the complainant do you accept me 
to try the matter between A and B, if the complainant says yes, I withdraw the 
disc and if the matter goes well they will not go up. If it does not go well 
according to his taste, he has the right to continue.  
1. So these state mechanisms, the police, courts of law, etc, are they 
accessible to the community members? 
2. Not actually as you think. You see corruption is everywhere. You see 
sometimes if you go to the police, somebody is owing you 150.000FCFA and 
the money is paid there, you hardly get the totality of that money back. Maybe 
the person is not willing to take a token, what I have done for you is good and 
maybe comes with a whisky than him to say I have worked for you so I have to 
take 25.000FCFA and you will take the balance because had it not been for 
me, you won‘t have got your money. Sometimes, after the bribe, they will put 
you in a cell to discredit you and come back to form a story. So that is some of 
the disadvantages of the government. Because the police have cell, they have 
the power no looking at the crime. Us here we say first to complain has the 
advantage.  
1. Are there any advantages of using the government? 
2. There are. Sometimes when a driver causes an accident then he disappears, 
it is for his safety. You go an meet him in a cell otherwise the community can 
use the jungle justice and hang him. Sometimes I also lock people in my 
parlour until I call the police to come and seize them so that the population 
does not attack. So we do something with a bit of knowledge and we are 
appreciated by the government.  
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1. So both the indigenous mechanisms and the state, do they work hand in 
hand? 
2. Exactly. 
1. Are there any possible ways to combine the two as a means of improving 
them or are they already combined, both state and indigenous? 
2. They are combined because we don‘t use jungle justice. If we use jungle 
justice, it means we have taken our decision and maybe that person is no 
longer alive. The government comes to say take him to the mortuary. No 
civilian will take the person to the mortuary because you will be questioned 
where you got this person from. So the police can do it not the civilian. So like 
me, when issues of either a thief comes here, no person has a right to touch 
that individual again. If you wanted to do it, do it where you were. Before me, I 
will not accept. Sometimes when you carry people here beaten by civilians, 
police refuse to take them that they must be treated first because they might 
die in police custody. So you carry the problem of treating him, either you take 
him to the hospital or treat the wound. 
1. So there is that collaboration? 
2. Yes there is that collaboration. 
1. Are there any areas which need improvement? 
2. Yes there are areas which need improvement because sometimes the 
population is above me, then I call the forces of law involvement. They don‘t 
come in time. I don‘t know whether we lack so many vehicles or elements. It is 
not me to recruit. We say that let them recruit. So many elements, the brigade 
should have many people working for them. If you go to these brigades on 
weekends, it‘s just two gendermes or three. It is not proper.  
1. Those are all my questions. Thank you very much for taking your time to 
participate in this study.     
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APPENDIX SIX: SAMPLE OF LAND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CASE 
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